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In one of Upton Sinclair’s Lanny Budd stories, a 
fictional President Roosevelt exclaimed to Budd, his Per­
sonal Representative to China; "Hi Marco Polo.... By 
golly, I can’t tell you how I have missed you." Sinclair’s 
Presidential Mission is of course fiction and his charac­
ters somewhat overdrawn, but his description of the affable 
and politically artistic Roosevelt is accurate; moreover, 
the characterization of Lanny Budd as a Presidential agent 
emphasizes one of the most consistent features of Roose­
velt’s administration: the use of the "Personal Represen­
tative" to implement foreign policies.
Traditionally, ambassadors and ministers have served 
as presidents’ representatives, but their responsibilities 
have centered on the day-to-day relations with a particu­
lar country and are generally guided by the State Depart­
ment. The Personal Representatives were unique, however, 
as they remained free from the official encumbrances and 
operated under instructions received directly from the 
White House. Further, the agents were not recommended to 




The urgent nature of the war, the distrust of the 
bureaucracy, and Roosevelt’s belief that his methods for 
success on the domestic political level— the direct per­
sonal. approach— would easily transfer to the international 
stage prompted Roosevelt to select several individuals 
to serve as his Personal Representatives, Most of these 
agents were New Deal politicians who lacked the diplo­
mat’s training and experience, but Roosevelt believed that 
the deficiency could be easily remedied by receiving in­
structions from the White House and reporting directly to 
the President. The agents included his personal adviser 
Harry Hopkins; New Deal economist Lauchlin Currie; 
politicians Joseph Davies, Louis Johnson, Patrick Hurley, 
Wendell Willkie and Henry Wallace; businessmen Myron 
Taylor, W. Averell Harriman, and Donald Nelson; and public 
servants William Phillips and Robert Murphy.
This study seeks primarily to determine the value of 
Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy as implemented by his personal 
representatives. Since Roosevelt’s preference for such 
extreme personal control of foreign policy was, in part, an 
overt demonstration of his lack of faith in the State 
Department, this study considers the impact of such an 
approach on that agency. Roosevelt’s willingness to risk the 
alienation of his own foreign office is not surprising when 
one considers that the wartime imperatives created special 
circumstances in which the end often justified the means.
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To Roosevelt, the larger objective of his diplomacy was 
twofold; to maintain the alliance between the United States, 
Great Britain, and Russia at all costs and to enhance his 
own image in the eyes of the American public. He felt that 
the personal approach was the only effective manner in which 
both of these objectives could be met simultaneously.
Aware of the high esteem in which the President of the 
United States is held by foreign officials as well as by 
the American people, Roosevelt saw the dramatic value that 
could be gained from dispatching the surrogate diplomats 
directly from the White House, If Roosevelt had any doubts 
about the practicality of implementing his program of Per­
sonal Representative diplomacy, they were completely 
assuaged by two additional important considerations. He 
could use the missions to pay political debts, and he could 
also remove from contention certain political aspirants and 
other "undesirables," Of course, much of the following dis­
cussion is devoted to the missions themselves, the roles of 
the individual agents, and their success or failures.
Since the emphasis of this study is on Roosevelt’s 
Personal Representative diplomacy rather than his overall 
wartime foreign policies, I have excluded from consider­
ation the Allied summit conferences. That aspect of World 
War II international relations was the ultimate in Roose­
velt's personal approach to American foreign policy; and 
he reserved that activity for himself.
Filmed as received  
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DECISION MAKING: ROOSEVELT, HULL,
AND THE "STRIPED-PANT SET"
CHAPTER I
While the main thrust in Franklin Roosevelt’s control 
of foreign policy emerged during the war years, the habit 
of close personal supervision appeared throughout the 
twelve years he served as President. A major character­
istic of New Deal decision-making in foreign policy was 
Roosevelt’s disdain for the State Department and his un­
willingness to view the Department as anything more than a 
clerical agency. Although the President often sought out 
the advice of experts for solving domestic problems, he 
virtually ignored the expertise available in his own State 
Department— an approach which became commonplace in Roose­
velt's conduct of American foreign policy.
Some observers of the Roosevelt administration noted 
the "inherently disorderly nature" of the New Deal and the 
"constant readiness for internecine strife" among Roose­
velt’s subordinates, but explained them as the President’s 
ways of testing and developing the abilities of his under­
lings. One must conclude, however, that his approach in 
the area of foreign policy was designed not so much as a
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means of evaluating his apprentices as a method of con- 
trolling foreign policy. By spreading responsibility for 
one area between two or more men, Franklin Roosevelt 
assured himself of a position at the center of the decision­
making process. This resulted In his receiving diverse 
views about American foreign policy— views ranging from 
politicians' recommendations, which were often Influenced 
by the voter's shadow, to the detached reports of pro­
fessional Foreign Service Officers who often described 
conditions and proposed policies regardless of their-Im­
pact on the public. Finally, the President's method of 
conducting diplomatic affairs became a means by which he 
could control and at the same time avoid using the State 
Department. The President's unwillingness to use the State 
Department and his consistent criticism of It reflect a 
deeply traditional and provincial American attitude toward 
foreign policy and the professional career diplomats.
First, the nation's Isolationist background prompted 
Americans to eye suspiciously a group that spent Its time 
developing policies for carrying on social, economic, and 
political Intercourse with the very outsiders that the 
American people sought to avoid. Second, from the early days 
of the republic, Americans viewed diplomatic negotiations 
as a waste of time— filled with too much talk, and not 
enough of the shirt-sleeved action that best Illustrated 
America's national virility. Thus, Roosevelt believed
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that a professional staff not accountable to the public, 
especially the dilettantes and striped-pant career men in 
the State Department, who would not be as reliable as 
advisers personally selected by the President. Once the 
United States became a belligerent in the Second World War, 
Roosevelt’s designs for consolidating his grip on foreign 
policy would be supplemented by the exigencies of the 
war— unavoidable circumstances which necessitated tighter 
personal control of foreign policy. Regardless of whether 
the motive was personal power or wartime pressures, 
Roosevelt’s method often produced an unsettling effect that 
resulted in a lack of interdepartmental coordination and 
the development of personal jealousies that hampered 
Roosevelt’s effectiveness as an international leader.^
When Franklin Roosevelt selected his Secretary of 
State in 1933, the decisions was not based on whether 
Cordell Hull had prior experience or personal ability as a 
diplomat but on his influence among Democratic politicians. 
The sixty-one year old Democrat served in the United States 
Congress from 1906 to 1933, as a Representative and
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New 
Deal, vol. 2 of The Age of Roosevelt (Boston; Houghton 
Mifflin and Co., 1959), 535-53^; Henry L. Stimson, and 
McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, c. 194Ü), 333; Julius Pratt,
"The Ordeal of Cordell Hull," Review of Politics. 28 
(January, 1966), 76-77; James M. Burns, Roosevelt; The 
Lion and the Fox (Harcourt, Brace and World, c. 1956), È73.
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Senator from Tennessee except for a four year period from 
1920 to 1924. During his legislative career, Hull helped 
draw up the Federal Income Tax Law of 1913, became a leading 
advocate of tariff reform, and attained prominence in the 
Democratic Party in the 1920's by serving as Chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee. Because of his ad­
vocacy of states-rights, his long-time opposition to 
economic privilege, and his support for Roosevelt over the 
urban liberal and Roman Catholic Alfred E. Smith, Hull had 
considerable influence among Southern Democrats and was 
expected to hold that voter bloc in line for Roosevelt. 
Further, Hull held the respect of his former colleagues 
in the Congress and would be a valuable negotiator for 
Roosevelt in the efforts to secure New Deal legislation.
While Cordell Hull had some voice in the attempt to 
develop policy for lowering tariff barriers and improving 
relations with Latin American nations, his over-all in­
fluence was limited by Roosevelt's methods of controlling 
American foreign policy. The technique against which Hull 
had no means of defense was Roosevelt's use of the Personal 
Representative. The President found this method to be an 
expedient way around the supposedly cumbersome and slow 
State Department, and he often told his agents to report 
directly to the White House in order to avoid the necessity 
of including the Secretary of State in the discussions.
Even though Hull could request information from the envoys.
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he was never sure that he would receive it; if the agent 
did respond, Hull remained unsure that he had received 
the most important information from the envoy, or the 
White House.2
2Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City; 
Doubleday and Company, 1964), 70, Since 1789, when 
Gouvenour Morris went to Great Britain for President 
George Washington, special emissaries, personal represen-, 
tatives, ceremonial agents, and other titular designees 
have gone to foreign states as personal envoys for many 
presidents. Even though the "executive agent" is not men­
tioned in the United States Constitution, the practice is 
generally accepted and has been upheld by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. See Henry M. Wriston's Executive 
Agents In American Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1929), for the most comprehensive study of 
the personal agent's role in American foreign policy to 
1920. For examples of President Roosevelt’s practice of 
by-passing the Secretary of State and the State Department 
see Charles Romanus, and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell* s 
Mission to China, and Stilwell's Command Problems, vol. 9» 
parts 1 and 2 of United States Army in World War II 
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1953 and 1956);
William H. Standley, and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Am­
bassador to Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955);
Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie, Fighter for Freedom 
(Marquette: Northern Michigan University Press, c. 1^66) ;
Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, c. 196é); Theodore
White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York, William Sloane 
Associates, Inc., c. 1948); James M. Burns, Roosevelt : The
Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanoyich,
c. 1970); Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American 
Experience in China, 1911-19^5 (New York: The Macmillan
Company, c. 1970). Throughout the Foreign Relations of 
the United States volumes for the years 1941-19^5, dispatches 
are often cited as "copied from file at Franklin D. Roose­
velt Library, Hyde Park, New York," and "copy received by 
the Department of State on (date) ," a date long after 
the original transmission of the communique. One can 
conclude that such messages, when not directed to other 
departments, went directly to the White House, and were 
then routed to the State Department— sometimes. Foreign 
Relations volumes hereafter cited as FRUS.
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The former Senator from Tennessee, a proud man 
humiliated at being bypassed in the formulation of foreign 
policy, often complained that Roosevelt's personal envoys 
"tended in many instances to create havoc with our Am­
bassadors in the capitals they visited" and "that no person 
outside the State Department and White House could break 
into these affairs without serious risk of running amuck 
so to speak, and causing hurtful complications." Regard­
less of his pleas, Hull learned early that Roosevelt not 
only relied on his own judgement via his surrogates, but 
cared little about the need to coordinate with or inform 
others of his decisions.3
Within three months after taking office, Roosevelt 
named Hull as head of the American delegation to the World 
Economic Conference at London, a meeting called to fight 
world-wide depression by obtaining international agreement 
on currency stabilization. Before the American delegation 
had gathered in London, the President's statements 
generally reflected agreement with the conference's basic 
goals, but after listening to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Roose­
velt changed his mind and decided the best monetary policy 
for the United States would be independent management of 
the dollar.
3cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), Ï1 191, 200 ;
II: 1585-1586.
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Instead of calling upon Hull to explain his new 
position, the President sent Assistant Secretary of State 
Raymond Moley to London. When Moley arrived at the con­
ference as Roosevelt’s personal envoy, he Immediately be­
came the central figure— much to the chagrin and em­
barrassment of Cordell Hull. As Roosevelt’s spokesman,
Moley explained the President’s position and agreed to a 
conference statement which recognized eventual stabilization 
and reserved the right of each nation to manage Its currency. 
When Roosevelt learned of Moley’s action, he rejected the 
agreement and announced that domestic economic recovery 
came before International financial cooperation. Although 
Hull attempted to keep the meeting from disintegrating, 
the President’s action doomed the conference to failure 
and nullified the efforts of both Hull and the personal 
agent Moley.
Knowing that Hull was upset at the outcome of the 
talks and his unannounced change of position, Roosevelt 
took steps to soothe the Secretary of State. Before Hull 
returned to the United States, Roosevelt cabled him to 
express his great regard, affection, and confidence In the 
Secretary of State and noted Hull’s display of personal 
courage and sincerity In the attempt at preventing a 
collapse of the conference. In a further effort to 
mollify Hull and to use his personal persuasiveness to 
convince the Secretary that others were responsible for the
12
London debacle, Roosevelt asked him to be a guest at Hyde 
Park on his return to the United States, Once the two men 
met, Roosevelt insisted that he had not given Moley any 
special powers but had meant for him to "drop over to 
London as a liaison man" between the delegation and the 
President, and that Moley had likely promoted the public 
fanfare which greeted him in London. To placate the 
Secretary of State, Roosevelt, within a few weeks, trans­
ferred Moley away from the State Department. Hull never 
got over Moley's Intervention, and when Postmaster General 
James Parley later tried to convince Hull that Moley was 
not so bad, he replied, "I admire loyalty and you certainly 
have put up a good case for Moley, But he is a Son of A 
Bitch after all, isn’t he?"^
At the same time he decided to send Moley to London, 
Roosevelt also decided to recognize the government of the 
Soviet Union. Instead of confronting State Department 
policy which adhered to lines set by earlier Presidents, 
and Cordell Hull’s moralistic objections to the atheistic 
nature of the Russian regime, Roosevelt called on his New 
York neighbor Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to begin talks with 
Russian economic representatives as preliminary steps to
Hull, Memoirs, I: 267-268; Harold Ickes, The In­
side Struggle, 193^-1939. vol. 2 of The Secret Diary of 
Harold L. Ickes. j vois. (New York: Simon and Schuster,
c. 1954), II: 686.
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recognition. While his long-time friend met with agents 
of Amtorg, the official Russian corporation, Roosevelt 
also contacted Assistant Secretary of State William C. 
Bullitt and ordered him to negotiate with the Russians and 
report directly to the President. Not only did Roosevelt 
use personal friends to conduct private talks, but now 
ordered professional Foreign Service Officers to bypass 
their superior officer— the Secretary of State— and report 
the outcome of the talks straight to him. Once assured 
that formal recognition of the Soviet Union was imminent 
Morgenthau withdrew from the talks in favor of State 
Department representatives.5
While the President often used Personal Representa­
tive diplomacy to avoid discussing policy decisions with 
Hull, he also entertained ideas of reconstructing the State 
Department in order to make it more responsive to his 
leadership, but he never initiated the action because of 
his reluctance to fire people or personally face the task 
of rebuilding an old organization and being responsible for 
the results. Instead, Roosevelt decided to rely on Sumner 
Welles, a close personal friend in the State Department,
5John M. Blum, Years of Crisis. 1928-1939. vol. 1 of 
From The Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston; Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1959), I: 54-57; Beatrice Farnsworth, William
C. Bullitt and The Soviet Union (Bloomington:. Indiana Uni­
versity Press, c, 1967), 87-119; Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
"The Morgenthau Diaries: How F. D. R, Fought The Axis,"
Colliers. 120 (October 11, 1947), 20-21, 72-79.
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to advise him on international issues. After making that 
decision, Roosevelt dispatched Under-Secretary of State 
William Phillips to Rome as Ambassador and then named his 
long-time friend as Under-Secretary. To satisfy Hull, who 
wanted Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore as Under-Secre- 
tary, Roosevelt activated the post of "counselor of State 
Department" by naming Moore to that position.^
Although Welles' selection as Under-Secretary was 
largely the result of his personal and political ties with 
the President, he did not lack for experience in foreign re­
lations. Welles first Joined the Department during World 
War I and served at the American embassies in Tokyo and Buenos 
Aires. In the 1920's, he served on a commission dealing with 
American-Honduran affairs and then in the Department's Divi­
sion of Latin American Affairs. In 1933, he served briefly 
as American Ambassador to Cuba, and then became an Assistant 
Secretary of State. Four years later, with twenty-two years 
experience, Welles was named Under-Secretary. Welles had a 
precise mind, was a hard worker, and got to the point of a 
policy discussion quickly, while Hull "was given to building 
up his case fact by fact and reason by reason."?
^Memorandum of conversation between Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr., and President Roosevelt, July 10, 1935, Morgenthau Diary, 
Book 8: 51, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New
York. The Roosevelt Library is hereafter cited as PDRL.
?Louis Wehle, Hidden Threads of History (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1953), 115.
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Throughout the six years Welles served as Under­
secretary, he and Cordell Hull clashed over many issues, 
but the basic conflict went beyond policy formulation.
Welles' personal relationship with the President and his 
grating practice of going over the Secretary's head caused 
Hull to develop a long-lasting personal bitterness for 
Welles and a tendency to be more in "agreement with [his] 
other associates more often than with Welles on important 
questions of policy.
In October 1937, Welles proposed that Roosevelt 
invite all Washington diplomatic representatives to the 
White House on Armistice Day to sit down and work out a 
plan for peace along lines to be proposed by Roosevelt.
Hull rejected the plan because Welles suggested it, and 
because he opposed any conference that would fail to produce 
any real results. After several conversations with the 
President, Hull finally convince him that he should abandon 
the project.
Hull found that he could njt discourage all of 
Welles' proposals when he learned from President Roosevelt 
that he was sending Welles to the major capitals of Europe 
in 1940 to determine if there were any prospects for peace. 
Hull saw this as another attempt by Welles to "step out 
more toward the center of the stage" and cautioned the
^Hull, Memoirs, I; 313.
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President that "five hundred different rumors would 
inevitably arise" and "would create confusion in Europe and 
here at home." Roosevelt decided to send Welles anyway 
and ultimately saw the trip end in failure. While Roose­
velt believed that his informing Hull would placate the 
Secretary, Hull's personal resentment toward Welles con­
tinued to smolder.
In July 19^1, the Secretary of State again became 
irate when Welles, not Roosevelt, informed him of the date 
for the beginning of the Roosevelt-Churchill talks in 
Newfoundland and then grew livid when he learned that the 
President asked Welles, not Hull, to accompany him to the 
summit meeting. Hull told Assistant Secretary of State 
Breckinridge Long that had he been consulted, he would 
have suggested Welles as the State Department representa­
tive to the conference, yet he deeply resented being totally 
uninformed of the events.9
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Welles 
traveled to Rio de Janeiro in early 1942 to try to create 
a band of wartime solidarity between the Americas by getting 
the Latin nations to declare war on the Axis powers. Prior 
to Welles' departure, Hull and the delegation agreed that 
a strong resolution must be signed and that the Latinos
^Hull, Memoirs, I: 546-549; Theodore Wilson, The
First Summit; Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 
1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19&9), 240.
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must cooperate with the United States to insure the safety 
of the Western Hemisphere, Because internal political 
problems and connections with Germans caused the Argentine 
delegates to refuse to declare war on Germany, Welles 
agreed to a compromise statement that recommended but did 
not openly announce the breaking of relations with the 
Axis nations. Cordell Hull first learned of the modified 
declaration from a radio news broadcast and went immediate­
ly to the White House. Through White House facilities, and 
with the President listening in, Hull spoke more sharply to 
Welles than he "had ever spoken to anyone" in an effort to 
get the Under-Secretary to rescind the agreement. Welles 
declared that he had the President's direct and personal 
authority to act and would not repudiate the statement 
unless Roosevelt decided otherwise. After listening to 
both men, Roosevelt rejected Hull's objections. The Pres­
ident's decision did pave the way for Welles' resolution, 
but at the same time it also Intensified Hull's frustration 
and animosity toward Welles.^0
The Under-Secretary of State had Roosevelt's ear, 
but the President's constant indifference toward Hull meant 
that the Secretary of State would eventually demand Welles' 
removal. In mid-1942, Hull, learning of rumors that Welles
I’̂IIull, Memoirs, II; 1148-1149; Sumner Welles, Seven 
Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1950), 94-122.
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engaged in homosexual activities, discussed the problem 
with Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, Over 
the next twelve months, Hull often mentioned his fear of 
the possible damage to the President and the State Depart­
ment if such rumors became public. If those rumors were 
known, Welles could have been subject to blackmail by 
foreign governments. By August 1943, Long noted that Hull's 
conversations dwelled at length on the subject, and within 
a month, Hull presented the President with an ultimatum on 
Welles— likely including the sordid rumors as one of the 
reasons why Welles had to resign. Fearing a serious rup­
ture in his Democratic coalition if Cordell Hull quit and 
finally seeing that his efforts to use Welles to circumvent 
the State Department had caused the Hull-Welles differences 
to grow beyond reconciliation, Roosevelt accepted Welles' 
resignation in September 1943. Although Roosevelt had the 
power and authority to use Welles in whatever manner he 
chose, the resulting Hull-Welles conflict caused the two 
men, the White House, and the Department much needless 
8uffering.il
llcordell Hull was not the progenitor of the gossip 
about Welles' purported indiscretion. Former Ambassador to 
France William C. Bullitt received information about the 
Under-Secretary from R. Walton Moore. As the result of 
his promise to the dying Moore, but more likely because he 
believed he might succeed to Welles' post, Bullitt went to 
the White House in April 1941 and gave Roosevelt a document 
that supposedly confirmed the rumors about Welles. Probably 
incensed over Bullitt’s charges and the revelation of the
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Besides Roosevelt's personal friends and Presidential 
envoys, the Secretary of State had to compete with fellow 
cabinet members in trying to develop foreign policy. After 
the Spanish Civil War erupted in 1936, Hull refused to issue 
passports to American ambulance units that volunteered to 
serve with the Loyalists. Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes was incensed at Hull's strict application of 
neutrality in that case. He felt that Hull was too intimi­
dated by totalitarian governments and that the Secretary 
of State was like "a bladder...filled with air. You push 
at one point and it bulges at the opposite." Ickes wanted 
tougher policies which would hinder the aggressive Germany 
and Japan, and accordingly in 1938 he refused to sell 
helium to Germany for the Zeppelin airships. Secretary of 
State Hull held that the United States agreed to sell the 
gas to Germany and could not back out of a binding contract.
document, the President sent Bullitt on a "mission of 
information" to the Middle East. Once he realized that 
Roosevelt had probably used the mission as a pretext to get 
him out of Washington, and later seeing that the President 
did not plan to use him in any meaningful way, Bullitt 
resigned as the President's Personal Representative; see 
Orville H, Bullitt, ed., For The President, Personal and 
Secret, Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
William C. Hullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1972), $12-^i7; ÿred L. Israel, ed.. The War Diary of 
Breckinridge Long (Lincoln; University ot Nebraska Press, 
c. I$b6), 3^3-335; "Welles Showdown Spotlights Feuds in 
the State Department," Newsweek, 22 (September 6, 19^3), 48; 
Welles to Roosevelt and Hull, September 21, 1943, Presi­
dent's Secretary's File: State Department, Welles, Sumner,
Box 79, FDRL.
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Ickes, however, got around that agreement by arguing that 
it was nullified by the fact that the Zeppelins could be 
converted to military use. It was Roosevelt's decision to 
overrule Hull by returning the German money and canceling
the contract.12
As the international situation grew tense, Ickes be­
came impatient with Hull's cautious policies and called 
for an embargo on oil, gasoline, and scrap iron to both 
Spain and Japan on the grounds that the Iberian neutral 
would send it to Germany and Japan who would use it for ex­
panded military activities in the Par East. The State 
Department opposed cutting off the oil to Spain out of fear 
that the neutral nation would be driven into Hitler's camp, 
while Hull's reluctance to confront the Japanese was based 
on the belief that the European situation required the bulk 
of the United States' support at that time, and to invoke 
the embargo against Japan could precipitate an all-out war 
before the American military would be ready. Ickes was 
beside himself, wondering "how the President can put up with 
the State Department," and accusing "that damn State 
Department at work again continuing its appeasement policy,"
l^Harold Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon 
(New York; Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943), 338; Ickes, The 
Inside Struggle, 1938-1939. and The Lowering Cloud, 1939- 
1941, vols. 2 and 3 of The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
3 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, c. iyb4), ii; yj, 
396-399, 414; III: 228; Hull, Memoirs. I: 597-598;
Pratt, "The Ordeal of Cordell Hull,'* 80.
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and when finally and totally exasperated, Ickes cried 
"Once again I say 'Goddamn the.Department of State.'"^3
Another interdepartmental conflict over policy for­
mulation concerned Hull's wartime efforts to improve the 
United States' position in Anglo-American trade relations. 
He tried to persuade Roosevelt to allow him to use wartime 
aid to pressure the British to revise their imperial pre­
ferential status for British colonies, but the President 
remained reluctant to do so until 1944, when he granted 
Hull permission to initiate talks with the British. At 
the same time, and in a seemingly unrelated action. 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed 
to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau's plan to convert 
Germany into a country primarily agricultural in character.
Recognizing that other departments and agencies 
would be involved in postwar planning, Hull was not par­
ticularly concerned over the leaders acceptance of Mor­
genthau's plan, although he did hold out for State De­
partment coordination and implementation of those policies. 
What incensed Hull was Morgenthau's agreement with Church­
ill that the United States would provide over six billion 
dollars in supplies to Great Britain— with no strings 
attached. Hull declared that the action angered him "as 
much as anything that had happened during [his] career as
13lckes, The Lowering Cloud, 1939-1941, III; 273-274, 
298-299, 339, 473, 640; Pratt, ibid., 87-88.
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Secretary of State.” Morgenthau's precipitous action 
undercut Hull's plan to use the loan proposal as an in­
strument to force the British to agree to revise their 
trade system. He told Morgenthau that he was "shocked at 
the way such vital matters had been settled without any 
consultations with the appropriate experts of our Govern­
ment and without any regard for the policy we had been 
trying to pursue in the past." Following that meeting,
Hull went to the White House to try to convince President 
Roosevelt to reject Morgenthau's plan and to allow the 
State Department to conduct all negotiations with the 
British for additional aid. When confronted by the irate 
Secretary of State, Roosevelt explained that he had not 
actually committed himself to Morgenthau’s plan, and he 
evaded the touchy issue by telling Hull that postwar planning 
did not need their attention at that time.^^
During World War II, Franklin Roosevelt's personal 
control of foreign policy became greater as he established 
the "Map Room" at the White House as the headquarters for 
all communications with the Allied leaders. An introductory 
note to the Map Room Pile at the Franklin Roosevelt Library 
states that the President wished to have in the Map Room, 
established in January 19^2, the only complete file of the 
personal messages he exchanged with Churchill, Stalin, and
l^Hull, Memoirs, I: 509-510.
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Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason messages from the Map 
Room went through Navy Department communications facilities 
and replies were received through the War Department,
While the President was on trips, all messages were 
encoded in the Map Room and sent to him through Army or 
Navy circuits. The President's replies, returning through 
the same military channels, were decoded in the Map Room.
In addition to the Map Room arrangement, a profusion 
of new wartime agencies chipped away at the State Depart­
ment's Jurisdiction and its role in foreign policy. As 
Cordell Hull complained;
The State Department was...bedeviled 
by the multiplicity of Departments and agen­
cies, speaking for the government in foreign 
relations, such as the Treasury, the Coordin­
ator of Inter-American Affairs, the Coordin­
ator of Information, the Petroleum Coordina­
tor, and the Office of Lend Lease Administra­
tion. Foreign diplomats were repeatedly 
coming to us to express their confusion at 
the number of agencies that approached them 
as the authorized representatives of the 
United States Government.
The Secretary of State did not acquiesce completely as his 
Department's power gradually eroded. In 19^2, Vice-Presi­
dent Henry Wallace, as chairman of the Board of Economic 
Warfare, persuaded Roosevelt to grant his agency enough 
authority to deal directly with foreign governments and to 
send its agents abroad for that purpose. Hull saw the 
order as "virtually creating a second State Department," 
and as giving Wallace's agency the power to negotiate
2H
postwar economic settlements. Beside the power conflict, 
Hull likely saw the Board of Economic Warfare as being 
organized "to throw a sop to left wingers by letting them 
use buying or purchases abroad for social and economic 
ideas they wanted to spread." Motivated then by personal 
and ideological differences, Hull convinced the President 
to reduce the powers of the Board of Economic W a r f a r e . ^ 5  
In addition to the impact of the Map Room and the 
new bureaus, the wartime estrangement of Hull and the 
State Department from Roosevelt widened when the White 
House, in 19^2, decided that Roosevelt would work with 
Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 
Premier Stalin and the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 
while Secretary Hull and the State Department would take 
care of the routine foreign relations and would develop 
plans for the postwar settlement. The President may have 
talked about delineating between wartime and postwar 
policies and problems, but his actions revealed that he 
allowed very little vital information about "Big Three" 
political agreements to be passed to the Secretary of State. 
Hull tried to improve his position by sending Sumner Welles 
to the White House to request copies of Map Room cables;
^5h u 11, Memoirs, II: 1155-1156; Frederick J. Dobney,
ed.. Selected Papers of Will Clayton (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, c. 1971), 66-&7.
25
however, three hours after the President seemingly agreed 
to provide the messages, Hull "got a message that the 
President had decided he would not do it." Hull told Sec­
retary of the Treasury Morgenthau that "The President runs 
foreign affairs. I don't know what's going on." He added 
that "since Pearl Harbor he does not let me help in 
connection with foreign affairs, I just don't know what's 
going on and the President won't let me help him," and 
further lamented that, "I asked to see the political part 
of the cables between the President and Churchill, because 
I have to find out from Halifax [British Ambassador in 
Washington] what's going on between the President and
Churchill."iG
The President also excluded Secretary of State Hull 
from the summit meetings at Casablanca, Cairo, Teheran, and 
Yalta, preferring instead to have Harry Hopkins at his 
side. Hull did attend the Quebec Conference of August 
19^3, but he spent most of his time in discussions with 
British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. The meeting Cordell 
Hull attended, where he could be considered a primary 
figure, was the Foreign Minister's Conference at Moscow in 
October 1943; even then he was second choice to Sumner 
Welles.
Memorandum of conversation between Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr., and Cordell Hull, July 9, 1943, Morgenthau Diary, Book 
647: 170, FDRL; George P. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, c. 1967), it2-173.
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Roosevelt's decision to withhold information relating 
to summit conference agreements from Secretary of State 
Hull and the State Department had a predictable effect on 
the Department's efforts to formulate plans for postwar 
policy. Three months after the Teheran Conference, career 
diplomat Robert Murphy told Hull that "many Foreign Service 
Officers like myself would be strengthened in our operations 
if we could be informed of the secret conversations which 
Roosevelt had had with Stalin." With the knowledge that his 
own persistent pleas for information about Teheran were 
ignored, Hull told Murphy that "the operations of the 
Secretary of State would also be strengthened if he knew 
what happened at Teheran." In July 1944, almost a year 
after the Teheran Conference, Hull attempted to remind 
Roosevelt that the State Department had little information 
about the Cairo and Teheran meetings when he wrote to the 
President that "the Department of State is accordingly en­
deavoring to obtain true copies of any documents agreed 
upon for the United States at the Conferences," and in 
January 1945, Hull again informed Roosevelt that "it would 
be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Depart­
ment who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the per­
tinent sections of the report on the Teheran Conference 
might be made available to the Department," When Henry 
Morgenthau told Hull that he had learned that Roosevelt 
had agreed that Germany should be "dismembered in either
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three or fifteen parts,” Hull declared that "this Is the 
first time I have heard this." He also added that he had 
"never been permitted to see the minutes of the Teheran 
Conference." Even though a State Department man, Charles 
Bohlen, had served as recording secretary for the American 
delegation at Teheran, his transcription of the meetings' 
minutes had gone directly to the White House, leaving the 
State Department only fragmented reports on the decisions 
about Poland, Germany, and the projected second front in 
Europe.
The information requested by Robert Murphy, when he 
referred to the Roosevelt-Stalin conversations, also affected 
an area of diplomacy specifically connected with postwar 
planning and policy. As a result of the information re­
ceived about the Teheran meeting. State Department 
officials concluded that the Allied leaders had agreed on a 
plan for postwar occupation zones for Germany. Earlier, 
in the spring of 1943, Secretary Hull and British Foreign
l^Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 447; Louis Fischer, 
The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945
(New York: Harper and Row, c. 1972), 196; Hull to Roose-
velt, July 20, 1944, President's Secretary's File: State
Department, 1944; Hull to Roosevelt, January 11, 1945» 
President's Secretary's File: Russia, 1944-1945» FDRL;
From the Morgenthau Diary at FDRL; Memorandum of conversa­
tion between Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Cordell Hull,
July 9» 1943, Book 647: 169; Memorandum of conversation
between Morgenthau, Daniel Bell, and Harry D. White, August 
18, 1944, Book 763: 202; Memorandum by Morgenthau,
September 8, 1944, Book 770: 120.
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Secretary Eden had started talks on surrender terms and 
occupation zones for Germany. Hull opposed permanent 
political-economic dismemberment for Germany, and with 
Eden's support, developed a zoning plan on that basis.
In a fashion not surprising when a lack of coordination 
persists, Hull set up a commission of representatives from 
the State, War, and Navy Departments, while Roosevelt, 
Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held private 
talks on the same topic. In addition to Hull's handicap 
of not knowing about the high level talks and agreements, 
the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department decided 
the zoning problem was of a military nature, and it re­
fused to take part in the discussions. When they finally 
did join the talks, the Civil Affairs representatives 
remained uncooperative. Again, Roosevelt's secretive style 
of diplomacy caused disjointed and uncoordinated responses 
from several groups working on the same problem.
In January 1944, the situation grew worse when the 
European Advisory Commission started planning for the zonal 
boundaries. The results of the lack of coordination and 
continuity In policy planning surfaced when the political 
adviser to the American delegation, George Kennan, received 
instructions which limited that group to an advisory role 
only and made It clear that Its advice was welcomed only 
upon request. Further confusion arose when shortly after 
the Teheran Conference, the British and Russian delegations
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presented their zoning proposals. The American delega­
tion, unaware of the prior discussions and agreements 
which affected their position, could do nothing but press 
for clarification of instructions. In March, a short 
dispatch arrived which contained the President’s zoning 
proposal: a plan that if presented would disrupt the
meetings. Roosevelt’s proposal included, for the American 
zone, over half of the Germany population, almost fifty 
percent of the Germany territory, with an additional area 
not relegated to any one zone. George Kennan returned to 
the United States, and after unsuccessful efforts to gain 
information from State Department officials unwilling to 
admit their own confusion, went to the White House and ex­
plained the situation to Roosevelt. The President "laughed 
gaily and said ’Why that’s just something I once drew on 
the back of an envelope.” ' Roosevelt, having earlier 
learned of the British zonal proposals, decided while en- 
route to the Cairo meeting, that the time for a policy 
position had arrived. He had drawn the zonal boundary 
proposal on the envelope. Then, in a manner typical of 
Roosevelt, he filed the "memo" and considered the basic job 
completed. With the American zoning policy proposals based 
on the envelope notations and the American delegation 
suffering diplomatic dyspepsia, the President finally 
sent instructions approving the British and Russian zoning
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proposals.18
As the President's wartime controls expanded and the 
new agencies reduced the State Department’s influence fur­
ther, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the State Depart­
ment faced an additional problem— a constant sniping by 
some journalists. While some of the criticism accurately 
described an organization in need of administrative 
repair, much of the attack was likely instigated by the 
White House in an effort to justify Roosevelt's singular 
control of policy and to transfer the blame to the State 
Department for any policies which might prove unpopular 
with the American public.
In articles for New Republic and The Nation, George 
Soule, I. P. Stone, and Malcolm Cowley described the 
"reactionary" State Department as an agency which selected 
permanent personnel according to wealth and social back­
ground and promoted them on the basis of seniority and 
favoritism rather than according to merit. The "collabor­
ationist" policies toward the Vichy French, the failure to 
expand quotas to admit more refugees from anti-Nazi 
countries, and the "dismal" Darlan deal were all laid on 
the doorstep of the Department, and George Soule, in a
l^Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950, 167-171; William M. 
Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," World 
Politics, 16 (October, 1963), 15; Philip E. Mosely, "The 
Occupation of Germany," Foreign Affairs, 28 (July, 1950), 
580-604. .
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statement typical of the critics, called for a greater 
division of responsibility in order that the "reactionary- 
type policies would not be followed in the future conduct 
of American diplomacy," What the writers often overlooked 
was the fact that the Department's policies reflected the 
views of President Franklin Roosevelt.
One book which reflects the composite reaction against 
the State Department is The Riddle of the State Department 
by Robert Bendiner, The author, also editor of The Nation, 
used most of the book to describe how a few men— conserva­
tive in their ideology and elitist in their educational and 
social backgrounds— guided American foreign policy. He 
blamed Cordell Hull and the State Department for the 
appeasement policies of the late 1930's; allowing Japan 
to purchase raw materials after the 1937 invasion of China, 
denying the cessation of shipping oil to Italy after that 
nation’s aggression against Ethiopia, and executing 
commercial arrangements with the Vichy French Government. 
Bendiner charged Hull with procrastinating, wishful thinking, 
and the tendency to spout moral homilies when faced with 
Axis aggression, yet at the same time he described Sumner 
Welles as the "guiding spirit of the Department"— a hard
19"state Department Appeasers," New Republic. 105 
(July 28, 1941), 105-106; George Soule, ^Liberals and the 
state Department," ibid., 107 (December 14, 1942), 788-789; 
Malcolm Cowley, "What*s Wrong With State," ibid., 109 
(August 16, 1943), 185; I.F. Stone, "Millionaires Club," 
The Nation. 199 (December 9, 1944), 703-704.
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working, humane and considerate statesman who had the most 
"realistic attitude" toward the Axis. Bendiner wrote that 
the ultimate responsibility was the President’s but that 
Roosevelt accepted the Department's policy recommendations 
because he recognized the Secretary of State's and the 
Department's domestic "political force." To rectify the 
situation and to give the chief executive more control, 
Bendiner proposed that the President announce policy 
decisions and leave the Department no choice but to develop 
policy along those lines. He further suggested that Roose­
velt make use of special emissaries for highly important or 
delicate missions instead of regular Foreign Service 
personnel, and he also called for the establishment of 
some new agencies to syphon off some of the State Depart­
ment's power. He was right about Hull's conservatism and the 
Secretary's political influence in the South; still, like 
many of the journalists enthralled by Roosevelt's domestic 
programs, Bendiner ignored the President's personal pre­
ference for isolationism in the decade prior to the war, and 
the fact that Roosevelt alone had directed wartime policies. 
Either Bendiner knew nothing about Roosevelt's techniques 
for controlling the policy making process, or else he wrote 
The Riddle of the State Department as a means of directing 
criticisms away from the President by attacking the State 
Department, and to give public support for Roosevelt's means
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of directing foreign policy.20
As a result of the public criticism and the President's 
feeble, reluctant defense of department policies, the State 
Department attempted to improve its own image. The Division 
of Special Research began analyzing newspaper editorials, 
journalists columns, organizations' statements, and Con­
gressional reactions to policies, and in 1943, the State 
Department contracted with the Office of Public Opinion 
Research in Princeton, New Jersey, to study and evaluate 
public attitudes toward foreign affairs. Hoping to lessen 
criticism and draw more supporters, the Department pub­
lished a book entitled Peace and War. The "White Paper" 
reviewed American foreign policy for the years 1931-1941 
in an effort to remind critics that the American public's 
isolationist attitude for that earlier decade did not allow 
the Department to choose a policy which might have deterred 
Axis aggression.21
While State Department officials wanted to learn 
about the American public's views on foreign policy and to 
improve the Department's image, more conservative supporters
2^Robert Bendiner, The Riddle of The State Depart­
ment (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, c. 1942).
2^William 0. Chittick, State Department, Press, and 
Pressure Groups (New York: Wlley-ïntersclence, c. 1970),
24-25; U.S., Department of State, Peace and War. 1931~194l 
(Washington: Department of State, 1943); Life, 14 (Janu-
ary l8, 1943), 28.
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attempted to defend the Department by attacking the 
critics. State Department files reveal two extensive re­
ports which reviewed the "Campaign Against the State 
Department" and the "Groups Attacking the Department of 
State,"
The theme of these studies, most interesting in light 
of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s attacks on the Department in 
the 1950's, was that the anti-State Department campaign 
originated with "communist and radical groups in the 
United States," The first report viewed the criticisms 
as most threatening to the "integrity of American 
institutions," It maintained that the body of "so-called 
American liberals and intellectuals" who attacked the 
Department was in fact composed of Marxist revolutionaries. 
The report named Robert Bendiner, Freda Kirchwey, I, P, 
Stone, and Michael Straight as having connections with or 
being on the fringe of the communist element within the 
United States, After further highly circumstantial accu­
sations against those individuals, the report attempted to 
show how an "infamous, meretricious, and diabolical" 
campaign by several organizations tried to influence the 
formation of American foreign policy. The report listed 
"Groups Attacking the State Department" as The Union for 
Democratic Action, The International Rescue and Relief 
Committee, Citizens For Victory, and the International Free 
World Association, and it accused those groups of not only
35
seeking to destroy the State Department but desiring the 
"abolition of the capitalist system and [replacing] In 
Its stead a modified form of Bolshevism." The "study" 
unleashed most of Its attack on the Union for Democratic 
Action, charging Its leaders— Dr. Relnhold Nelbuhr, Robert 
Bendiner, Freda Kirchwey, Kenneth Crawford, and Dr. Frank 
Klngdon— with concerted attempts to get rid of high State 
Department officials and of being members of or collaborating 
with the American Communist Party. The Union for Demo­
cratic Action, forerunner of the Americans, for Democratic 
Action, concerned Itself with developing and advocating 
Improved national social programs for the United States, 
and promoting a policy of cooperation with the non-fascist 
governments of the world.22
While most professional State Department officials 
refused to give any attention to those contrived and 
reactionary polemics, the mere existence of the reports 
shows how Roosevelt's singular control of foreign policy 
and the sometimes contrived attacks on the Department 
eventually produced harsh reaction to the criticisms. The 
legitimate defense of the State Department and the
22"Attacks on the United States State Department, 
1942," unsigned manuscripts In Box 90, Pile 403> Cordell 
Hull Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; 
Freda Kirchwey, "McCormick's Gas Attack,"; and I.F. Stone, 
"Washington Notes," The Nation, 154 (May 23, 1942), 
590-591.
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professional efforts to improve its image were the direct 
results of the President’s unwillingness to accept re­
sponsibility for his own foreign policies when they produced 
unfavorable responses and of his willingness to allow the 
State Department to bear the brunt of the press’s criti­
cisms of those policies.
After Franklin Roosevelt won re-election in November 
1944, Cordell Hull resigned as Secretary of State, The 
seventy-three year old Hull felt some satisfaction in his 
accomplishments in that office: reciprocal trade agree­
ments, improved relations with Latin American nations, 
smoother executive-legislative relations regarding long- 
range postwar foreign policy planning, and the laying of a 
foundation for a new international organization. Yet 
Hull’s conservative style and his lack of administrative 
experience, when combined with Roosevelt’s neglect, left 
a State Department poorly equipped to deal with the rapidly 
changing world.
The President recognized this, and prior to Hull’s 
resignation, he named Edward R. Stettinius to replace the 
departed Sumner Welles. According to the President, the 
new Under-Secretary was "going to raise Hell in the State 
Department" because the "’personal prestige of the Secre­
tary of State, the organization that he heads, has only to 
be mentioned in almost any circle, American or foreign, to 
arouse either doubt, despair, or derision.’" Stettinius’
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first job was to reorganize the State Department into 
groups with similar functions within the same divisions, and 
to streamline and improve the processes for long-range 
policy planning. More important, at least to Franklin 
Roosevelt, was the creation of the Office of Public In­
formation which concentrated on developing a better image 
for the State Department by explaining the Department's, 
and Roosevelt's, policy positions to the American public.^3 
When Hull left office, Roosevelt replaced him with 
Stettinius, who immediately recommended the elevation and 
appointment of several advisers; Joseph L. Grew became 
Under-Secretary; Dean Acheson was retained, and William 
Clayton, Nelson Rockefeller, and Archibald MacLeish were 
named as Assistant Secretaries. Within the new organiza­
tion, Stettinius established a Planning Committee to advise 
the Secretary on long-range policy matters and to re-dis- 
tribute Departmental activities so that the geographic 
offices reported to Assistant Secretaries rather than to 
the Under-Secretary. Although the new Secretary of State 
tried to construct a new, more efficient system for 
disseminating information within the Department, the primary 
control of American foreign policy remained as before—
23walter Johnson, "Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.," in 
An Uncertain Tradition, American Secretaries of State in 
the twentieth Century. Norman A. Graebner, ed., (rfew York; 
McGraw-Üill Book Company, 1961), 210.
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with Roosevelt.
While Stettinius appeared to be developing a smooth 
running foreign office, the lack of communications be­
tween the White House and the State Department was so great 
that it bothered, at least momentarily, the President’s 
top Personal Representative, Harry Hopkins. At the Cairo 
Conference, he met and was impressed by a young Foreign 
Service Officer, Charles E. Bohlen. Hopkins spent much 
time talking with Bohlen, and quickly became aware of the 
career diplomat's outstanding knowledge of policy issues 
and objectivity toward Husso-American relations. When 
Hopkins evaluated the Foreign Service as full of "cookie 
pushers, pansies--and usually isolationists to boot,"
Bohlen defended the Department with such a forceful and 
intelligent argument that Hopkins persuaded President 
Roosevelt to have Bohlen assigned to the White House as a 
State Department liaison man. Bohlen's role was to keep 
the President, Hopkins, and Admiral William Leahy, Roose­
velt's military adviser informed on current world problems 
and to get quick Departmental recommendations on any sub­
ject when Roosevelt needed it. Bohlen held the Job from 
December 1944 to April 1945, but his effectiveness as a 
White House-State Department liaison officer was limited 
as he was in London from January to March 1945, and when he
Z^ibid.. 213-214.
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returned to the United States, he went to San Francisco for 
the United Nations organizational conferences. Once James 
Byrnes became Secretary of State, Bohlen returned to field 
duty. Even President Roosevelt seemed to be paying more 
attention to the State Department. At Yalta, he declared 
that the Department's assistance was so important that he 
would not attend another meeting without its representa­
tives. His rhetorical recognition of the Department's 
value came only two months before his death.25
Even though United States-Japanese negotiations 
between 1939 and 19^1 were conducted almost exclusively by 
Cordell Hull and the State Department, Franklin Roosevelt 
acted as his own Secretary of State. It was not that he 
deceived the American public when he picked Hull as 
Secretary of State; it was a matter of priorities, and in 
that position, the former did what Roosevelt wanted; deal 
with the Congress. In using Hull in that manner and in 
conducting foreign policy from the White House, Roosevelt 
did not exceed his constitutional authority— he merely 
broadened it. While this manner of handling Japanese 
relations was an apparent contradiction in Roosevelt's 
policy, there are possible explanations. Knowing that 
Roosevelt would never have delegated much authority to the
25gmith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 260.
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Secretary of State unless the situation demanded It, one 
can conjecture that Roosevelt's preoccupation with the 
war in Europe took precedence over his concern with Asian 
affairs. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Roose­
velt was firmly convinced he could better handle foreign 
policy issues than could the Foreign Service and the 
State Department. Moreover, as the head of the Democratic 
Party and one who appeared to have achieved considerable 
success on the domestic front, Roosevelt no doubt believed 
that through greater personal control he could also succeed 
on the international level, thus building in the voter's 
mind an image of security through Democratic competence in 
foreign affairs. While President Franklin Roosevelt's 
efforts to broaden his personal control of foreign policy 
was by personal calculation, at the same time, the war 
caused a burgeoning of agencies concerned with the war and 
postwar foreign policies which cut into the State Depart­
ment's position and provided the President with even 
greater control of American foreign policy.
UPHOLDING THE ATLANTIC CHARTER.......ALMOST
CHAPTER II
Prior to America's entrance into World War II,
Franklin Roosevelt’s thinking on foreign policy remained 
ambivalent. When a crisis developed, he seemed to push 
the United States to extend further aid to the European 
allies, but he would then back off and await the public's 
approval before he took a firm stand. Yet the President's 
ambiguity is understandable; he was reluctant to take 
steps that would involve the United States in war, and 
while he received growing public support for his policies, 
he hesitated in taking a firm stand because he did not 
want to risk Congressional defeat of his plans for aiding 
those nations already at war with Germany.
As the Axis machine rolled into high gear, Roosevelt 
saw the potential menace to the United States and sought 
Indirect methods of stopping it. He saw that the neutrality 
legislation of the 1930's hindered the European nations' 
efforts to get American supplies but he did not publicly 
advocate the revision of that restrictive legislation until 
early efforts to repeal the arms embargo failed. When the 
President finally did act on September 21, 1939, he
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Informed a special session of Congress that replacing 
the arms embargo with cash and carry was necessary to 
keep the United States out of war.
Although Roosevelt talked about the madness of 
Hitler’s world and the need to bolster Great Britain and 
France, he remained unwilling to commit the United States 
to physical involvement in the war. As Norway, Denmark 
and the Low Countries fell and France struggled against the 
German onslaught, Roosevelt told the American people that 
the nation needed to provide all-out aid to the Allies, 
but when the French Premier requested military support, 
Roosevelt responded with a tribute to French fighting 
stamina and also allocated additional material support, 
but no troops. Roosevelt’s hesitant response to Churchill’s 
plea for American warships created a four month delay in 
delivery. Not until popular approval swelled and White 
House lawyers found a legal way of avoiding a fight with 
Congress did Roosevelt agree to trade fifty old destroyers 
for eight naval bases. Even with the negotiations concluded, 
Roosevelt spoke of the agreement not as a means of aiding 
Britain, but of expanding the American line of defense.^
^Robert A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War II 
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Prior to December of 1940, Great Britain had followed 
the Congressional prescription, and paid cash for their 
goods and British vessels to carry the supplies to the 
home islands. In that same month. Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill informed President Roosevelt that Britain could 
no longer pay cash for shipping and American munitions.
To make sure that Britain received the needed supplies, 
Roosevelt sought a way of removing the dollar sign from 
the aid. He finally settled on lending goods instead of 
money— lend lease. Roosevelt sent the bill to Congress, 
where it faced intense opposition from an Isolationist 
bloc which viewed the proposal as another step closer to 
American involvement in the war.
After he had taken his stand, Roosevelt’s first 
thoughts turned to how he could get more public support 
for the bill. He told Harry Hopkins that he believed a 
lot of the opposition toward lend lease could be quieted 
"if Churchill and I could just sit down together for awhile," 
but he added that arrangements could not be made at that 
time. Hopkins immediately proposed that he go to London 
to confer with the Prime Minister. At first, Roosevelt 
refused, declaring that Hopkins' place was in Washington to
Policy: A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, 6 (July,
1928), 573-586; Elliott Roosevelt! As He Saw It (New York; 
Due11, Sloan and Pearce, c, 1945), 36-39; Morton J. Frisch, 
"Roosevelt on Peace and Freedom," Journal of Politics, 29 
(August, 1967), 585-596.
help prepare the State of the Union address, a budget 
message, the third Inaugural, and to develop strategy for 
the battle with Congress over lend lease. Pleading that 
his position on lend lease might be more of a hindrance 
than a help in the fight with Congress, Hopkins received 
support for his cause from Marguerite LeHand, Roosevelt's 
personal secretary, and Justice Felix Frankfurter who 
induced the President to change his mind and send Hopkins 
to England.2
The frail, sickly Hopkins had begun to secure his 
position in the Roosevelt political family when Jesse 
Strauss resigned as head of the New York State Temporary 
Emergency Relief Administration. William Hodson, chairman 
of the Russell Sage Foundation, suggested Hopkins as a 
successor for Strauss, and Governor Franklin Roosevelt put 
him to work. In this role, Hopkins, as he had done in his 
earlier New York state social work, used imagination and 
ability to circumvent the bureaucracy, and he quickly 
Impressed Roosevelt. Shortly after becoming President, 
Roosevelt called Hopkins to Washington to become director 
of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Hopkins 
then became head of the Works Progress Administration, and 
later moved up to serve briefly as Secretary of Commerce. 
After Louis Howe's death in 1936, Hopkins became Franklin
^Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, c. 194b), 32, 23Ü.
H5
Roosevelt’s most trusted adviser, dispatched the President’s 
final decisions, served as Roosevelt's critic for speeches 
and legislative ideas, and to attest to his importance, 
soon became the main target for Roosevelt's naysayers.
By 19^0, Roosevelt so valued this relationship that he 
moved Hopkins into the White House to live. Later, Roose­
velt told Wendell Willkie:
some day you may well be sitting here 
where I am now as President of the 
United States, And when you are, you’ll 
be looking at that door over there and 
knowing that practically everybody who 
walks through it wants something out of 
you. You’ll learn what a lonely job 
this is, and you’ll discover the need 
for somebody like Harry Hopkins who 
asks for nothing except to serve you.
He also recognized in Hopkins a trait which made him even
more valuable for Roosevelt’s style of diplomacy: "Harry
is the perfect ambassador for my purposes. He doesn’t even
know the meaning of the word ’protocol.’ When he sees a
piece of red tape, he Just pulls out those old garden
shears of his and snips it."3
When Roosevelt decided to send Hopkins to England,
he told reporters that Hopkins was going merely to say
hello to a few people. Roosevelt spoke the truth. He
could get the needed information for the aid program through
the American Embassy, but he really wanted publicity for
3lbid.. 2-17.
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the lend lease proposal, and he believed Hopkins’ mission 
would accomplish that, plus boosting the British public’s 
morale.
On the day before Congress began debate on lend lease, 
and in the midst of an air raid, Harry Hopkins arrived in 
London to confer with British leaders. As Roosevelt made 
clear in his instructions to Hopkins, the mission was not 
to decide the extent to which Great Britain should be 
aided but to determine if British leaders were ’’asking 
for enough to see them through."^
The next morning, January 10, 1941, Hopkins went to 
No. 10 Downing Street for an appointment with Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill. They talked of the desire of 
Roosevelt and Churchill for a personal meeting, the state 
of British defenses, and the need for closer and better 
communications between the two leaders. After spending a 
weekend with the Prime Minister and paying his respects 
to the royal family, Hopkins cabled his first Impressions 
to Roosevelt. In one of many notes delivered directly to 
the President, Hopkins wrote that the British "need our 
help desperately and I am sure you will permit nothing to 
stand in the way." In Hopkins' estimation, "Churchill is
the gov’t in every sense of the word--he controls the
grand strategy and often the details--labor trusts him---
^Ibid.. 236.
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the army, navy, air force are behind him to a man,  I
cannot emphasize too strongly that he is the one and only 
person over here with whom you need to have a full meeting 
of the minds." Hopkins indeed believed that Churchill 
personified the British tenacity in holding their own 
against German pressures at home and in the Mediterranean, 
and he reiterated his approval of Roosevelt's desire for a 
summit conference by adding that "I am convinced this meeting 
between you and Churchill is essential."5
While Hopkins conferred with the Prime Minister,
Roosevelt sought other ways to publicize the need for lend 
lease. Governor Herbert Lehman of New York suggested that 
he invite Wendell Willkie to the White House to discuss 
the best means of gaining total support for the national 
defense program, and the President agreed. Although Will­
kie opposed Roosevelt's domestic programs, the 1940 Repub­
lican Presidential candidate supported the Chief Executive's 
proposal to extend aid to Great Britain. With Willkie's 
approval, Roosevelt could dramatically declare bipartisan 
support for the measure, and hopefully reduce Congressional 
opposition.
The White House expanded on Governor Lehman's suggestion 
and decided that Willkie should make a trip to England.
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Harold Guinzburg broached the
5%bid., 242-244.
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idea to a Willkie friend, Irita Van Doren, who in turn 
suggested the trip to Willkie. Shortly after the aid 
legislation went to Congress, Willkie publicly declared 
his support for the proposal and announced his plan to go 
to England to learn more about the situation.^
Four days later, at the urging of Secretary of State
Cordell Hull with prompting from the President Willkie
appeared at the White House to discuss his trip with 
Roosevelt. The President suggested that in addition to the 
Prime Minister, Willkie should confer with leading members 
of the Labor Party, people responsible for production, 
representatives of labor, and the English intellectual 
community. Following the conference, Willkie again called 
for Congressional approval of lend lease, warning opponents 
within the Republican Party that it would remain a minority 
party if they ignored the International crisis. Now, 
Roosevelt had the popular Republican on his side, and 
although Willkie paid for his trip from personal funds, he 
became the President’s unofficial, personal Representative 
to Churchill and the English people.?
^Herbert Lehman to Roosevelt, November 7, 1940, 
President’s Personal Pile; Lehman Folder, Box 93, PDRL; 
Typewritten manuscript detailing account of dinner meeting 
with Wendell Willkie, January 16, 1941, Felix Frankfurter 
Papers, Willkie, Wendell Pile, Box 112, Manuscripts Division, 
Library of Congress.
^Frankfurter file, ibid.; U.S. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong.,
1st Sess., vol. 87, pt. 1Ô, January 14, 1941, A106; New 
York Times. January 15, 1941, 12; January 20, 1941, 6; 
Donald B. Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell
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On January 26, Willkie held a news conference in Lon­
don. Speaking to a gathering of over two hundred newsmen,
Willkie contributed what Roosevelt desired the voice of the
opposition party in behalf of aid to Britain. When ques­
tioned about the practical value of his trip, Willkie de­
clared, "I don't know what you mean by practical use but I 
do make speeches and write sometimes,” and to the delight 
of the British, added that "I want to do all I can to get 
the United States to give England the utmost aid possible in 
her struggle for free men all over the world,”®
Between January 27 and February 5, Willkie met Bri­
tish officials, toured coastal defense installations, saw 
the House of Commons in session, and inspected the results 
of German air raids. Further, by the frequent visits 
with the man on the street and his publicized jaunts 
around the country, Willkie helped dramatize the signifi­
cance of the President's lend lease proposal.
At that time, with an abundance of newspaper reports 
describing Willkie's activities, the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Walter George, 
sought Willkie's appearance before that committee. On 
February 9, he returned to the United States and presented 
his support for lend lease before the Senate committee.
Willkie (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, I960), 173,
®The Times, January 28, 1941, 4; New York Times, 
January 27, 1941, 1,4; February 9, 1941, part 4, 8,
50
With Winkle's testimony before that body, Roosevelt 
had the most recent Republican Presidential candidate’s 
concurrence— backed by a personal Inspection for his 
proposed lend lease legislation.9
While the Republican leader did his job, Harry Hop­
kins continued his activities. With Prime Minister 
Churchill, Hopkins traveled to Scotland to give a send-off 
to Lord Halifax, the new British Ambassador to the United 
States. They visited air raid warning stations, toured 
coastal defenses at Dover, Southampton, and Portsmouth, 
met with representatives of some governments-ln-exlle, 
and appeared together on the platform when Churchill spoke 
to local officials In Glasgow.
After extending his stay to six weeks, Hopkins 
cabled his full report to President Roosevelt. That 
Hopkins' thirty page report was probably compiled by a 
logistics expert did not matter; the Important point is 
that the British trusted Hopkins with secret data that 
revealed the dire situation In England. Further, the 
British Prime Minister knew that this Personal Representative
9u.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Hearings on S.275. part 3, 77 Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, 873, 
9OO-9O0; Roosevelt seriously considered using Willkie as his 
Personal Representative to the Prime Ministers of New Zea­
land and Australia but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
ended that Idea. Welles to Roosevelt, December 5, 1941; 
Roosevelt to Willkie, December 5, 1941 (never sent); Memo 
by Grace Tully to Roosevelt, December 8, 1941, President’s 
Personal File: 7023 (Willkie, Wendell), PDRL,
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was the President’s closest adviser, and treated him with 
utmost confidence and respect. Churchill developed the 
kind of relationship with Hopkins whereby he presented 
proposals to Hopkins for the President's consideration, 
but if Hopkins felt the time was not right for the idea, 
Churchill knew he should not approach Roosevelt.
In conjunction with the aid program, Roosevelt wanted 
a summit meeting with the British leader. He believed a 
personal conference with Churchill would lend emphasis to 
the American commitment to the Allies and at the same time 
promote a consensus in the American public's mind for a 
more active role in the conflict. The Prime Minister 
concurred with the President's idea, but the protracted 
debates over lend lease, British intervention in Greece, 
and German successes in the Balkans caused first Roosevelt 
and then Churchill to ask a postponement of the conference.
By the summer of l$4l, however, Roosevelt concluded 
the summit must be held soon. He decided to include a 
discussion of the coverage of Iceland by American naval 
patrols, and he wanted personally to reassure Churchill
1 Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 28, 1941, 855.001 
Leopold/78; Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 28, 1941,
740.0011 EWI939/806I; Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 30,
1941, Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 121, Folder A; Harry Hopkins 
Diary, January 30, 1941; Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 
31, 1941; Hopkins to Roosevelt, February 3, 1941, 121,841 
Hopkins, Harry/10 3/7, Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 121,
Folder A, FDRL; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 257-258.
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about continued American support. Again, he sent Hopkins 
to London, this time to get Churchill’s agreement on a 
firm date for the meeting.
Once in London, Hopkins informed Churchill of 
Roosevelt's decision about the shipping; moreover, he 
secured agreement on a date for the conference. Later, as 
he discussed other problems with British officials, Hop­
kins concluded that his lack of knowledge about the Russian 
front and its relations to Anglo-American military 
strategy necessitated a trip to Russia. On July 25, Hop­
kins cabled Roosevelt that he should travel from London to 
Moscow because "everything possible should be done to make 
certain that the Russians maintain a permanent front even 
though they be defeated in this immediate battle." Roose­
velt could send a personal note so that "Stalin would then 
know in an unmistakable way that we mean business on a 
long term supply Job." On the following day, Roosevelt 
cabled his approval.
Shortly after arriving in Moscow on July 28, Hopkins 
met Premier Stalin and informed him that President Roose­
velt desired a discussion of the ways in which the United 
States could most effectively extend aid to Russia. Stalin
llRoosevelt to Hopkins, July 2$, l$4l, U.S. Congress, 
Joint Committee On The Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack, Hearings. part 20, 79 Cong., 2d Sess., 1946,
4373.
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at once requested anti-aircraft guns, two thousand pursuit 
planes, and added that Murmansk would be the best ice-free 
port for receiving supplies. After a brief meeting with 
British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps and Foreign Affairs 
Minister V.M. Molotov, Hopkins and Stalin met for a 
second time. Stalin opened with an in-depth analysis of 
German military positions on the Eastern front, their 
capabilities, and the successes and failures of the Russian 
forces. He reiterated the primary need for tanks, aluminum 
for aircraft construction, machine guns, and large anti­
aircraft guns. Hopkins noted the requests but added that 
the logistics problem could not be adequately resolved 
until a joint conference was held to explore the strategic 
interests and needs of the three nations. Stalin agreed to 
give the proposal his personal attention, an action which, 
to Hopkins, meant that the conference was almost assured of 
taking place. Hopkins had earlier met with Molotov and 
learned so little from that conference that he knew Stalin 
alone gave out any important information and made all vital 
decisions. Roosevelt valued and later used Hopkins’ personal 
observations in his attempts to win over the Russian
leader.12
l^Memorandum by Harry Hopkins, July 30, 1941, FRUS, 
1941, I: 802-815; Harry Hopkins, "The Inside Story of My
Meeting With Stalin," American Magazine. 132 (December, 
1941), 14-15, 114-117.
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Departing Moscow on August 1, Hopkins hoped to 
return to England in time to accompany Churchill to 
Newfoundland for the historic meeting with Roosevelt,
His physical condition, however, did not lend itself to 
the arduous task of riding a military bomber on a trip 
from Great Britain to Russia and back within three days.
He had been seriously ill in 1937 when a cancerous 
malignancy required the removal of part of his stomach.
Now,' in his haste to return, he forgot his supply of 
medicine and spent the journey in misery. The next day, 
August 2, one week after he cabled for permission to go 
to Russia, Hopkins rested on the British warship Prince 
of Wales as it awaited the Prime Minister.^3
On August 9, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill met at Argentia Bay, Newfoundland. In addition 
to discussions on military strategy and the extension of 
the American naval patrols, Churchill tried unsuccessfully 
to gain a positive understanding about America’s position 
if war should break out in Asia. Realizing that they had 
to make a public declaration and hopeful of dramatizing 
the growing relationship between the two nations, the two 
leaders discussed the possibility of issuing a Joint 
statement of purpose. The British delegation proposed five 
articles, the third of which read "they respect the right
^^sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. 347-348.
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of all people to choose the form of government under which 
they will live." Roosevelt, unable to pass up an oppor­
tunity to express his convictions about self-determination, 
proposed that they add "and they hope that self-government 
may be restored to those from whom it has been forcibly 
removed." With some revisions, the two leaders issued a 
press release which became known as the Atlantic Charter. 
The statement declared that both nations sought no terri­
tory or territorial changes without the consent of the 
people involved, recognized the rights of all people to 
choose their own form of government, favored access by all 
nations to trade and raw materials of the world, sought 
world cooperation to improve labor, economic, and social 
standards, desired a world free from fear and want; and 
believed that all nations should have freedom of the seas 
and a peace based on disarmament pending establishment of 
a permanent system of international security.
The Atlantic Charter received praise throughout the 
parts of the world which struggled against Axis aggression 
and inspired many inhabitants of the British Empire. Most 
Americans accepted the statements as drawing the two 
nations closer together and in particular viewed Article 
Three as symbolic of the United States’ position in the
l^Memorandum by Sumner Welles, August 10, 1941, FRUS, 
1941, I: 354-356; Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading 
(New York; Harper and Brothers, c. 1^46), 6-lb,
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world of 1941.
While President Franklin D. Roosevelt strongly be­
lieved in the right of self-determination, his attempts to 
uphold Article Three of the Atlantic Charter would be in­
fluenced by the American war effort, domestic politics, 
and the article’s possible effect on the Grand Alliance. 
This became clear shortly after the summit meeting when 
British and Russian forces invaded and occupied Iran. The 
Iranian Minister in Washington called on the United States 
to take steps to uphold Iranian independence. Recognizing 
the strategic importance of the territory and not wanting 
to block the Allies’ efforts against Germany, Roosevelt 
replied that the invasion was justified.15
Although the President wisely refrained from inter­
vening in the Iranian situation, British policy toward 
India caught his attention. He reacted to the problem 
with imprudent and meddling policies which showed once 
again his tendency toward impulsive, dramatic responses 
which not only confused many American citizens. State 
Department officials, and Indian nationals hopeful for 
independence, but also strained Anglo-American relations. 
Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
l^Memorandum of conversation by Cordell Hull, August 
22, 1941, FRUS, 1941, III: 406-407; Memorandum by Wallace 
Murray, August 26, 1941, ibid.. 419-421; Memorandum of 
conversation by Cordell Hull, August 27, 1941, ibid., 431.
57
Roosevelt and Churchill met in Washington to plan wartime 
strategy. Anxious over the military losses in the Far 
East, Roosevelt opened discussion on British policy in 
India. As the Prime Minister himself later wrote, "I 
reacted so strongly and at such length" that Roosevelt 
never spoke of the problem again,
In spite of Churchill’s adverse reactions, events 
caused Roosevelt to continue pressing for a change in 
British policy. The Japanese move into Singapore on 
February l4, 19%2, caused him much anxiety, and at the 
same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up 
the matter of British policy and India. On February 25, 
the Committee reviewed the status of American manpower in 
the Far East, specifically in China and India. Senators 
Thomas Connally, Arthur Vandenberg, Robert LaFollette, 
and Theodore Green were particularly outspoken in their 
belief that the United States should demand autonomy for 
India. The State Department representative at that 
meeting, Breckingridge Long, concluded that the unanimity 
of the members present and the length of their arguments 
should be taken seriously, because their strength could 
lead to attacks against the administration for its failure 
to push for political changes and large scale military
l^Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 of 
The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1950), 209.
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activities to support the American manpower in the Par 
East. The White House took note of the Senators’ collective 
view, for on that same evening Roosevelt wired John Winant 
that either the Ambassador or W, Averell Harriman, Roose­
velt’s Personal Representative in charge of lend lease in 
Britain, should determine Churchill’s attitude toward a 
new policy in India.
On the next morning, February 26, Churchill told 
Harriman that the Moslems made up seventy-five per cent 
of the Indian fighting force, and since that group’s popu­
lation exceeded one-hundred million and remained antago­
nistic to the All India Congress movement, he would do 
nothing to alienate them. While Churchill remained 
adamant in his position, he did inform Roosevelt that the 
British had thought of dominion status for India, but to 
grant it at that time would throw the state into chaos. 
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister saw the need for softening 
the criticism of Britain’s position and ordered a special 
mission under Sir Stafford Cripps to conduct direct dis­
cussions with Indian political leaders and the heads of 
Indian cities and towns. Knowing that many politicians 
and members of the All India Congress sought immediate 
independence, Churchill also agreed to propose full
l^Memorandum by Breckinridge Long to Welles, 
February 25, 19%2, FRUS. 1942, I. 606-607.
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independence to India after the war if demanded by an
1 Relected assembly.
In order to hush his Senatorial critics and to refute 
Churchill's arguments about the instability of Indian 
political diversity, Roosevelt suggested a specific policy 
to the British leader. He pointed to the individuality of 
the original thirteen American states and how they even­
tually formed a strong unified nation. Citing this ex­
ample, Roosevelt called for a temporary government in 
India to be headed by a group representing the different 
castes, religions, geographic areas, and the existing 
British government. Such a body, he believed, could set 
the ground work for a permanent government which could take 
over following the war. Unsure that his suggestions would 
not upset the British and thinking of the likely political 
and religious turmoil in India if his plan should be 
accepted, Roosevelt covered his tracks by declaring, "For 
the love of heaven don't bring me into this, though I do 
want to be of help. It is strictly speaking, none of my 
business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the 
successful fight that you and I are making."^9
l^Harriman to Roosevelt, February 26, 1942, ibid., 608; 
Churchill to Roosevelt, March 4, 1942, ibid., 612.
llRoosevelt to Churchill, March 10, 1942, FRUS. 1942,
I: 615-616; Gary Hess, America Encounters India. 1941-194? 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, c. 1971), 39.
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While the President was attempting to give Churchill 
a lesson in political science. Assistant Secretary of State 
Adolf Berle proposed the dispatching of an economic 
mission to India to evaluate the productive capacity and 
efficiency of India's war effort. Because of the devastating 
and rapid military successes by the Japanese, Roosevelt 
decided the mission must go and announced that Louis Johnson 
would head the task force.
The President's decision to send an envoy to India 
came primarily from his concern for the effect of the 
political quarrel on the Allies' military effort. Further, 
the selection of Louis Johnson, a novitiate in diplomacy, 
perhaps reveals Roosevelt's belief that the presence of 
any Personal Representative in India would influence the 
disputants to turn their energies against the Japanese,
Although Roosevelt was primarily concerned with 
strategy, he also used the mission as a means of employing 
the loyal and influential Johnson, The West Virginia 
Democrat served as organizer of the veterans' vote in the 
1932 campaign, and was rewarded with an appointment as 
Assistant Secretary of War, In that post, Johnson ad­
vocated all-out preparedness for the United States but 
ultimately resigned in 19^0 because of a policy clash with 
the isolationist Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, The 
President did not know or care that his man had no known 
views on colonialism or the specific subject of India, but
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instead remembered him as an organizer and former national
commander of the politically potent American Legion, who
felt hurt when not appointed to succeed Woodring as
Secretary of War, and betrayed when Roosevelt selected
Henry Wallace as his running mate. By naming Johnson to
the India mission post, Roosevelt could use him to perform
a vital task for the nation, while at the same time, soothe
?nthe politician’s feelings.
At the outset of the discussions on his mission to 
India, Johnson objected to the title of ’’Commissioner" 
because he felt that many Southerners viewed it as a label 
for "a conspicuously unsuccessful lawyer." He did, how­
ever, agree with the suggestion that he be the "Personal 
Representative of the President." When Assistant Secretary 
of State G. Howland Shaw then informed him that his duties 
as Special Representative at New Delhi would take prece­
dence over his work as Chairman of the mission, Johnson 
said that was the first he had heard of that and complained 
that he had not received any information about his mission.
The State Department continued to brief Johnson for 
his mission, but he received no specific instructions from 
the President. While the earlier suggestions to Churchill
P 0Memorandum by Adolf Berle, January 28, 1942, Berle 
to Roosevelt, January 29, 1942; Roosevelt to Berle, 
February 2, 1942, Official File 48-H, PDRL; Department of 
State Release, March 9, 1942, FRUS. 1942, I: 613; Burns, 
Roosevelt; Soldier of Freedom. 220.
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for a possible confederacy in India revealed Roosevelt’s 
imprecise and poorly-conceived approach to the Indian 
question, the lack of instructions to Johnson perhaps in­
dicated calculation on Roosevelt's part. He likely refrained 
from spelling out those objectives because he knew that John­
son tended to be blunt in tackling political problems and 
that he would probably charge into the conflict with the self- 
imposed goal of settling the issues so that the war could be 
fought without facing serious political obstacles. Am­
biguity also provided Roosevelt an opportunity to later al­
ter Johnson's status without appearing to bend to British de­
mands that the United States stop meddling in its colonial 
policies. At the same time he modified Johnson's status, 
Roosevelt recalled the American Commissioner from New Delhi. 
Thomas Wilson had served in that post since July 19%1, and 
could have provided valuable assistance to Johnson; but the 
President wanted "one who had a close recent contact with 
military affairs and who is well known to the leaders of our 
armed forces." In fact, Roosevelt wanted someone in India 
whom he could trust and rely upon to report directly to him. 
Moreover, the announcement that the "President's Personal 
Representative" was being dispatched to India would be more
likely to capture the American public's attention than
PImerely upgrading a Foreign Service Officer.
^^Welles to Wilson, March 11. 1942, FRUS, 1942, 
I: 617-618.
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During this time. Sir Stafford Cripps met with 
Indian leaders and explained the British plan to broaden 
the Viceroy’s executive council to include Indian national 
representatives. While the Viceroy continued to be the 
Imperial administrator in India and the Council remained 
responsible to the Crown, the British promised that in­
structions to the Council would be kept at a minimum.
The plan further called for all military operations to be 
under British officers, but once the war ended, a repre­
sentative group of Indians and delegates from the princely 
states would prepare a constitution establishing India as 
an independent dominion; but each province would retain 
the right to join or remain outside the federation and 
form its own government. The Cripps Plan met opposition 
from Indian nationals who rejected the proposal because 
of continued British control of defenses and Britain's 
intention of granting recognition to Pakistan.22
With the belief that his Commander-in-Chief stood 
firmly behind him, Louis Johnson arrived in New Delhi on 
April 3, 1942. After holding two long sessions with 
Cripps, Johnson cabled Roosevelt that Cripps favored some
Z^Haselton to Hull, March 26, 1942, Department of State 
File 845.01/133 National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Here­
after any reference to Department of State Piles will be 
D.S. File...NA; Haselton to Hull, March 28, 1942, D.S.
File 845.01/134 NA; Merrel to Hull, April 2, 1942, FRUS.
1942, I: 624; Haselton to Hull, March 31, 1942, D.JTTile 
845.01/140, NA.
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compromises which included giving India a place in the 
War Cabinet and the naming of an Indian as defense minister. 
Cripps had also proposed an alternative which would con­
vert the defense ministry into a war ministry under the 
Imperial Commander and, at the same time, create a new 
office of Minister of Coordination of Defense. This post 
would be filled by an Indian who could be in charge of 
"relatively innocuous matters." While Cripps worked 
diligently to develop an acceptable compromise. Viceroy 
Lord Linlithgow and General Archbald Wavell informed 
Churchill of their opposition to the plan. Agreeing with 
Cripps’ proposals, Johnson called for the President to 
intercede with Churchill or risk failure of the entire 
British effort. Roosevelt rejected Johnson's plea for 
intercession on the grounds that if he "interposed his own 
views, the results would complicate further an already 
complicated situation."
Even though the President decided to stay out of the 
affair, Johnson pushed hard for Cripps’ compromises. On 
April 8, Johnson met with General Wavell and convinced him 
that nothing would be lost in changing the form of the 
military administration in India. With Wavell’s recommen­
dation and Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s apparent approval.
^Johnson to Roosevelt, April 4, 1942; Welles to 
Johnson, April 5, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.01/149, NA; Hess, 
America Encounters India. 47.
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Johnson and Cripps seemed ready to achieve a settle- 
2hment.
While Johnson pursued the compromise, Roosevelt's 
chief agent, Harry Hopkins, met with Churchill to discuss 
forthcoming military operations. The Prime Minister called 
Hopkins to his office and read a dispatch from the Viceroy. 
According to Lord Linlithgow's account, Cripps, with 
Johnson's active cooperation, presented the alternative 
plan without consulting the resident administrator in 
India. In an attempt to assuage Churchill's "unfortunate 
impression" that Johnson had instructions to intervene, 
Hopkins told the Prime Minister that Johnson's original 
mission had nothing to do with the political crisis and 
that he was not acting in an official capacity. Hopkins 
then informed Churchill that Roosevelt wanted his name 
kept out of the situation unless the Prime Minister re­
quested his assistance and that he would mediate only if 
both parties would accept any plan he worked out. Church­
ill had all he needed to stop Johnson's meddling and informed 
the Viceroy that the American was not acting on Roosevelt's
behalf.
^^Johnson to Hull, April 9, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/
153, NA.
^^Hopkins to Roosevelt, April 9, 1942, D.S. Pile 
845.01/158, NA; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 524-
525.
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Unaware of the activities in London, Johnson pro­
posed the substitute defense amendment and received en­
dorsement by Cripps, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Indian 
Congress President, Cripps then announced that he could 
not change the original proposals unless Churchill 
approved, an announcement which meant the end to the 
negotiations. Johnson held no bitterness toward Cripps, 
for the American knew that London— meaning Churchill— had 
not been enthusiastic about the talks. It appeared to 
Johnson that as the negotiations reached a settlement, 
the Prime Minister could not accept the prospects of seeing 
the government lose any control of its valued possession.
On April 19, the Indian Congress rejected Cripps’ plan.
If the Louis Johnson mission to India had a specific 
goal of settling the political conflict, it failed. Respon­
sibility for the lack of success rests not with Johnson 
but in the White House. Roosevelt knew well that Johnson 
would not stand still during the Cripps negotiations, yet 
he refused to back his envoy with any serious efforts to 
dissuade Churchill from recalling Cripps. His clumsy, 
whimsical proposal for an Indian confederation exposed his 
shallow understanding of the conflict and gave Churchill 
an opportunity to blame the Indian politicians for not
^^Johnson to Roosevelt. April 11, 19^2, President’s 
Secretary's Pile; India, 1942, Box 43, PDRL.
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accepting the Prime Minister’s plan— which had some 
similarities to Roosevelt’s proposal. Moreover, Hopkins' 
discussions with Churchill In London, whether directed by 
Roosevelt or not, demonstrated the President’s unwilling­
ness to support his envoy. Hopkins knew of Johnson’s 
modified title to "Personal Representative Near The 
Government at New Delhi," but had no choice In his story 
to Churchill as he knew well that Roosevelt had no desire 
to confront the Prime Minister on the Indian Issue.
Although the negotiations had ended, Johnson continued 
to try to fulfill what he thought was his mission. He 
Informed Washington of a forthcoming All India Congress 
meeting and believed the pro-Allled Nehru would be 
strengthened In his attempt to gain more power In the 
Congress If the United States, Great Britain, and China 
would Issue a joint statement of Pacific war alms which 
Included freedom and self-determination for India. In an 
attempt to Improve America's Image In India, Johnson held 
a press conference and later spoke to the Indian people over 
the All-India Radio Station at Delhi. In both Instances, 
he vaguely Implied that the United States supported the
^Johnson to Murray, June 10, 1942, D.S. Pile 123 
Johnson, Louis A . / 3 8 .  NA; Johnson to Leonard Parker, June 
29, 1942, D.S. Pile 845 .2 4 /24 5 ,  NA; Leo Crowley to Roose­
velt, July 6, 1942, OP 4o69; Crowley to Stephen Early, 
July 10, 1942, OP 77, PDRL; Hess, America Encounters 
India, 52.
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Indian goal of independence, but did not denounce colonial 
administrators or advocate specific changes in British 
policies. His efforts proved unsuccessful as angry 
British administrators saw Johnson’s words as inflammatory, 
and Indian politicians criticized him for failing to con­
demn the British policies in India.
While Johnson persisted in his efforts to salvage 
something from the mission, mutterings were heard in 
Washington about the further usefulness of the President’s 
Personal Representative. The Near Eastern Division of the 
State Department became concerned over Johnson’s direct 
appeal to the Indian people and the effect of a declaration 
of war aims in the Pacific. Wallace Murray told Sumner 
Welles that Johnson’s suggestion was impracticable and 
unadvisable because such a policy must include other 
Pacific areas or it would arouse antagonism among those 
groups. In a dispatch to Johnson, Welles set down 
Murray’s ideas and further informed Johnson that he should 
not get too involved with any particular Indian political 
group. Fearful that he would completely antagonize the 
colonial government, the State Department hoped this 
message would quash any further public utterances by
^Bjohnson to Roosevelt, April 13, 1942, FRUS, I: 
635-637; Johnson to Roosevelt, April 17, 1942, ibid., 
638-639; Memorandum of conversation by Wallace Murray, 
April 24, 1942, ibid.. 639-642; The Statesman, April 22, 
1942 (British newspaper in New Delhi); transcription of 
Louis Johnson Broadcast, April 23, 1942, OF 48-H, FDRL,
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Johnson.29
On May 4, Johnson made one final plea to Washington. 
He wrote Roosevelt that the All-India Congress had passed 
resolutions which reflected Gandhi's call for non-resis­
tance to the Japanese. Johnson again proposed a national 
government for India, with the primary military defense 
of India to be left In the hands of the Viceroy. Welles 
told Roosevelt that the military situation would likely 
see little change and that the proposals should be rejected 
since they had no assurances that a second effort would 
be successful. The President wired his appreciation to 
Johnson for his efforts, but rejected the plan.
One day later, realizing the President's support had 
disintegrated, Johnson decided to end his mission. He had 
struggled for over a month and had nothing but rebuffs for 
those efforts. In addition, a bothersome sinus condition 
required minor surgery, and caused Johnson even more 
aggravation. With his physical condition as an excuse, 
Johnson announced his decision to return to the United
29johnson to Roosevelt, April 21, 1942, D.S. Pile 
845.01/170; Johnson to Roosevelt, April 25, 1942, D.S,
Pile 845.01/171; Wallace Murray to Berle, Welles, and Hull, 
April 24, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.01/175; Memorandum on Louis 
Johnson Press Conference, April 23, 1942, D.S. Pile 
845.01/170, NA.
^Ojohnson to Roosevelt, May 4, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.01/ 
176; Wallace Murray to Welles, May 6, 1942, Ibid.; Welles 
to Roosevelt, May 7. 1942, Ibid.; Roosevelt to Johnson,
May 6, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.ÔÎ7Ï86A, NA.
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States. In spite of pleas from Washington that his sudden 
return would be misinterpreted, Johnson left India on 
May 14.31
In a conversation with Wallace Murray after his 
return to Washington, Johnson aired his ideas as to why 
the mission failed. Loyal Democrat to the end, Johnson 
made no comments on the President's vacillation and re­
jection of his policy proposals. Instead, he said the 
British Government had sabotaged the Crlpps Mission, never 
wanting it to succeed. He also declared that while Cripps 
had not received specific power to make alternative pro­
posals, the situation could have improved if Churchill had 
consented to further talks. Johnson never realized that 
the Prime Minister remained uncompromising in his position 
partly because Churchill knew Roosevelt was not committed 
to a definite change of policy by the British.32
Following his meeting with State Department officials, 
Johnson recuperated from his illness at Mayo Clinic in 
Rochester, Minnesota, and then returned to the law firm 
of Steptoe and Johnson in Clarksburg, West Virginia. 
President Roosevelt decided he should find a,Job for the
31johnson to Roosevelt, May 9, 1942, PRUS, I: 651> 
Hull to Johnson, May 13, 1942, ibid.. 653; Doctor Orrin E, 
Swenson to Johnson, May 14, 1942, D.S, Pile 123 Johnson, 
Louis A./38, NA.; Johnson to Roosevelt, May 14, 1942, PRUS, 
I: 654.
S^Memorandum by Wallace Murray, May 26, 1942, D.S. 
Pile 845.01/206, NA.
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politically valuable Johnson but not as his Personal 
Representative. After the United States seized the German- 
owned General Aniline Corporation, Roosevelt, in July 1942, 
named Johnson as President of the General Dyestuff Corpora­
tion, a sales organization for the parent company, Johnson 
remained in that post until 1949, when he resigned to be­
come Secretary of Defense for President Harry S. Truman. 
Johnson served in that post until September 1950, when 
illness and policy conflict caused his retirement.^3
During the summer months of 1942 conditions in India 
continued to worsen. Prom New Delhi the ranking State 
Department officer, George Merrell, sent messages revealing 
Gandhi’s plan for massive civil disobedience in order to 
force immediate withdrawal by the British. Merrell also 
pointed out that Nehru and the All-India Congress would 
follow Gandhi’s lead and passively demonstrate in a demand 
for immediate independence. When the British offered no 
changes in their policies, the Indian Congress passed 
resolutions calling for mass non-violent disobedience. As 
the passive resistance began, the British rounded up leading 
Indian political figures, and the promised revolt began. 
Throughout the remainder of August 1942, over four thousand 
Indians were killed or wounded, and about 100,000 were 
arrested and jailed. In a reply to the rebellion, Churchill
^^New York Times, December 8, 1951, 5.
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blasted the Indian Congress’ actions and held the original 
Cripps proposal as the only possible solution.3^
As the Indian issued flared, Roosevelt learned that 
some Indian political leaders believed that he could find 
a solution to the problem. The President again changed 
his mind and decided that he would again try to resolve 
the conflict.
Unable to resist the call of the Indian politicians, 
and understanding that the extremely tense situation 
"warranted the appointment of a trained diplomat of great 
distinction and prestige," Roosevelt named his old friend 
William Phillips as the new Personal Representative to 
India. Roosevelt selected Phillips partially because of 
their solid friendship but moreso because he knew Phillips 
to be a conservative, tight-lipped diplomat who would not 
act in India without first securing the White House’s 
approval. Also, the choice of Phillips became even easier 
because, in the summer of 1942, he did not have any out­
spoken views on the crisis and had the reputation of being 
an Anglophile.
A New England native, Phillips entered the diplomatic 
service in 1903 as personal secretary to Rufus Choate,
3%Merrell to Roosevelt, May 21, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.01/ 
,191; Merrell to Roosevelt, May 25, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.01/ 
192; Merrell to Hull, June 17, 1942, D.S. Pile 845.01/207, 
NA.; Hess, America Encounters India, 81-88.
73
American Ambassador to the Court of St. James, and within 
nine years became first secretary of the Embassy in London, 
He then resigned his post and returned to the United States 
to serve as Secretary of The Corporation at Harvard Univer­
sity, At the urging of President Woodrow Wilson, he re­
turned to the State Department in 1914 as Third Assistant 
Secretary of State, and while in this post became acquainted 
with Assistant Secretary of Navy Franklin Roosevelt, Par­
ticularly well-suited for the conservative nature of 
American diplomacy of the 1920’s, the quiet, obedient 
Phillips served as Minister to The Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
and Belgium, The singular instance of personal reaction to 
American foreign policy came when Phillips resigned his 
Ambassadorship in Ottawa, Canada because of President 
Herbert Hoover’s tariff policies. When Roosevelt became 
President, Phillips agreed to serve as Under Secretary of 
State, In 1936, he became Ambassador to Italy and remained 
in that post until 1940, By the summer of 1942, Phillips 
was Director of the Office of Strategic Services head­
quarters in L o n d o n , 35
35phillips to Roosevelt, February 10, 1933, President’s 
Personal File 552, FDRL; William J, Donovan to G. Howland 
Shaw, July 16, 1942, D.S, File 123P54/515, NA,; William 
Phillips’ personal Impressions of his government career, 
and the mission to India are found in his Ventures In 
Diplomacy (Boston; The Beacon Press, c, 1952); Raymond 
Moiey ATcer Seven Years (New York: Harper and Brothers,
c, 1939')“, 131.
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In the State Department, Sumner Welles and Wallace 
Murray recommended to Hull that Phillips be called home so 
he could be acquainted with the facts and latest develop­
ments about India. Even though Phillips had no diplomatic 
experience in that part of the world and had not been 
briefed about Johnson’s mission, Roosevelt decided that 
Phillips would go directly to New Delhi. In addition to the 
State Department’s problem of trying to inform Phillips 
of the situation in India, there was the nettlesome matter 
of his official title. Murray pointed out that because rank 
held great import in India, and since Phillips had rendered 
long and distinguished service to the government, he should 
be entitled to "Personal Representative of the President 
With the Rank of Ambassador.” Murray further reasoned that 
if Phillips were named "Commissioner,” the appointment would 
have to go to the Senate where some embarrassing questions 
might be asked about the last mission. While Roosevelt 
could settle the titular problem, the British did not agree 
so quickly. Lord Halifax preferred the latter title, be­
lieving that Personal Representative Johnson had committed 
serious blunders and had caused hard feelings between the 
two allies by actively exceeding his instructions. If 
Phillips had the lesser sounding title, Halifax believed 
his chances of mediating the problem would be nullified. 
After the British finally agreed, Roosevelt announced the 
appointment of William Phillips as his "Personal
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Representative to serve near the Government of India.
With the announcement of Phillips’ appointment, 
many people assumed that his goal was to actively seek a 
solution to the Indian problem, and in drafting his 
instructions, the State Department proved to be no excep­
tion. The proposed message mentioned that Phillips should 
discuss the Indian situation with British officials in 
London, and once abroad, he should keep "close contacts 
with the representatives of British, Hindu, and Moslem 
thought in India, as well as with representatives of any 
other influential groups." These suggestions gave Phillips 
more latitude than Roosevelt intended, as indicated by the 
cable of November 20 which made clear that Phillips’ job 
did not include "such informal discussion to the point 
where it might be charged by the opposite side that you 
and this Government were attempting to intervene on our own 
initiative to put up proposals and plans for them to 
accept." Phillips then read that "the terrific complexities 
of the Indian situation are difficult to analyze and under­
stand. With your great experience and fine common sense 
you will well understand how to preserve thoroughly agreeable
S^Welles to Murray, November 5, 19^2; Murray to Welles, 
November 6, 1942; Welles to Hull, November 7, 1942; Murray 
to Welles, November 7, 1942; Murray to Welles, November 
19, 1942, D.S. Pile 123P54/525 1/2; Murray to Shaw, Novem­
ber 10, 1942, D.S. Pile 123P54/557, NA.; M. J. McDermott 
to Stephen Early, December 10, 1942, OP 2314, PDRL.
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relations with both countries and how to say or do anything, 
in a tactful way, that might encourage both sides or either 
side, in the way of a practical settlement." Phillips was 
struck by the naivete^ of the statement that suggested that 
he might be able to produce an agreement when the conflict 
had been so intense for years. But then Phillips, like 
Louis Johnson, concluded that he must do everything possible 
to help solve the issue because he assumed the President 
had finally decided to make a firm stand on the Indian 
question; otherwise why send him?3?
After he arrived in New Delhi on January 8, 1943, 
Phillips spent the first few weeks acquainting himself 
with the situation. Presenting Roosevelt’s personal letter, 
he met the Viceroy and received his assurances that he could 
travel about the country as he wished. He met Generals 
Archbald Wavell and Claude Auchinlech, both of whom 
Phillips counted on as supporters of his mission, Wavell 
remained a believer in the empire but favored softer mea­
sures, while Auchinlech looked at the possibilities of 
improved military activities by the Indians if the political 
situation improved, Phillips found that while people in 
England wanted to grant dominion status to India, the 
Government of India remained totally opposed to a free
Draft of message to Phillips, November 7, 1942; 
Hull to Phillips, November 19, 1942, D,S, Pile 123P54/531, 
NA,; Phillips Ventures In Diplomacy. 343-345,
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India, and that "it was the British themselves who were 
permitting the impasse to continue rather than using their 
good offices to bring the opposing parties together," 
Phillips’ personal conclusions, reached early in his stay 
in India, caused him much frustration and bitterness toward 
the British for their unyielding attitude.
Anxious to get away from the ever growing line of 
Indian nationalists at his office, and seeking to strengthen 
his position toward the Viceroy, Phillips visited several 
Indian provinces. He traveled to Lahore, Punjab, met 
several local officials, visited Punjab University and some 
holy shrines, and talked with local politicians. After two 
days Phillips returned to New Delhi enroute to Bombay.
Believing he could not carry out his mission unless 
he met Gandhi and the Congress leaders, all of whom were 
in custody, Phillips saw the Viceroy and asked permission 
to visit Gandhi in Bombay. The Viceroy denied Phillips’ 
request on the ground that no government officials would 
be permitted to visit him, and indicated that Gandhi 
planned to start a fast the next day. Realizing the 
serious nature of Gandhi’s action, Phillips agreed and post­
poned the rest of his tour.
On February 11, two days after Gandhi started his
SBphillips to Roosevelt, January 22, 1943, FRUS. 1943, 
IV; 180-183; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy. 34^-555.
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fast, Phillips wired Roosevelt that since the situation 
might reach serious proportions, more and more pressure 
centered on him to do something. Phillips described how 
every Indian visitor referred to the American power and 
influence to solve the problem, which left him in a 
position of not knowing what to say in return. Having 
requested clarification of his position and latitude of 
action, Phillips awaited word from Roosevelt.
Over the next three days, shops and markets closed 
in Calcutta, Bombay, New Delhi and smaller cities; ex­
plosions occurred in the Delhi railroad station; many 
Indian students stayed away from classes and demonstrated 
in sympathy for Gandhi. In describing those incidents, 
Phillips again pointed out that the Indian press continually 
criticized his silence and wondered when the American 
would see the jailed Congress leaders. Phillips’ frustra­
tions became clear as he wrote that "such comment is not 
pleasant to read" and "without instructions, I must not 
do anything to jeopardize my position with the Viceroy and 
therefore must stay and do nothing which might be inter­
preted as critical of the Government’s actions or inaction." 
The President— with Phillips on the scene— had to make a
decision.39
39phillips to Hull, February 8, 1943, FRUS 1943. IV: 
185-187; Phillips to Roosevelt, February 11, 1943, ibid., 
189; Phillips to Hull, February 13, 1943, ibid., 19?; 
Phillips to Hull, February 15, 1943, ibid., 193.
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Roosevelt felt he had to take some action to answer 
the charges of American indifference toward India, but 
more importantly he feared that Phillips, like Johnson, 
might start making proposals to Indian politicians and 
British administrators. Roosevelt simply would not risk 
a confrontation with Churchill's policies because the 
prospects of a serious division could set back or destroy 
the Allied priority of defeating Germany. To have that 
strategy realigned because of India would mean less pressure 
on Germany from the West, a probable loss of one or more 
years operations in Europe, and the possibility that one of 
the Allies would find a separate peace to be in its 
national interests. In his work, America Encounters India, 
1941-19^7, Gary Hess claims that Roosevelt lost his 
"coercive potential" due to the Allies victories in North 
Africa, Stalingrad, and the Pacific in late 19%2 and 19%3; 
but if Roosevelt was really serious about independence for 
India, he would have been in a stronger position with the 
physical threat to India diminished and the concern about 
the impact of India's internal struggle on Allied military 
strategy eliminated. Roosevelt did.not pressure Churchill, 
but told Secretary of State Hull that "in view of the fact 
that William Phillips is getting pretty well oriented in 
regard to the general situation in India, will you please 
wire him that I would like to see him in Washington the 
end of April or the beginning of May, and that he can get
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a chance to be In this country about a month.” Roosevelt 
wanted Phillips out of India but likely held out the 
possibility that he would soon return to India in order 
to keep him from making a Johnson-style exit.^0
Even though he knew Roosevelt's thoughts, Phillips 
represented the President and could not remain in India 
as a disinterested observer. After receiving approval to 
approach the Viceroy and informally inquire about Gandhi's 
fast, Phillips told the Viceroy that the President "hoped 
some means could be found to avert the worsening of the 
situation which would almost certainly follow Gandhi's 
death." The Viceroy told Phillips that the present British 
policy remained correct and that although there would be 
some trouble in India, it would pass within six months.
He told Phillips not to mention his visit but tell reporters 
that the Viceroy vias keeping him informed. From that, 
Phillips assumed the Viceroy desired no further personal 
contact with the American, and from that time, few of 
Phillips' messages mention meetings with the Viceroy. One 
day later, February, 19, Phillips met with Chakravarty 
Rajagopalachari, another Indian Congress leader. Known as 
a moderate in Indian politics, Rajagopalachari told Phillips 
that the United States needed to clarify its position or
^'^Roosevelt to Hull, February 15, 1943, OF 48-11, 1943, 
FDRL; Hull to Phillips, February l6, 1943, D.S. File 
123P54/58I, NA.; Hess, America Encounters India, 102-103.
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or Asians would conclude that America was collaborating 
with Great Britain in India. Voicing his fear of an anti­
white reaction should Gandhi die, he called on Phillips 
to do something to prevent the catastrophe,^^
Without instructions, Phillips could do nothing.
Indian nationalists saw his inaction and silence as 
America's support for British policies. Following the 
unsuccessful meeting with the Viceroy, Phillips suggested 
that Roosevelt pressure Ambassador Halifax and that the 
Crown release Gandhi, Phillips really wanted a statement 
from Washington which would reassure the Indian nationalists 
and give him positive instructions to intervene to help 
solve the immediate crisis, Phillips got his instructions 
on February 20 when Hull wired him to tell politicians and 
reporters "that any phases of the Indian situation which 
requires discussion will be dealt with by the ranking 
officials of the American and British Governments," Phillips 
still had no way of pressuring the Viceroy or answering
h pthe Indian nationalists,^
By March 3, with the fast ended and Gandhi still 
alive, Phillips wrote President Roosevelt that the fast
Phillips to Hull, February,l6, 1943, D,S. Pile 
845,00/1798, NA,; Hull to Phillips, February 17, 1943, 
PRUS, 1943, IV; 195; Phillips to Hull, February 19,
ÎTO, ibid,. 196-197,
42Hull to Phillips, February 20, 1943, ibid,, 199,
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resulted in greater anti-British feelings throughout 
India; and to reduce the hostility, Phillips proposed that 
the President invite all Indian political leaders to gather 
and discuss future plans for India. The conference would 
be chaired by an American who could harmonize the divergent 
views of the participants, show America's interest in 
India's future, and serve as a guarantee of India's inde­
pendence. To pressure the Indian politicians, the confer­
ence Bould be held under the auspices of the King, Presi­
dent Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek. Phillips felt certain that the Indian leaders 
could not refuse the offer, for to do so would show the 
world that India was not ready for self-government. In 
closing, Phillips appealed to Roosevelt's political side by 
declaring that while the conference might not be successful, 
it would nevertheless show that the United States had taken 
dramatic steps to further the ideals of the Atlantic 
Charter. Phillips never received a reply to his March 3 
suggestions, but Roosevelt read them, thought them "ama­
zingly radical for a man like Bill," and asked Hopkins to 
show the report to the visiting Anthony Eden. The British 
Foreign Minister saw the dispatch but ignored it because 
he knew Roosevelt would not reply favorably to Phillips' 
plan. Unaware of the President's action, the State De­
partment also reviewed Phillips' formula for a settlement 
and in a long note to Welles and Hull, Wallace Murray added
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his support to Phillips' proposal to enable the United 
States to at least be on record as having made the effort. 
While the State Department seriously pondered the Import 
of the note, Hopkins showed the dispatch to Eden and then 
had it filed away.^3
After writing down his ideas, Phillips left on his 
delayed tour of southern India. In Bombay, he met with 
many local politicians and found the same anti-British 
hostility there as in Delhi. He then traveled to Madras 
where he again met Rajagopalachari and learned that the 
Indian again planned to call for Gandhi's release— con­
vinced that a "duration of the war" settlement could be 
reached. Phillips also toured the states of Hyderabad, 
Travancore, and Mysore and learned more about the immense 
problems which awaited the Indians in attempting to reconcile 
sectional, political, and economic differences.
Upon his return to New Delhi, Phillips learned that 
the conference between the Viceroy and the Indian political 
leaders had fallen through. The Indians sought to gain 
permission to see Gandhi, but the Viceroy refused to go 
beyond statements to be delivered and answered in writing. 
Concluding that the British authorities had no desire to
^3phillips to Roosevelt, March 3, 1943, D.S. Pile 
845.00/1906; Roosevelt to Hopkins, March 19» 1943, Presi­
dent's Secretary Pile: India, 1943, Box 43, PDRL; Murray
to Welles and Hull, March 31, 1943, D.S. Pile 845.00/1916, 
NA.; Hess, America Encounters India. 106.
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end the deadlock, Phillips knew his request to see Gandhi 
and Nehru would also be refused. As Phillips planned to 
return to Washington, he felt the mission would end in 
failure unless he saw the leading Indian politicians.
Knowing the meaning of Washington’s silence on his March 3 
proposals, Phillips nevertheless told Hull that his request 
to the Viceroy would be strengthened if he were "in a 
position to say that my Government hopes that my request 
for permission to visit Gandhi and Nehru will be granted." 
Welles opposed the idea and told Hull that as Phillips was 
returning to the United States shortly, nothing should be 
done to deviate from past policy until the Department and 
Phillips reviewed his conclusions. Hull accepted Welles’ 
recommendations and informed Phillips on April 14 that his 
request would have to be on a "purely personal basis.
Under Secretary of State Welles not only opposed 
Phillips proposal for intervention, but inadvertently made 
Phillips’ stay in India more uncomfortable with a letter 
to the New York Times. Replying to Harvard University 
Professor Ralph Barton Perry’s criticism of the Department’s
^^Donovan to Hull, March 11, 1943, FRUS. 1943, IV:
208; Bowers to Hull, March 19, 1943, ibid.. 209; Phillips 
to Hull, March 19, 1943, D.S. File 123FW591; Phillips to 
Hull, April 1, 1943, FRUS. 1943 IV: 210; Phillips to Hull,
April 4, 1943, ibid. ;~TFiHips to Hull, April 2, 1943, 
ibid.. 211; Murray to Welles. April 6. 1943; and Welles to 
SÜÎÎ, April 6, 1943, D.S. File 845.00/1933, NA.; Hull to 
Phillips, April 14, 1943, FRUS. 1943, IV: 215.
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India policy, Welles repudiated a role of active inter­
vention by the ,United States in India. When news of 
Welles' letter reached India, the story omitted a passage 
referring to America's willingness to assist in the 
situation, leading the Indian press to conclude that 
Welles' letter reflected an American underwriting of 
British policy. In a tense meeting with Hindu newspaper­
men, Phillips tried vainly to explain policy limitations 
but saw that the only action to offset the bitter feelings 
would be a successful attempt to meet with Gandhi and 
Nehru. As a result of the conference, Phillips wrote 
Roosevelt that;
India is suffering from paralysis, 
the people are discouraged and there is 
a feeling of growing hopelessness. The 
political leaders remain hostile to one 
another, although they maintain that if 
the British would open the door to nego­
tiation they could manage to pull to­
gether on a provisional basis for the 
duration of the war and to prepare for 
postwar responsibilities. Meanwhile, 
there is very little thought given to 
the war among Indians. India Is in a 
state of inertia, prostration, divided 
counsels and helplessness, with grow­
ing distrust and dislike for the British, 
and disappointment and disillusion with 
regard to Americans. Indians say that 
while they are in sympathy with the 
aims of the United Nations, they are 
not to be allowed to share the benefits 
of such aims, and they feel, therefore, 
that they have nothing to fight for.
Churchill's exclusion of India from the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter is 
always referred to in this connection.
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As I see it, unless the present 
atmosphere Is changed for the better, 
we Americans will have to bear the 
burden of the coming campaign in this 
part of the world and cannot count on 
more than token assistance from the 
British in British India.
It was for this reason that I 
have laid so much stress on asking the 
Viceroy for permission to see Gandhi.
If the record shows that I have never 
made a serious effort to obtain the 
the views of the Congress Party from 
Gandhi, then indeed my future useful­
ness here is at an end. For it would
be assumed that I have not been in­
terested in the picture as a whole and 
have been satisfied to give my Govern­
ment a one-sided and incomplete report 
of the situation. My stock would fall 
very low indeed, unless it were known . 
that I had, at least, made the e f f o r t .
When he received an invitation to join the Viceroy 
for a tiger hunt, Phillips knew the time to make his re­
quest had arrived. During a three hour elephant ride,
Phillips explained that if the Viceroy refused to let him 
see Gandhi, he would let it be known publicly that he 
had tried. The Viceroy refused to allow Phillips to see 
Gandhi and with little choice agreed to Phillips’ statement 
about the rejection. Phillips’ visit to Dhera Dun was an 
unsuccessful ’’hunt for Gandhi," but he left satisfied after 
finally making the effort.
45New York Times. April 11. 1943. 1. 28; Phillips to 
Hull, April Ï6'. 194'3. PRUS. 1943, IV: 2l6; Phillips to 
Roosevelt, April 19, 194$, President’s Secretary’s Pile: 
India, 1943, Box 43, PDRL; Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy.
378-381.
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Prior to his departure from New Delhi, Phillips 
hosted a cocktail party for the press. There he announnced 
that ”I should like to have met and talked with Mr.
Gandhi; that I have requested the appropriate authorities 
for permission to do so and have been informed that they 
were unable to grant the necessary facilities." Phillips 
finally placed the burden directly on the British, and 
thereby gave Indians the impression that he tried but was 
denied a chance to mediate the conflict. Newspapers 
throughout India criticized the British for refusing the 
request, with the Indian Social Reformer alone pointing out 
Washington’s lack of support for Phillips. American 
newspapers and periodicals reported his announcement, but 
it created little excitement among the public.
Once back in Washington, Phillips met with the Presi­
dent to discuss the Indian situation. In his manner of 
personally avoiding unpleasantries, Roosevelt started to 
Joke, rambled on other topics, and so monopolized the con­
versation that Phillips could only listen. Far from satis­
fied that the President understood his feelings about India, 
Phillips went to the State Department and wrote a report 
to Roosevelt. Airing his pent-up frustrations, Phillips 
informed the President that:
46phillips to Hull, April 25, 1943, FRUS. 19%3, IV: 
220; Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy, 382-383; Hess, 
America Encounters India, 109-110.
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There is no evidence that the 
British intend to do much more than 
give token assistance. If that is so, 
then the conditions surrounding our 
base in India become of vital import­
ance. The present Indian army is pure­
ly mercenary and only that part of it 
which is drawn from the martial races 
has been tried in actual warfare and 
these martial soldiers represent only 
thirty-three percent of that army.
It is not right for the British 
to say "this is none of your business" 
when we alone presumably will have the 
major part to play in the future 
struggle with Japan. If we do nothing 
and merely accept the British point of 
view that conditions in India are none 
of our business then we must be pre­
pared for various serious consequences 
in the internal situation in India which 
may develop as a result of despair and 
misery and anti-white sentiments of . 
hundreds of millions of subject people.^'
One week later, Roosevelt asked Phillips to talk with 
Churchill while the latter visited in Washington. Phillips 
assumed that the President had had enough of Churchill on 
India and that he preferred that Phillips himself be across 
from the Prime Minister at this meeting. Perhaps Roose­
velt believed that if Churchill was rough enough on the 
diplomat, Phillips would be reluctant to return to India, 
thereby giving Roosevelt a way out of the situation. At 
the British Embassy on May 23, Phillips learned firsthand of 
the obstinance encountered by Roosevelt when he raised the
^"^Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy, 386-387; Phillips 
to Roosevelt, May l4, Présidentes Secretary’s Pile;
India, 1943, Box 43, PDRL.
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topic of India with the Prime Minister. In his memoirs, 
Phillips writes that he presented his views on the 
military, political, and educational aspects of Indian 
society and added that Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
leader of Muslims in India, should be given the opportunity 
to meet and try to reach an agreement. Highly annoyed, 
Churchill exclaimed "My answer to you is: Take India if
that is what you want! Take it by all means! But I warn 
you that if I open the door a crack there will be the 
greatest bloodbath in all history; yes, bloodbath in 
all history. Mark my words, I prophesied the present 
war, and I prophesy the bloodbath." Phillips reported 
the Prime Minister's reaction to Roosevelt who seemed amused 
at the meeting, "but glad I had spoken out so frankly."^®
At a later meeting with the President, Phillips 
mentioned that unless some British policy changes took 
place, he felt a return to India would be useless. Roose­
velt agreed and said he would ask Churchill to send Eden 
to India for exploratory talks with all political leaders, 
and if the Prime Minister agreed he would then say that 
he wanted Phillips to go along. At the same time, Roose­
velt astonished Phillips by suggesting that until the Eden 
proposal had been accepted, he would take the Minister's 
post in Ottawa, Canada. Roosevelt may have been amused at
^^Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy. 389-390,
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Phillips’ meeting with Churchill, but he decided the dip­
lomat's usefulness in India had ended, Phillips knew that 
such an appointment would be seen in India as a decision 
by the President to ignore Indian aspirations for inde­
pendence, Roosevelt agreed, and not wanting to discuss 
the issue further, he told Phillips to take a leave and 
await further developments.
The State Department and the American Mission in New 
Delhi explained Phillips’ extended stay in the United 
States as due to the Indian "hot season," but as that 
period drew to a close, the President had to decide about 
a public statement on Phillips’ future. By ordering Phillips 
back to his post, Roosevelt would raise false hopes among 
the Indians and irritate Churchill, If he did not send 
him back, Roosevelt would disappoint Indian politicians 
and be criticized for acquiescing to British policy. To 
solve his dilemma, and probably at the President’s own 
suggestion, the War Department requested that Phillips 
assist with political and civilian planning related to the 
forthcoming Allied operations against the European continent, 
Roosevelt quickly agreed to the request and declared that 
if conditions warrant, he would order his Personal Repre­
sentative back to New Delhi, Phillips retained his official 
title, but Roosevelt never intended to send him back to India»^^
49Phillips, ibid,. 391-392; Phillips to Roosevelt,
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Before he left the United States for London, Phillips 
learned of a serious famine in Bengal and attempted to per­
suade Roosevelt that the United States should make all 
possible efforts to help relieve the suffering of those 
people. Not only did the humanitarian element prompt 
Phillips to make the suggestion, but he believed the 
American image in India could be improved by that action. 
The President finally decided to make no further gestures 
toward the British regarding India and "carried this policy 
to tragic lengths." Phillips' note and appeals from the 
Indian League of America were sent to the State Department 
where Cordell Hull declared that "shipping between the 
United States and India is now under British control and 
it therefore rests with the British to determine to what 
extent available space may be utilized for the transpor­
tation of any foodstuffs which might be sent from this 
country."50
May 31, 19^3, President's Secretary's Pile; India, 1943,
Box 43, PDRL; Merrell to Hull, July 2, 1943, FRUS, 1943,
IV*. 225; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe A. Morris, 
eds.. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932), 52-53; Merrell to Hull, 
September 8, 1943, D.S. Pile 123P54/616; Memorandum by Hull 
to Roosevelt, August 30, 1943, D.S. Pile 123P54/616 1/2,
NA.; Hull to Merrell, September 8, 1943, PRUS, 1943,
IV: 226-227.
SOphillips to Roosevelt, September 9, 1943, President's 
Secretary's Pile: India, 1943, Box 43, PDRL; Hull to
Merrell, October 13, 1943, PRUS. 1943, IV: 307; Burns,
Roosevelt. Soldier of Preedom. 381.
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Even with Phillips safely entombed in Allied Military 
Headquarters in London, Roosevelt's gesture of dispatching 
a personal agent to India proved to be even more trouble­
some. On July 25, 1944 , Drew Pearson's column in the 
Washington Post quoted from Phillips' May 14, 1943 letter 
to Roosevelt in which the diplomat roundly criticized 
British policy in India. In Washington, British Minister 
Sir Ronald Campbell learned from Assistant Secretary of 
State Adolf Berle that the publication had not been 
authorized and that the Government regretted its appearance. 
Later, Campbell told Acting Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius that the British Government wished that either 
Roosevelt or Hull would make a public statement of disso­
ciation because of the letter's effect on the Indian army's 
morale and the unkind reference to Britain's secondary 
role in the war against Japan, Hull pointed out to the 
President that while the Department had expressed its 
regret over the publication, it was not felt that a state­
ment of that sort could be issued as the Department shared 
Phillips' views. Roosevelt agreed and said nothing. 
Realizing that his continued presence in London complicated 
the matter even further, Phillips left his post and returned 
to the United States.
 ̂ Copy of Drew Pearson article in President's Secre­
tary's Pile;. State Department, Phillips, William C.,
Box 77» FDRL; Memorandum of conversation by Adolf Berle,
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Although Phillips knew the hazards of expressing 
one's views In letters to public officials, his wife 
Caroline demanded that the White House explain the leakage 
of the letter. She wrote that although her husband was 
deeply Injured by the publication of the letter, his para­
mount concern was the availability of presidential files 
to Drew Pearson. Roosevelt answered her letter and pointed 
out that Phillips sent three copies of the letter— to the 
President, the State Department, and to Sumner Welles. 
Roosevelt denied the leak came from his office and said 
that while the State Department's denial proved nothing, 
the leak likely occurred "because of the friendship be­
tween Sumner Welles and Drew Pearson, the suspicion points 
to him." Throughout the Louis Johnson and William Phillips 
missions to India, Franklin Roosevelt with Sumner Welles' 
support, controlled the American reaction to British policy 
In India. Welles opposed both envoy's suggestion that the 
President pressure the British to change their policies, 
and for that reason would have little desire to embarrass 
the British. However, Welles' long-time personal conflict 
with Cordell Hull culminated In Welles' resignation as 
Under Secretary of State In September 1943, and the rancor
July 27, 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: 239; Memorandum of conversa­
tion by Edward Stettinius, August 8, 1944, ibid,, 24l. Al­
though Phillips left his post in London, Roosevelt did not 
formally accept his resignation as Personal Representative 
until March, 1945.
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which Welles felt toward Hull could have prompted him to 
use the letter as a means of embarrassing Hull and the 
State Department. Further, Drew Pearson's later statement 
that a State Department official passed the letter to him 
lends some circumstantial credence to Roosevelt's accusation.
Shortly after Phillips resigned, the incident took 
on new controversy. In another column, Pearson quoted 
Anthony Eden's dispatch, in which the Foreign Secretary 
told Ambassador Campbell that India was worth more than 
Phillips. To complicate matters further. Senator A. B. 
Chandler of Kentucky, at the time of Phillips resignation, 
denounced British interference in American diplomatic 
affairs and revealed that Phillips had been declared 
"persona non grata" to the British Government. Lord Halifax 
denied the charges, indicating that Chandler was misinformed 
and had made erroneous charges. Chandler then happily 
publicized a telegram which supported his charges and 
showed the British answers to be evasive and wrong. Signed 
by Sir Olaf Caroe, of the New Delhi External Affairs Office, 
and directed to the Secretary of State for India in London, 
the message described the British use of censorship to stop 
publication of Pearson's article in India, and how "we 
understand designation of Phillips is still President's 
Personal Representative in India. Whether or not he was 
connected in any way with leakage, views he has stated 
would make it impossible for us to do other than regard
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hlm as persona non grata and we could not again receive 
him. His views are not what we are entitled to expect 
from a professedly friendly envoy. Viceroy has seen this 
telegram." With the Indian administrator’s views exposed 
to the American public, the British requests for a state­
ment from Roosevelt or Hull ceased, and the issue eva­
porated with the front page news of the Allied efforts on 
the continent.52
Realizing that any further American involvement in 
British-Indian affairs would accomplish only greater 
alienation of both the British and the Indians, Roosevelt 
chose to postpone his attempts to promote the principle of 
self-determination. In reacting to the Indian crisis, 
Roosevelt believed the situation could be indirectly 
mediated by his personal envoys. But once he saw Winston 
Churchill’s adamant opposition to any revision in India’s 
status, Roosevelt directed policy in such a way as to 
mask his loss of interest in Indian self-determination and 
to try to overcome some of the irritation in Anglo-American 
relations caused by his clumsy approach to the problem.
He purposely remained vague and noncommittal about his
52caroline Phillips to the Secretary of the President, 
August 26, 19^4, President’s Secretary's Pile: State De­
partment, Phillips, William C., Box 77; Roosevelt to 
Caroline Phillips, August 28, 1944, ibid., PDRL; Hess, 
America Encounters India, 142-147; Memorandum of conversa- 
tion by Breckinridge Long, September 2, 1944, THUS, 1944,
V: 243-246.
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Personal Representatives' objectives, and when Louis 
Johnson and William Phillips made requests for greater 
freedom to press the British to take a more conciliatory 
position, Roosevelt did little to support them. Roosevelt's 
primary concern at this time was the Immediacy of the war 
In Europe and the overriding priority of cooperation with 
the British and Russians. This situation overshadowed any 
Inclination that Roosevelt had for Insisting on Immediate 
and universal application of the Atlantic Charter.
CATHOLICS, COMMUNISTS, COLLABORATORS, AND FASCISTS: 
ROOSEVELT'S UNHOLY ALLIANCES
CHAPTER III
At the same time that Franklin Roosevelt was involved 
in Indian politics, he was considering approaches that 
might be used to improve the Allies' position In Europe. 
Concerned by the possible defeat of Russia and the general 
growth of German military success on the continent, Roose­
velt concentrated his efforts toward reducing the pressures 
on the Allies' position not only by offering material aid 
to Russia, but also by refraining from pressing for Russian 
acceptance of political principles that might hinder 
Allied military cooperation. He saw that the issue of 
religious freedom in the Soviet Union, which he had 
broached in order to gain more domestic support for lend 
lease to the Soviet Union, was becoming a source of irri­
tation to the Russian Premier; consequently he chose not 
to press the issue further. While Roosevelt refrained from 
pursuing further involvement in Russian domestic affairs, 
he recognized the benefits to be derived by raising politi­
cal issues to court the favor of the neutrals. To 
accomplish these ends, he used Personal Representative
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diplomacy in an attempt to gain a better relationship with 
Generalissimo Franco of Spain and Prime Minister Salazar 
of Portugal. Further, in an attempt to insure overwhelming 
success of the 1942 invasion of Africa, the President 
directed his personal agent to deal with the collaborationist 
French at Vichy. Thus not unlike his direction of American 
policy toward India, Roosevelt decided that rather than 
demand adherence to the principles expressed in the 
Atlantic Charter, American policy would follow lines of 
expediency— negotiate and deal with fascist and communist 
governments alike.
Before the United States started aid to the Soviet 
Union, however, the problem of the coordinating of requests 
and delivery of supplies to Great Britain confronted 
Roosevelt. At the time of his first visit to London,
Hopkins recommended that Roosevelt send a man who could 
maintain good relations with Britain's industrial community 
and at the same time have enough status to be influential 
in the diplomatic circles, but one who would not be burdened 
with the responsibilities of an embassy. Roosevelt 
selected W. Averell Harriman as his Personal Representative 
in charge of lend lease in Great Britain. Averell Harri­
man, the son of railroad magnate Edward H. Harriman, 
acquired considerable experience in the business world as 
a financier and as chairman of the Board of Directors of 
Union Pacific Railroad. He had demonstrated his ability by
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successfully directing construction of the first prefab­
ricated ship for use in World War I and later operating 
the Union Pacific without capital loss during the de­
pression. Impressed by Harriman’s capabilities as a 
business administrator, Harry Hopkins brought him to 
President Roosevelt's attention. Called to duty in the 
New Deal, Harriman served in the National Recovery Ad­
ministration, Commerce Department, and briefly as chief 
of the raw materials branch of the Office of Production 
Management.
In his attitude toward the administration of lend 
lease and foreign policy in general, Harriman followed 
President Roosevelt's example. He viewed the military 
establishment as central to his wartime function and 
tended to turn to that side for advice. In London, Harri­
man saw his position as that of "delivering the goods" 
and seeing that no delays impeded the military's actions. 
He understood lend lease to be the crucial feature of 
Anglo-American relations at that time and that the White 
House directed the entire program— to the general exclu­
sion of the American Embassy. Believing that his asso­
ciation with the top British leaders produced the needed 
information, Harriman made little use of the State Depart­
ment or Foreign Service personnel other than as general 
clerical laborers for the lend lease program. Accurate 
in his reporting, understanding the locus of power in
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Great Britain, and disinterested in personal gains,
Averell Harriman was a good choice for the London job.
While much of Harriman’s activities involved the 
tedium of economic and technical details, the President 
also expected him to fill other duties in England, The 
United States had a regularly appointed Ambassador, John 
Winant, but Roosevelt was not sure if Winant could do the 
job, so in addition to his regular lend lease duties, 
Harriman went to London to oversee Winant, Roosevelt not 
only bypassed his Ambassador, but with the lend lease 
mission independent of Embassy control, Harriman used 
private couriers and Naval communication facilities to 
report directly to Roosevelt and Hopkins, When Ambassador 
Winant found that Harriman had greater access to Roose­
velt, he also used the military channels to communicate 
directly to the White House, It again became clear that 
the State Department was being bypassed, and the air no 
doubt grew thick as Hull received month-old dispatches 
with a note attached informing the Secretary that "this 
is for your information,"^
Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 27, 19^1, D,S. Pile 
121,841 Hopkins, Harry/9, NA; Felix Prankfurter-Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr., conversation, January 23, 1941, Morgenthau 
Diaries, Book 350, 186, PDRL; PRUS, 1941, III; 309n; 
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 269-270; Harriman to 
Roosevelt, April 19, 1941, President's Personal Pile 6207 
(Harriman, W, Averell); Harriman to Roosevelt, May 7, 1941, 
PSP; Great Britain, Harriman Polder, Box 41, PDRL; Wilson, 
The First Summit. 275; George P, Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, c, 1967), 231-2^4.
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Once settled in England, Harriman served as "general 
handholder" for Britishers with aid-related problems, 
toured British defense bases at Churchill's request, and 
traveled to the Middle East to look into supply problems.
As Roosevelt expected, Harriman not only served as an 
administrator but became a popular symbol of American 
air to Great Britain,
As Harriman settled into his role, Hopkins cabled 
Churchill that Roosevelt had instructed Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox to recommend 
supply allocations for Great Britain and Russia for a period 
extending to June 29, 19^2. With that information gathered, 
Roosevelt proposed that a Joint conference be held in 
London to be followed by a similar meeting in Moscow; 
both meetings would have as their major objective a recon­
ciliation of the differences between the Allies' needs 
and the American ability to provide the goods. To head 
the American mission, Roosevelt selected Harriman and 
Churchill named Lord Beaverbrook to represented Great 
Britain. Following the London meeting, the Anglo-American 
mission traveled to M o s c o w . ^
^Harriman to Roosevelt, May 7, 19^1, PSP: Great
Britain, Harriman Folder, Box 4l, FDRL; Harriman to Roose­
velt, June 3, 1941, FRUS, 1941, III: 276; Harriman to 
Hopkins, June 25, 1941. ibid.. 280; Hopkins to Churchill, 
September 9, 1941, ibid.. 1941, I: 829-830.
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After arriving in Moscow on September 28, and over 
the next three days, Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook held 
meetings with Stalin. Other emissaries met with their 
Russian military counterparts, but as Hopkins had earlier 
noted, little came from the subcommittee meetings because 
all Russian information and decisions came from the 
Russian Premier. Harriman and Beaverbrook found Stalin 
to be genial at the first meeting, and listened as Stalin 
estimated that German tanks outnumbered the Russians by 
three to one; German air superiority by four to one; 
and in army divisions by 380 to 320, To stem the German 
offensive, Stalin called for four thousand tons of barbed 
wire per month, small caliber anti-aircraft guns, and 
armor plating. At the next meeting, Harriman found Stalin 
to be in a rather restless mood, seemingly disinterested, 
and as Harriman noted, Stalin "rode us pretty hard" in an 
attempt to get all he requested. At the final conference, 
Stalin resumed his earlier, more affable stance and 
"accepted with undisguised enthusiasm" the list of items 
put forth by Harriman and Beaverbrook, No doubt Stalin 
was pleased with the agreement that included four hundred 
planes and five hundred tanks per month, over twelve 
hundred anti-tank guns and five thousand Jeeps to be shipped 
to Russia by the end of June, 1942.3
3Harriman to Roosevelt, September 29, 1941; Harri­
man to Hopkins, September 30, 1941; Harriman to Roosevelt,
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Before Harriman left Russia, he came into direct 
conflict with the State Department and Cordell Hull,
Knowing the Department had no control over lend lease, 
Harriman, at Roosevelt’s urging, suggested that Stalin 
bypass the Department and communicate directly with the 
President on any matter of importance, especially lend 
lease. Harriman clashed with Hull when the Secretary of 
State informed the Russian Government that the United 
States would help build petroleum refineries in Russia if 
American petroleum engineers and technicians could inspect 
the sites. Through his secretary Edward Meiklejohn, 
Harriman told State Department officials that they had 
adopted an unrealistic position that would create harmful 
suspicion among the Russians, and since all aid to Russia 
came under lend lease, any matter relative to supplies 
and equipment should go to Harry Hopkins at the White 
House, The basic conflict between Harriman and Hull's 
Department went beyond that of control of lend lease to 
the type of policy the United States would maintain toward 
Russia. State Department officials sought a ’’quid pro quo” 
policy that would force Russia to make concessions of
September 30, 19^1; Harriman to Roosevelt, October 1, 19^1; 
Harriman to Roosevelt, October 3* 19^1; Steinhardt to Hull, 
October 3, 1941, PRUS, 1941, I: 836-842; Sherwood, Roose­
velt and Hopkins, 387-388; William H, Standley and Arthur 
A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador To Russia (Chicago; Henry 
Regnery Company, 19^5), 66.
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postwar political security in Europe and Asia in return 
for American aid. But Harriman, like the President, opposed 
any qualifications on the aid to be given in order to in­
sure continued Russian resistance against the Germans and 
to put off troublesome negotiations over major non­
military issues.^
In one of his conversations with the Russian Premier, 
Harriman learned that Stalin lacked confidence in Laurence 
Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Russia. Stalin 
tole Harriman that the Ambassador, believing rumors that 
Moscow would soon fall, had sent most of the Embassy staff 
to safer locations, and had on separate occasions became 
panicky about the situation. Resentful over the Ambassador’s 
lack of confidence in the Russian army, Stalin indicated 
that Steinhardt's attitude "made him of little value in the 
relationship between the two countries." Harriman informed 
the White House, and Roosevelt soon cabled Steinhardt 
that since future Soviet-American relations would be 
dealing with supplies and equipment, he believed it would 
be advantageous to have an ambassador who was acquainted 
with American production and supply. Steinhardt left 
Russia one week later and became Ambassador to Turkey in
^Memorandum by Edward Page, November 15, 1941, FRUS. 
1941, I: 860-861; Hull to Steinhardt, November 5, 1941, 
ibid., 853-855; Raymond H. Dawson, The Decision To Aid 
Russia. 1941 (Chapel Hill; The University of North 
Carolina Fress, c. 1959), 267.
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early 19^2. In addition to his role as lend lease nego­
tiator, Harriman effectively removed barriers to the 
expeditious shipment of lend lease supplies to Russia.
To replace the departed Steinhardt, the President 
suggested General James Burns of the Lend Lease Adminis­
tration, but strenuous objections from the State Depart­
ment prompted Roosevelt to offer instead. Admiral William 
H. Standley. Former Chief of Naval Operations and long­
time friend of the President, Standley was a modest 
proponent of the Department's policy recommendations.
While Standley's appointment buoyed State Department hopes 
about a possible change in policy, the White House knew 
such a shift unlikely. In order to rush delivery of goods 
and to insure control of lend lease by the White House, 
Roosevelt's lend lease agents channeled requests from 
Moscow directly to Hopkins, who then expedited the ship­
ment of orders. The growing prospects of a German victory 
demanded quick action, and the Roosevelt-State Department 
policy differences negated any chance that the President 
would use the Department to implement his aid p r o g r a m .5
Although Roosevelt felt no hesitation in extending 
immediate aid to Russia, he did not include the Soviet
^Harriman to Roosevelt, October 1, 19%1, Harry Hop­
kins Papers: Harriman Pile, Box 123, PDRL; Roosevelt to
Steinhardt, November 5, 19^1, FRUS. 1941, I: 852-853;
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 395»
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Union in his initial lend lease proposal to Congress be­
cause many Americans had not dropped their antagonism toward 
the communist regime. Among hostile groups, the Catholic 
bloc loomed large in the President’s thinking. Because 
of the Russian Government's suppression of Catholics,
Vatican leaders and many American Catholics opposed aid 
to the Soviet Union.
To offset the expected protests, Roosevelt directed 
Harriman to raise the issue of religious freedom in Russia 
during his talks with Stalin. In response to Harriman’s 
inquiries, Stalin told him that a response to the Presi­
dent's statements on religious freedom would be forth­
coming "in a manner to obtain maximum publicity in the 
United States." The Russian leader's response would 
satisfy Roosevelt but many Americans still had to be further 
convinced that Russia had dropped its barriers against 
religious freedom.&
In addition to prompting a gesture from Stalin, 
Roosevelt sought the support of the Catholic hierarchy and 
turned again to the Vatican. Two years earlier. In 1939,
In an attempt to gain more information about Internal 
conditions in Italy, and to try indirectly to pressure 
Mussolini Into a less belligerent position, Roosevelt had
^Memorandum by Harriman on Religion In The USSR, 
October 4, 1941, Hopkins Papers; Harriman Pile, Box 123, 
PDRL.
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decided to establish informal relations with the Holy See,
Now, in an attempt to lessen Catholic opposition to his 
aid plan, Roosevelt called on his unofficial Ambassador 
to the Vatican.
The President’s Personal Representative to the 
Vatican, Myron Taylor, had spent considerable time in the 
1920's negotiating the reorganization of several faltering 
textile mills. In 1927, at J, P, Morgan's insistence,
Taylor Joined United States Steel, and as the firm's 
finance committee chairman, he directed a major reorganiza­
tion of the company's financial structure, enabling it to 
pay off $3^0,000,000 in debts. He sharpened his negotiating 
skills in the 1930's when labor disputes enveloped the 
steel industry. As chairman of the Board of Directors of 
United States Steel, Taylor junked the company's traditional 
anti-labor policies and in 1937 became the first major 
steel executive to recognize and sign a collective bar­
gaining agreement with the Congress of Industrial Organiza­
tions. Following Taylor's retirement a year later, Roose­
velt selected him to head the American delegation to a 
1938 international conference on war refugees. Taylor's 
qualifications for the Vatican post improved as he became 
acquainted with several Vatican representatives at those 
meetings; also the Pope, before his rise to the pontificate, 
had been Taylor's guest while visiting in the United States, 
Taylor's soft-spoken approach remained an asset throughout
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the period in which he served Roosevelt. His ability to 
project a sense of confidence in the American cause and his 
very deliberate style of negotiating helped prevent any 
resentment or fear of intimidation among the leaders of 
the neutral nations he visited.
The President appointed Taylor as his "Personal 
Representative To The Pope" in December, 1939. In the 
face of considerable domestic opposition, Taylor traveled 
to Rome in February 1940, and presented his letter of 
introduction to the Pope. However, he remained in Rome 
only a month before illness forced his return to the 
United States.?
Although Roosevelt sought the Pope’s assistance in 
reducing criticism of the aid program, he also knew that 
the supply of needed information about Italy's political 
affairs had dwindled since Taylor's first trip. Further­
more, Roosevelt feared that Germany might occupy the Azore 
Islands, so he instructed Taylor to learn Prime Minister
Antonio Salazar's feelings about Portugal's strategic 
o
possessions.
?Martin J. Hastings, "United States-Vatican Relations," 
Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of 
Philadelphia, 69 (June. 195Ü), 46; New York l*imes. May 7, 
1959» 33; Taylor to Roosevelt, February 38, 1940, D.S.
File 121.866a/31j Hull to Taylor, March 18, 1941, D. S.
Pile 121.866A/39B, NA.
^Welles to Roosevelt, January 24, 1941, D.S. Pile 
121.866A/105A; Johnson to Hull, January 26, 1941, D.S. Pile
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Before he left the United States, Taylor met with 
Roosevelt to discuss the strategy he would employ at the 
Vatican conferences. The envoy pointed out that the 
opponents of aid to Russia supported their argument with 
a passage from the 1922 "Encyclical on Atheistic Commu­
nism" by Pope Pius XI. The statement that "communism is 
intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian 
civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking 
whatsoever" appeared in many Catholic newspapers and left 
Roosevelt’s Catholic supporters little choice but to either 
disregard the Papal encyclical or not support the President. 
Taylor believed a statement from Pope Pius XII would re­
solve the dilemma of the Catholic supporters, and he 
received Presidential instructions to pursue that objective. 
In his letter to the Pope, Roosevelt wrote that he believed 
Russian churches would remain open, that wartime exigencies 
would force the Russian Government to recognize freedom 
of religion, and that ultimately religion in Russia would 
be accorded more respect than in Germany. Roosevelt then 
tried to convince the Pope that Russia's totalitarianism 
remained less dangerous than that of Germany, and suggested 
that the Pope enlighten Church leaders in the United States
121.841, Hopkins, Harry/8; Welles to Taylor, February 
3, 1941, D.S. Pile 121.866A/105 1/2, NA.; Welles to 
Roosevelt, June 4, 1941, PSP: Portugal, Box 51, PDRL; 
Memorandum by Welles, August 9, 19^1, PRUS, 1941, I: 345.
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so that they would give no further aid to Germany by their 
parochial attitudes. Fortunately, the Pope realized that 
Roosevelt faced domestic opposition and overlooked the 
President's clumsy efforts to down play the atheistic nature 
of the Russian Government,
When Taylor reached the Vatican, he tôld the Pope 
that the American people would not stand for a German 
victory, but that the 1922 encyclical caused much diviseness 
among American Catholics, Taylor reiterated Roosevelt's 
belief that the encyclical did not condemn the entire 
Russian population, but objected to official abuses of 
civil liberties. To confirm this interpretation, Taylor 
requested a Papal clarification of the message. The Pope 
replied that neither the United States nor the Vatican 
could influence the Russian Government's policy toward 
religion and prophesized that communism would spread 
throughout Europe and Latin America if Germany should be 
defeated. Following three extensive meetings in which 
Taylor elaborated on Roosevelt's determination to see 
Germany defeated, the Pope declared that he understood 
the reasons for supporting the Soviet Union and agreed g
to make public his interpretation of the 1922 encyclical.
^Transcript of Taylor telephone message to the White 
House, August 30, 19^1, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor Pile,
Box 55, FDRL; Myron Taylor, ed,. Wartime Correspondence 
Between President Roosevelt and Pope t*lus XII (kew fork: 
the Macmillan Company, 19^7), 57-62; hoosevelt to Pope
Ill
After the Pope clarified the difference between 
giving aid to the Russian people and supporting the 
communist ideology, the American Catholics' response 
was generally favorable. The editor of the Michigan 
Catholic chided its readers for over-simplification and 
taking out of context passages of the 1922 message to 
support their anti-Russian position. And as if on cue, 
Russian Ambassador Ivan M. Maisky told a luncheon meeting 
of the American Chamber of Commerce that the Soviet 
Union considered religion a private matter for each 
citizen, that the Russian Constitution provided for free­
dom of religious worship, and that the new Polish Army 
being created in Russia would include Roman Catholic 
chaplains. With the Pope's message and the Russian 
gestures to use as levers, Roosevelt encountered less 
outward opposition from American Catholics to his aid 
plan.^0
On September 22, Taylor left Rome to complete the 
remainder of his mission. He flew to Lisbon, Portugal 
and called on Prime Minister Salazar. Portugal had a
Pius XII, September 3, 1941, PSP: The Vatican, Taylor File,
Box 55, FDRL; Memorandum by H. E. Monsignor Tardinl, 
September, 1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor File, Box 56,
FDRL; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War. 746.
lOp.S.,Cong. Rec.. vol. 87, pt. 8, 77 Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1941, B7ÔO-87bl; Maisky speech, September 23,
1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor Pile, Box 55, FDRL; Dawson,
The Decision To Aid Russia. 1941, 267.
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predominantly Catholic population, and even though 
Salazar was a dictator, he sought to remain on good terms 
with the Vatican, When he learned of the American’s 
relationship to the Pope, he may have been influenced to 
be more cooperative in allowing the United States to 
compete with Germany in buying war materials from Portugal, 
Further, Taylor got the impression that the Portuguese 
leader did not adhere to the Nazi system, and would make 
every effort to keep Portugal and the Azores neutral.
After meeting with Salazar, Taylor traveled to 
England and conferred with Ambassador Winant about the 
relationship between Great Britain and Ireland, This 
trip itself produced little success, for the Irish Govern­
ment remained married to a policy of neutrality, and the 
British refused to change their policies regarding the 
six counties of North Ireland where there was a Catholic 
majority, Taylor’s earlier visit to Rome, however, 
appears to have influenced the Pope to be friendlier 
toward the British, and even though it had little impact 
on British policies, the Vatican's new attitude likely 
helped offset German attempts to propagandize Irish 
Catholics,
When Taylor returned to the United States, Sumner 
Welles informed him that the Government would not continue 
to raise the subject of official Soviet attitudes toward 
religion. After learning from Harriman that Stalin opposed
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any liberalization of policy beyond that described in 
Maisky's speech, and fearful that the Soviet Government 
might become even more resentful with added prodding, 
Roosevelt wisely drew back from a policy designed to 
promote the Atlantic Charter.^
After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and the 
United States entered the war, Roosevelt's main goal was 
to first win the war in Europe, and with that came the 
necessity of keeping Russia in the struggle. One way of 
achieving both objectives was a counterattack by the United 
States and Great Britain against Germany. At Argentia, 
Roosevelt showed interest in Churchill's proposal of an 
African invasion designed to begin pinching in on the 
Axis. Because the American public might grow restless 
and demand immediate action against the Japanese, Roose­
velt wanted quick deployment of American troops into the 
war, but of greater import, he wanted to show the Russians 
that the United States and Great Britain intended to cooper­
ate fully to reduce German pressure on the Soviet front.
In Washington, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and 
Chief of Staff General George Marshall worked to get the 
President to accept their plan. Instead of Africa, they
^^Memorandum by Myron Taylor, no date (September, 
1941), Hopkins Papers, Box 51; Memorandum by John Winant, 
September 37, 1941, PSP; The Vatican, Taylor File, 1941, 
PDRL: Welles to Taylor, November 19, 1941, D.S. Pile
861.404/459, NA.
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concluded that an invasion of the European continent would 
draw off sizable German forces and keep Russia in the war. 
Roosevelt agreed, and he responded by directing Harry 
Hopkins and General Marshall to go to London to explain 
the plan to Churchill.
On April 8 Hopkins and Marshall arrived in London 
to lay the plan before Churchill. Even though the Prime 
Minister recalled the prolonged trench warfare and high 
casualty rates of World War I, his sympathetic reaction 
to the proposal convinced Hopkins that they would soon 
reach an agreement. However Churchill soon called Hopkins 
to his office and began to talk about the political 
situation in India, the serious nature of the British naval 
defeats in the Indian Ocean, and the fact that more 
American military aid was needed in that sector. Hopkins 
saw the Prime Minister's attempt to reorder the military 
priorities and stated that a European invasion remained 
foremost in the President's mind; and further that the 
attack must be carried out without serious delay. In the 
final meeting, Hopkins got Churchill's agreement on the 
principle of the proposal, and despite the fact that 
Churchill remained skeptical of an early strike against 
the continent, Hopkins informed Roosevelt that planning 
for the operation should go ahead.
When Hopkins' message reached Washington, Roosevelt 
cabled Stalin to request that Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
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Molotov be sent to Washington to discuss the second 
front. When Molotov reached the White House in late May 
19^2, Roosevelt had his plan ready. He told the Russian 
that a second front could be expected before the end of 
the year. At Molotov’s insistence, the President agreed 
to a public declaration which, while ambiguous in wording, 
in effect stated that the Allies had reached an accord 
for a second front in 19^2.
In his haste to propose the cross-channel operation, 
and without awaiting over-all military analysis of the 
plan, the President acted out of both political and 
military considerations. He knew that the Russians were 
pressing Great Britain to recognize Soviet territorial 
claims in the Baltic, and as Hopkins told Churchill, the 
President made the proposal to ease the pressure of 
Russian diplomatic demands on England, A more important 
concern, however, was the immediate strategic situation 
in Eastern Europe; Roosevelt feared that the Germans might 
deliver a decisive blow to the Russians in the next 
offensive or at least become entrenched with control of 
the Caucasus and Ukraine; thus, an Anglo-American second 
front would reduce the pressure on the Russian front by 
drawing some German forces away from that area.
In June, Churchill, with his reservations about the 
plan, flew to Hyde Park to discuss the military operation 
and to try to persuade the President to reconsider. When
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he learned of the fall of Tobruk, Churchill concluded 
that the move against the continent must be postponed and 
offered his original plan; an operation against Africa.
Neither Roosevelt or Personal Representative Hopkins 
had any choice in the strategy decision since a cross­
channel invasion could not be undertaken without the 
British, who were now adamant in their opposition. Further­
more, Roosevelt should have realized that the planning, 
transportation, and accumulation of supplies made the 
continental invasion impossible before mid-19^3 at the 
earliest. Indeed, the American industrial sector had not 
been totally converted to wartime production by that time 
and would not be able to meet the additional demands for 
supplies required by the operation. Finally, as the 
Dieppe raid of August 19^2 showed, German military might 
was strong enough to turn back an Allied operation.
After the Prime Minister and his military advisers 
set their opposition to the European invasion, Roosevelt 
directed his attention to the African proposal and sent 
Hopkins on his fourth trip to confer with Churchill. This 
time Roosevelt would have no delay, and he instructed 
Hopkins to tell the British leader that if an acceptable
^^Memorandum of Conference at the White House, May 
29, 30, and June 1, 1942, FRUS. 1942, III: 566-58?;
Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 of The Second 
World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, c. 1950),
377-585; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. 518-519; 525.
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plan for the Invasion of Africa could not be developed, 
American troops would be used in another region— implying 
a possible shift in emphasis to the Pacific. When the 
British appeared reluctant to get down to business, Hop­
kins cabled Roosevelt to set a date for the project. 
Confronted by Roosevelt’s statement that the North African 
campaign should start no later than October 30, the joint 
conference soon agreed to map out the strategy.^3
As the new plans meant postponement of the continen­
tal invasion, Churchill went to Moscow to explain the 
revised strategy to Stalin. Averell Harriman cabled 
Roosevelt and suggested that he attend the conference to 
indicate American agreement with the decisions and to 
allow him to make personal reports directly to the President, 
At first, Roosevelt opposed the idea because he preferred 
that Churchill face Stalin alone and because he did not 
want to leave the impression that he had sent Harriman to
l^Hopkins made his last trip as a Roosevelt Personal 
Representative in January 19^5, when he spent several days 
in London trying to soothe the Prime Minister, who was 
smoldering over a State Department press release that 
criticized British policy in Italy. After the cool recep­
tion in London, Hopkins flew to Paris and conferred with 
Charles DeGaulle, then to Rome where he had an audience 
with the Pope, and to Naples where after a brief visit, 
Hopkins flew to Malta to await President Roosevelt’s 
arrival for the Yalta Conference; Roosevelt to Hopkins, 
July 16, 1942, Hopkins Papers, Box 125, Book 5, PDRL; John 
Gaddis, United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 
1941-194? (dew York: Columbia University Press, 19tl),
Jzl Arthur Bryant. Turn of the Tide (London; Collins, 
1957), 425-429.
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spy on Stalin and Churchill. After Anthony Eden informed 
Churchill of Harriman’s suggestion, the Prime Minister 
wired Roosevelt that Harriman would be helpful. The 
President ordered Harriman to Moscow and instructed him 
to inform Stalin of the President’s desire to meet with 
him in the near future.
The meeting began with Churchill’s explanation of 
the reasons for the postponement. In reply, Stalin 
described the German pressures on Stalingrad, sarcastically 
adding that the war could not be won unless the Allies 
were willing to take risks. After chiding the British 
leader, Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
decision but stated that he could not force a decision about 
the second front. Harriman thought that Churchill’s ela­
boration on the African plans and the possible movement 
of British and American air forces into southern Russia 
was effective enough to put Stalin in a cordial mood for 
the next meeting, but his.evaluation of the Premier’s mood 
quickly changed when Stalin gave both men a formal state­
ment that reflected his bitterness over the Allies’ decision 
and pointed out how the change adversely affected Russian 
military plans. In reply, Harriman supported the Prime 
Minister’s position and added that no promise had been
l^Harrlman to Roosevelt, August 4, 1942; Roosevelt to 
Harriman, August 4, 1942, and August 5, 1942, Map Room 
File, Miscellaneous Presidential Messages, Box 14, Polder 1 
(A), PDRL.
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broken regarding the second front.
Before the conference ended, Harriman informed 
Stalin of Roosevelt's desire for a personal meeting of 
the two leaders. Stalin agreed rather than cause pro­
longed negotiations with Roosevelt but when the President 
later proposed a meeting in 1943, the Russian leader 
declined. Roosevelt, with his personal approach to diplo­
macy, found a tougher figure in Stalin than any he en­
countered in dealing with American politicians.15
While Harriman and Churchill met with Stalin, the 
President heard from Wendell Willkie, The Republican 
leader told Roosevelt that he wanted to visit the fighting 
fronts of Russia, the Middle East, and possibly China. 
Roosevelt agreed, seeing a chance possibly to soften 
Stalin's bitterness over the postponement of the invasion; 
such a move would demonstrate to world leaders the unified 
stand of American politicians. Always the shrefd politician, 
Roosevelt also saw an opportunity to lessen the Republican 
Party's appeal in the 1942 Congressional elections by 
featuring their leading personality as the "President's 
Personal Representative" and having him out of the country
15Harriman to Roosevelt, August 14, 1942, and August 
15, 1942, ibid.: Churchill, The Hinge of Pate. 483-486; 
After that trip to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman 
returned to London and served as the direct contact for 
Americans traveling to London on official business. After 
serving at London, and as a part of the Roosevelt diplo­




As Willkie embarked on his trip on August 26, Roose­
velt cabled Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek that Willkie would 
soon visit the two nations, but he mentioned no specific 
reason for the mission. Franklin Roosevelt should have 
realized his envoy’s independent manner and have limited 
him to a mission of discussing general aid plans in addi­
tion to inspecting industrial facilities of the countries 
he visited, but Roosevelt's estimation of Willkie’s ability 
to draw support for his wartime policies negated any fears 
he had about the trip. Consequently, he ignored Acting 
Chief of Staff Joseph McNarney’s warning that Willkie should 
be given specific instructions because "when we send a 
representative to a foreign country he immediately embraces 
all of their problems as his own and urges the United States 
to undertake the solution of them."^?
When Willkie landed in Russia, he met Ambassador 
Standley at the temporary capital of Kuibyshev and set off 
on an inspection tour of collective farms, airplane
l^Willkie to Roosevelt, July 27, 19^2; Roosevelt to 
Willkie, August 2, 1942, PSP: Willkie, Wendell, Box 132,
FDRLj Donald Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell 
Willkie (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, I960),
215; Furns, Soldier of Freedom, 274-276.
Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, August 21, 1942; 
Roosevelt to Stalin, August 22, 1942, Elliott Roosevelt, ed., 
FDR, His Personal Letters. 1928-1945 (New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, c. 1950), II; 1341; Joseph McNarney to 
Roosevelt, July 31, 1942, PSF: Willkie, Box 132, FDRL.
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factories, and facilities along the Volga River. Wherever 
he traveled, Willkie— as a good politician— talked with 
the working class Russian and found that the conversation 
invariably turned to the second front. Willkie knew 
nothing about the forthcoming African operation but offered 
his view that the American people hoped a second front would 
open very soon.
Following his three-day stay in Kuibyshev, Willkie 
traveled to Moscow and again played the role of important 
American dignitary by visiting factories, farms and 
appearing at public gatherings. When he stopped to talk 
with "the Russian on the street" in Moscow, Willkie found 
the question the same as before: When will the second
front begin? Willkie likely began to wonder if the Presi­
dent had agreed to his visit knowing that he would be 
confronted at every turn by that embarrassing question.
During the remainder of Willkie’s stay, he was 
guest of honor at several dinners. At more than one of 
those affairs, he declared that the United States favored 
a second front but that Great Britain opposed it, later 
adding that the only way to help Russia was through the 
second front and to get the project moving, the American 
public might have to prod the military leaders. At a 
time when Roosevelt and Churchill tried to gain Stalin’s 
understanding about the need to postpone the operation. 
Personal Representative Willkie was in Moscow making
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statements which could only prompt the Russians to remain 
adamant in their demands for the invasion. The situation 
was indeed confusing for the Russians as they could hardly 
believe that Roosevelt's envoy would make such statements 
without the President's approval or that he would be 
directly opposed to administration policies, Willkie's 
remarks also infuriated many American officials who be­
lieved they had enough problems without Willkie calling on
1 Rthe civilian population to "prod" the military.
While Willkie's remarks caused elation and bewilder­
ment among some Russians, his activities led to agonizing 
moments for Ambassador William Standley. Prom the be­
ginning, Standley opposed the envoy's presence in Russia—  
it made him appear and feel as if he were nothing more 
than a nominal office-holder. He resented the politician's 
casual style of diplomacy and became incensed at Willkie's 
lack of regard for the Embassy in making his own arrange­
ments for conferring with Soviet officials, foreign diplo­
mats, and news correspondents. Standley's irritation grew 
almost beyond control when he learned the date and time 
for the Willkie-Stalin conference from the English-speaking 
Russian doorman at the Willkie guest house. When Standley
1 p
Memorandum by Ambassador Standley, attached to 
cover letter Of October 24, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 637-648;
Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie...lighter For Freedom 
(Marquette: Northern Michigan Press, c7 1966), 3&6.
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asked about.the meeting, Willkie declared it to be between 
Stalin and himself, adding that he would let Standley know 
of the results later, Willkie did give the Ambassador a 
brief review of the meeting but added, "There are other 
matters so secret that I can't.trust them to coded 
messages or even to the Ambassador," Enraged, Standley 
requested that he be recalled to Washington for consulta­
tion. He returned to the United States and gained what he 
thought would be a definite understanding that visiting 
Personal Representatives, when they had to appear in Russia, 
would operate through the Embassy,
Although Willkie'5 second front remarks irritated 
Roosevelt and Churchill and his presence in Russia strained 
Standley's patience, it appears that his meeting with 
Stalin produced a favorable response from the Russian 
leader. At the meeting, Willkie followed Roosevelt's one 
suggestion and raised the question of Polish-Soviet rela­
tions. Roosevelt's suggestion was a part of his effort to 
gain better treatment for Polish citizens in Russia and to 
get the Russians to release from Jail the members of a 
Polish relief delegation. Willkie pointed out that the 
causes of friction between the two European nations should 
be removed so as not to detract from the Allied war effort, 
Stalin informed Willkie that he did not wish to argue the
l^Standley, Admiral Ambassador. 295.
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case but would meet with Polish officials. Although Stalin
seemed curt in his exchange with Willkie, it appears that
the meeting prompted a positive decision. Within two
months, Russian officials informed the Polish Charge^that
espionage charges against fifteen Polish officials would
be dropped, and seventy-eight others would be expelled
?Dfrom Russia instead of being tried.
Once Willkie reached Chungking, he followed much
the same pattern toward American officials that he
exhibited in Russia, He refused Ambassador Clarence Gauss'
offer of housing and instead used the sumptuous quarters
provided by the Chinese Government, believing those
quarters would give him more freedom to meet Chinese
officials without Gauss being around. Embassy officials
also suffered considerable anguish over his abruptness and
indifference toward the President of China who had hosted
a dinner for Willkie, They were also concerned that when
Willkie inspected factories, he drew the accompanying
reporters around him and blithely toured the plants without
as much as a question or kind word for his host, the
P 1Chinese Minister of Economics,
^^Memorandum by Polish Ambassador Ciechanowski, 
October 26, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 196.
^^Barnard, Willkie, 367; Mary Dillon, Wendell 
Willkie (New York: J, B. Lippincott Company, 1952),
2Bo-2 « 1 ,
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While Willkie toured the Chinese wartime capital, 
the Generalissimo saw the American as another pawn in his 
efforts to influence Roosevelt's policy toward China.
Chiang Kai-shek wanted more military supplies and an 
American field commander who would follow his orders without 
question. Without Willkie fully understanding the situa­
tion, the Chinese leader planned his itinerary to put Will­
kie in enough schools, factories, and other sites to keep 
him completely isolated from Americans in China who dis­
agreed with Chiang's policies. As the American field 
commander for operations in China, Joseph Stilwell wrote, 
"the idea is to get him so exhausted and keep him so torpid 
with food and drink that his faculties will be dulled and 
he'll be stuffed with the right doctrines." Chiang did not 
want Willkie reporting to Roosevelt that Stilwell's command 
was necessary for victory in Asia; therefore, he skillfully
manuevered Willkie into ignoring Stilwell except to request
22an interview with Claire Chennault, a favorite of Chiang.
The shortcoming of Roosevelt's practice of sending 
uninformed envoys abroad became evident when Willkie met 
the air force leader. Chennault startled Willkie when he 
told him that the air force defended China with less than 
one hundred fighters and that Stilwell held back his plan
Z^Gauss to Hull, October 8, 19^2, D.S, Pile 032 
Willkie, Wendell/124, NA.; Theodore H. White, ed.. The 
Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, c.1948), 1551
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for defeating the Japanese in China with air power, Stil­
well rightly believed that Chennault’s airplanes could not 
operate without adequate ground forces to hold the air 
bases, but Chennault's simplistic plan appealed to Willkie. 
Overlooking the implications of Chennault’s proposal that 
he be given full authority in China for the plan to be 
successful, and ignoring the fact that he was going around 
Stilwell, Willkie ordered Chennault to prepare a report 
that he would personally carry to the President. In 
addition to his public policy suggestions in Russia, Will­
kie now promoted more dissension among American military 
men in China.^3
While Willkie continued the series of tours and 
luncheons, he received word that his call for a second 
front had incensed officials in Washington and that Roose­
velt had tried to downplay his words by telling reporters 
that he did not think Willkie's stories were important 
enough to read. The Army and Navy Journal believed Will­
kie' s status as a Personal Representative had ended and 
said that it was Just as well, before he called for another 
second front— in the Pacific, The remarks about the second 
front infuriated Roosevelt, but he could only wait until his 
Personal Representative returned to the United States to try
23ciaire Chennault, Way of A Fighter (New York;
G.P. Putman's Sons, c. 1949), 212; Romanus, and Sunderland, 
Stilwell's Mission To China, 252.
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to squash any further policy suggestions from Willkie.
As Willkie made his way back to the United States, 
his differences with the President began to appear. At a 
stop-over in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Willkie told news­
men that "in regard to flippant statements made by certain 
public officials concerning the expression of my opinion in 
Russia on the question of a second front, I did not deem 
it appropriate or in good taste for me to reply to such 
flippancies while I was in other countries. I felt it my 
duty while abroad to uphold the President, which I continued 
to do even after such remarks were made," Knowing that 
Willkie directed the statements toward him, Roosevelt 
instructed his secretary, Stephen Early to inform Sam Pryor, 
a vice-president of Trans-World Airways and Willkie’s close 
friend, that reports of Willkie's anger had upset the 
President, In his effort to head off anymore publicity over 
the tiff, Roosevelt wanted to see Willkie before he made 
any more statements, and by getting Willkie into the White 
House, the President thought he could charm the irate
p hIndiana itinerant.
After Willkie's plane landed at Minneapolis and Pryor 
phoned him of the President's request that he go to Washing­
ton to report first to Roosevelt, Willkie made only general 
remarks about the trip. When asked about the "flippant"
^^New York Times, October 13* 1942, 1; ibid., October
14, 1942, 1; Dillon, Wendell Willkie, 280.
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statement, Willkie waved it off with the comment that "the 
element which criticized my trip were the same old diehard 
Tory groups that still think America can live to itself." 
Seemingly Willkie's anger had cooled, but by the time he 
reached Washington, he was boiling over Roosevelt’s remarks 
about "typewriter strategists" and how they were trying to 
run the war effort. Actually, the President had directed 
those remarks toward some professional journalists, but 
Willkie took it as a personal attack.
Once he reached the White House, Willkie and Roose­
velt talked for more than an hour. Roosevelt listened to 
Willkie’s report, and then branded as false the reports 
that he had criticized Willkie's remarks. After the 
lengthy meeting, Willkie held a press conference and 
summarized the White House discussion. He said that as he 
and Roosevelt had agreed that Willkie would speak his mind 
while on the trip, that his remarks about the second front 
were entirely proper, and that he closed the conference 
with the note that he and Roosevelt were not at odds over 
American policy.^5
While the President partially calmed Willkie's 
rumpled feelings, Roosevelt could not keep him from broad­
casting a report to the American people. No doubt Willkie 
sought to drive home the need for international cooperation
^^New York Times, October 15, 1942, 7; Dillon, ibid.
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while keeping his name before the American public and 
strengthening his position within the Republican Party.
On October 26, Willkie told a radio audience of over three 
million listeners about the trip and his Impression of the 
Allied war effort. He launched into a critique of 
American foreign policy, how it created liabilities and 
caused severe leakage in the "reservoir of good will." 
Willkie first cited the failure to make good the promises 
of military aid to the Allies because of the fact that 
America was only "40 per cent mobilized." To Willkie, the 
fact that the United States had not clearly defined its war 
aims confused many people in Russia, China, and particularly 
India— who could not "ascertain from our government’s 
wishy-washy attitude toward India what we are likely to 
feel at the end of the war." Willkie remembered Standley 
and Gauss, apparently unimpressed by the Ambassadors he 
neglected, and called on the President to stop treating the 
people of Eastern Europe as inferior allies and "send to 
represent us among our Allies really distinguished men who 
are important enough in their own right to dare to tell our 
President the truth." To Roosevelt and the others who 
criticized him, Willkie referred to the "atrophy of intelli­
gence which is produced by stupid, arbitrary or undemocratic 
censorship," and that the "record of this war to date is 
not such to inspire in us any sublime faith in the infalli­
bility of our military and naval experts," Willkie then
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called for the start of the second front in order to 
relieve German pressure on the Russians. The speech buoyed 
internationalist feeling across the nation, and added to 
Willkie's political popularity. Some political analysts 
declared it the best speech of the 1942 campaign, in fact, 
Joseph Barnes, a correspondent and Willkie's companion on 
the world Junket, stated that the speech produced more mail 
than any speech Willkie ever made.
Following the speech, Roosevelt told reporters that 
he approved of Willkie's view, adding that there was "not 
a controversy in a car load" about differences between the 
two men. Roosevelt did agree with Willkie's evaluation of 
how the world should exist, but knew the realities of the 
wartime situation went beyond Willkie's simplistic pre­
scriptions. Roosevelt resented the public criticisms of 
the administration's war efforts, but could say or do 
nothing because he was trapped by his own doings. Roose­
velt had sent Willkie as his Personal Representative, and 
now could not publicly rebuke him lest he be willing to have 
the American public believe the President made a bad deci­
sion in sending Willkie abroad. If he did attempt to chas­
tize Willkie, Republicans would use his criticism to show 
Roosevelt's refusal to listen to suggestions and also label 
it as oppression of the freedom of speech. Finally, to
^^Joseph Barnes, Willkie (New York; Simon and
Schuster, 1952), 311.
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dispute Winkle's statements would cause the Allies to 
raise questions about American strategy as Roosevelt had 
made similar statements about the need for a second front, 
more aid to China, and an end to colonialism.
Besides causing confusion among the American public 
and the Allies, this Instance of Roosevelt's Personal 
Representative diplomacy proved of little worth as a 
domestic political Instrument. In the 19^2 elections, 
the Republican Party gained forty-four seats In the House, 
nine In the Senate, and captured the governorships In 
several states having large electoral votes.
While the President recovered from the Willkie 
fiasco. Under Secretary of State Welles met with Myron 
Taylor and discussed the latter's mld-19^1 trip to the 
Vatican. They agreed with the view of many lay Catholics 
and Vatican representatives who believed the Pope had been 
greatly encouraged at the appearance of Roosevelt's repre­
sentative In Rome. Taylor Informed the President of this 
and added that another trip would encourage Catholics In 
Axis occupied countries.
Although Roosevelt liked this method of propagandizing 
and agreed It would encourage those people, he wanted Taylor 
to go abroad for more Immediate reasons. As the Axis forces 
achieved fresh victories, their representatives at Rome
^^New York Times. October 27, 19^2, 8.
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appeared at the Vatican and called for a Papal appeal for 
peace. Because Roosevelt feared the Pope might eventually 
make a statement which would hurt the Allied cause, he 
wanted Taylor to see the Pontiff in an effort to offset 
the Axis pressures. He also instructed Taylor to visit 
Spain and Portugal to determine their attitudes toward an 
Allied operation along the African coast.
Even though he agreed that Taylor should return to 
the Vatican, the President wondered how Taylor planned to 
get into Italy. The answer to Roosevelt's question brings 
to light the case of Harold A, Tittman, "secretary" to the 
Vatican envoy. After the United States had entered the 
war, Heinrich Himmler convinced Benito Mussolini to expel 
the "nest of diplomatic spies" from the Vatican, meaning 
the Allied diplomats who moved to the Vatican when the 
war started. While the Vatican did not plan to yield to 
this pressure, the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See did 
point out that Tittman was not a representative of the 
American Government to the Vatican. The Vatican officials 
had no answer for that charge and requested Tittman to 
clarify his position. As this bode no good for Tittman, 
he wrote Hull that he needed a title— Minister of Charge-- 
to regularize his diplomatic status with the Vatican. A 
short time later, Roosevelt provided the rank of Charge^for




At the same time that he granted a title to Tittman's 
station within the Vatican, the President's action raised a 
legal question concerning Taylor's position. While White 
House and State Department officials consistently denied 
any change in Taylor's status, Harold Tittman's new title 
conferred the responsibility of a legal mission on him 
while the next higher officer. Minister or Ambassador was 
absent. Although Tittman's personal safety required Roose­
velt's immediate action, the President never attempted to 
later gain the Senate's approval, nor did the State Depart­
ment revise its story that Taylor served as "Personal 
Representative," and that Tittman served as his secretary—  
not as Charge^of an embassy.
Safely ensconced in his official station, Tittman 
took up the matter of Taylor's Journey with Vatican 
officials, who in turn inquired about safe conduct from 
Italian authorities. The Italian Foreign Office opposed 
the trip because the United States refused safe passage for 
the Italian Ambassador to Argentina, but when Foreign Minister
^Hull to Tittman, February 9, 19%2, D.S. File 
121.866A/305; memorandum by Adolf Berle, December 13, 19^1, 
D.S. File 121.866A/202 1/2; Welles to Hull, December 13, 
1941, D. S. File 121.866A/203 1/2; Tittman to Hull,
December 23, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/206; Welles to Arch­
bishop Cicognani of the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, 
December 23, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/205 1/2; Senator 
Henrik Shipstead to Hull, June 1, 1944; Hull to Shinstead, 
June 15, 1944, D.S. File 121.866A/403, NA.
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Count Ciano stated that treaty rights which granted neu­
trality to the Vatican and all foreign missions to it must 
be upheld, the Italian Government presented no objections.
On September 12, 1942, Taylor flew from New York to 
Lisbon, where he boarded an Italian commercial plane for 
the remainder of the trip. Once in Rome, Taylor traveled 
in an official Vatican automobile escorted by Italian 
police.30
During his three audiences with the Pope, Taylor 
attempted to offset German pressures on Italy and the 
Vatican. He declared that if the Italian people decided 
to abandon Hitler, they would be "given adequate assistance" 
in postwar reconstruction programs. Aware that his propo­
sals of money for relief and reconstruction would reach 
Italian officials, Taylor made the gesture hoping it would 
be another wedge in prompting the Italians to make a 
separate peace. In an effort to gain the Pope’s assurances 
that he would not make public statements about Axis peace 
proposals, Taylor read a long, broadly phrased statement of 
American war aims that Just happened to coincide with the 
Pope’s ideas for world peace. He mentioned Roosevelt’s
30Tittman to Hull, August 26, 1942, D.S. File 
121.866A/242; Tittman to Hull, September 4, 1942, D.S. 
Pile 121.866A/246; Welles to Bert Pish, American Minister 
to Portugal, September 3, 1942, D.S. Pile 121.866A/248; 
Tittman to Hull, September 29, 1942, D. S. Pile 121.866A/ 
272, NA.
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goals of no territorial ambitions, self-determination for 
all people, and the need for an "expanded United Nations" 
to insure world peace. Gently but firmly, Taylor pressed 
the Pope to make no remarks about the Axis suggestions for 
peace. At the next audience the Pope told Taylor to in­
form the President that the United States did not have to 
worry about a Papal advocacy or approval of compromise peace 
proposals and that outside pressures would not force a 
change in the Vatican's attitude.31
At the same time Taylor sought his cooperation, the 
Pope requested Taylor's assistance in a matter of vital 
importance to the Vatican. As early as February 1942, the 
Vatican made inquiries in London and Washington about the 
possibility of Allied bombers bypassing Rome, and now, the 
Pope asked Taylor to intercede with the Allied leaders.
At a dinner meeting with Churchill in London, Taylor 
mentioned the Pope's concern for Rome's safety and asked 
for Churchill's assurances that the eternal city would be 
spared from Allied bombs. When the Prime Minister refused, 
Taylor then tried to persuade him to limit bombing to 
military targets, but Churchill refused on the grounds that
3lReport by Myron Taylor to Roosevelt on the Trip to 
the Vatican, September 17-September 28, 1942, PSP: The
Vatican, Myron Taylor Pile, Box 56, PDRL; Taylor to Roose­
velt, September 21, 1942, D.S. File 121.866a?256; Titt­
man to Hull, September 29, 1942, D.S. Pile 121.866A/272,
NA.
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night bombing did not lend itself to the accurate bombing 
of military targets. Taylor thought he would be more 
successful in Washington because Roosevelt had earlier 
implied that the United States might follow an independent 
course on the bombing of Rome, but when he tried to get 
the President’s concurrence, Taylor found that Roosevelt 
had once again changed his mind and would not object to 
the bombing of military installations in Rome when 
necessary.3^
After Taylor finished his talks with Vatican officials, 
he flew to Spain to conduct talks with the leaders of that 
neutral nation. His mission remained in line with the 
American policy of trying to keep Spain from becoming 
actively aligned with the Axis powers and supplying them 
with vital materials.
In Madrid, Taylor met with Generalissimo Franco and 
Foreign Minister Gomez Jordana. Taylor never mentioned an 
alliance with the United States but instead he tried to 
convince the two men that only the Allies could offer an
3^Winant to Hull, December 8, 19^2, PSP: The Vatican,
Myron Taylor File, Box 56, PDRL; Memorandum of Myron Taylor 
telephone message to Roosevelt, November 30, 19^2; Hull 
to Roosevelt, December 3, 19^2. FRUS, 1942, III: 792-793;
Roosevelt to Taylor, December 4, 1942, PSF: The Vatican,
Myron Taylor File, Box 56, FDRL. Between February 1942,^ 
and June 1944, the bulk of correspondence between Charge 
Harold Tittman and the Vatican officials dealt with the 
bombing of Rome, Monte Cassino, and other Papal terri­
tories; see FRUS, 1942, III: 791-800; 1943, II: 910-953;
1944, IV: 1274^314.
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assurance of a stable postwar society in Europe. Franco 
and Jordana understood the meaning of Taylor’s offer of 
postwar food and reconstruction loans but refused to make a 
commitment to the Allies.
Although the talks produced no Immediate results, 
Ambassador J. H. Carleton Hayes believed Taylor's display 
of confidence in the Allies ability to continue the fight 
and his stern conviction that Germany would soon collapse 
helped soften Franco’s attitude toward the Allies. At the 
same time, the pro-Franco Archbishop of Toledo published 
a four-page condemnation of a pro-Nazi book In the official 
Spanish Catholic periodical Official Bulletin. With this 
sudden shift by the Spanish prelate and Taylor’s exposure 
of Franco’s uncertainty about the outcome of the war, Hayes 
cabled Roosevelt that Taylor's trip to Madrid came "at the 
right psychological moment for the American cause In 
Spain."33
From Spain, Taylor’s mission took him to the other 
neutral but equally Important Portugal. Though It did not 
possess outright military power, Portugal’s tungsten holdings 
were of basic Importance to the production of weapons, and 
the mid-Atlantic Azores could be used as naval stations and 
supply bases. Following the British approach of mild 
pressure and trade agreements, the United States reached an
33j. H, Carleton Hayes to Roosevelt, September 30, 
1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 296-298.
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agreement with Portugal for the purchase of the vital ore, 
wolframite. Although the American acquisitions did not cut 
into that pledged to Germany, they did keep larger amounts 
from going to the Axis, and the pact also allowed the 
United States to over-bid the price of wolframite, an action 
which made it so expensive the Germans could not long afford 
the vital minerals.
In his conversation with Salazar, Taylor used the 
same confident but subtle persuasiveness that he used with 
the Pope and Franco. He described the predicted social 
upheaval in postwar Europe and elaborated on United 
States’ plans to maintain political and economic stability 
there. Then Taylor deftly turned the conversation to a 
discussion of Salazar's bogeyman— communism. He used that 
phobia and the prospect of American aid as an incentive to 
Salazar to form an alliance or at least pro-Allied neutrality. 
The Portuguese leader remained non-committal in 1942 but 
later granted facilities in the Azores to the United States.
After the conference with Salazar, Taylor met with 
the Catholic Cardinal of Portugal in an effort to get the 
Prelate's endorsement for a pro-Allied agreement. He told 
the Cardinal of his very long and satisfactory conferences 
with the Pope and the extended talks with Vatican Secretary 
of State Cardinal Maglione and other Vatican officials.
To further impress the leading Portuguese Catholic with the 
Vatican's attitude toward the United States, Taylor showed
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him the document in which the Pope rejected Axis attempts 
to force a change in his attitude and declared his support 
for the Allied goal of total victory. Even though the 
Cardinal remained noncommittal, Taylor left Portugal with 
the impression that the talks had won another spokesman 
for improved Portuguese-American relations.3^
Although Myron Taylor's trip to the Vatican and the 
Iberian Peninsula produced no outward shift toward the 
Allies, it did contribute to the Allies' psychological war­
fare. Taylor's mission became a symbolic one-man invasion 
force crossing enemy lines and setting up camp in the 
capital city of one of the Axis countries. The later 
rumors of his trip's value to the successful invasion of 
Africa so incensed the Italian and German Governments that 
President Roosevelt wisely refrained from sending him back 
to Rome until late 1944. The Pope's agreement not to 
discuss Axis peace proposals helped the Allied cause in the 
early days of the war when rumors of separate peace talks 
needed to be quashed. The psychological impact of his 
suggestions about postwar security no doubt caused Franco 
and Salazar to wonder about their relationship with the 
Axis. Franco's decision not to send troops against the 
Allies in Africa and Salazar's later agreement on the Azores 
likely found some impetus from Taylor's visit.
3^Hull to Taylor, September 8, 1942, PSF; The Vatican,
Myron Taylor Pile, Box 56, FDRL; Dobney, ed.. Selected
Papers of Will Clayton. 66,
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The nature of the early days of World War II demanded 
that the President follow a moderate policy toward any 
government which would help the Allies. At that time, the 
United States did not have the military wherewithal to de­
feat the Axis. Thus, Roosevelt used what political means 
were available to try to offset Axis influence, especially 
in Vichy Prance and the French possessions in North Africa.
After Germany's victory in Prance in 1940, a French 
government was set up in the unoccupied part of France at 
Vichy. While Germany held command in most of France, it 
did not control the French possessions in either Africa or 
the Western Hemisphere. The American public objected to 
doing business with the French, but Roosevelt recognized the 
value of continued diplomatic relations with that govern­
ment. He felt that with encouragement, the Vichy group 
might resist German pressures on their colonies and might 
cooperate when the second front got underway. Although 
Admiral William Leahy served as Ambassador to Vichy France, 
the President wanted information about the French colonies 
in Africa, so he directed Robert Murphy to cultivate 
sympathizers and report on political conditions in the 
French possessions.
Murphy first became acquainted with the nature of 
diplomacy when he worked as a code clerk in Switzerland 
during World War I. Following the war, he returned to the 
United States, completed law school, and passed the foreign
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service examination. In the 1920*s while serving as 
American Consul In Munich, Murphy observed the growth of 
Hitler’s Nazi Party. Like many other Foreign Service 
Officers, Murphy reported on the situation but thought 
Hitler's activities no more reactionary than that of many 
other German political groups. During the next decade,
Murphy served In the American Embassy In Paris; and when 
Ambassador William Bullitt left France In 1940 after the 
German occupation, Murphy became Charge^of the American 
delegation at Vichy, until called by the President, and 
worked to keep French possessions In Africa from falling 
under German control.
After reading reports on French Africa, Roosevelt 
wanted to discuss ways of aiding and encouraging French 
administrators who remained relatively free In operating 
those holdings, so he called Murphy to Washington In 
September 1940. Roosevelt Instructed Murphy to make a 
complete inspection of conditions In Africa and report 
directly to him. The President again showed his disregard 
for the State Department by telling Murphy that when he 
learned something of special Interest not to bother with 
Department channels but to send It to the White House.
Murphy felt uneasy at the prospects of Ignoring his pro­
fessional superiors but accepted the situation as "one of 
the occupational hazards of Roosevelt's special assignments," 
Murphy understood the President's brand of personal diplomacy
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as he later remarked that "there always was the consolation 
that the President, though he might let one down in a pub­
lic utterance, gave very staunch support in private."35
Throughout the trip, Murphy saw and heard much anti- 
Nazi sentiment voiced by Frenchmen in Africa, and as a 
result of his observations, Murphy suggested that the United 
States sign an economic aid agreement with French North 
Africa. With Roosevelt's approval, Murphy and the French 
administrator for Africa, Maxime Weygand, concluded nego­
tiations on that accord. The terms of the agreement 
allowed frozen French funds in the United States to be used 
to buy non-strategic goods to be shipped to Africa. And 
to insure the goods did not fall into German hands, the 
French agreed to permit American representatives to observe 
the off-loading of the supplies in African ports. While 
the compact encountered heavy criticism from the American 
press, Roosevelt viewed the agreement as practical. He 
agreed to Murphy's plan, and the Weygand-Murphy Agreement 
became effective in March 1941.
While the aid never reached the amounts desired by 
the French, it did bring much friendship for the United 
States among the needy French and Arabs who had not 
received promised German aid. Of greater importance, the 
right to have personnel in vital ports allowed the resident
35Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 70.
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Americans to carry on surveillance activities and keep 
informed of German movements, as well as build personal 
friendships which were of value in the later military 
operations.
After Murphy completed the initial mission, he spent 
the rest of 1941 traveling between Africa and Washington 
trying to quell opposition to the aid program. The 
biggest objection came from the Board of Economic Warfare 
and their British counterparts, which opposed any assistance 
to the French. The result was a considerable delay in the 
movement of goods. Following several months of protracted 
negotiations, the British finally agreed to allow the French 
ships to cross the British blockade. Murphy encountered 
another obstacle when the Vichy Government, under German 
pressure, recalled Weygand in November 1941, an action 
which resulted in American suspension of the agreement.
One month later, as a result of Churchill-Roosevelt talks 
on the possible invasion of Africa, Cordell Hull cabled 
Murphy that the accord was being reactivated.3^
As Murphy continued his African operations, his 
increased knowledge of the French colonists led him to call 
for a conciliatory and cooperative policy for late 1942.
3^The Jurisdictional conflict between the State 
Department and the Board of Economic Warfare is described in 
William Danger's Our Vichy Gamble (New York; W. W. Norton, 
1947), 264-272.
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He saw the melange^ of Europeans living in French Africa: 
the rich and poor refugees; Jews and Polish nationals; 
Spanish loyalists and communists, all comprising a part 
of a potentially disruptive element that needed to be 
controlled in the event of hostilities. To Murphy, only 
the experienced French administrators could keep stability 
in the European community in Africa at the time of Allied 
military operations.3?
When he returned to Washington in late August 1942, 
Murphy carried those impressions with him. Shortly after 
his arrival, Murphy met with Secretary of War Stimson and 
General George C. Marshall and found both men uninspired by 
the strategy to invade Africa. Stimson never gave up the 
idea of a continental strike, and Marshall, if it had to be, 
wanted an outright attack on French Africa without any 
collaboration with the French administrators. When Murphy 
traveled to Hyde Park, he found that the President under­
stood the political problems associated with the landing 
of American forces in French Africa. To undertake the 
invasion without some form of cooperation by the Vichy 
Government would leave the United States facing resistance 
by loyal French forces in Africa. If French resistance did 
slow the operation, German forces in Africa could attack 
the Allied troops before they could establish a salient,
3?Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 97-98.
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thus prolonging the North African campaign and possibly 
provoking the Germans into sending troops through Spain 
to seize Gibraltar and cut off the Allied train of supplies 
to Africa. This possibility left the alternative of 
either needing an overwhelming force to offset the French 
military or as Murphy suggested, convincing the leading 
civilian authorities to cooperate with the Americans. At 
the same time, Murphy hoped French naval officers could be 
persuaded to pull the French warships out of their berths
at Toulon, France and join the Allied fleet.
After they reviewed the African situation, Roose­
velt informed Murphy of the invasion plans and added:
"Don’t tell anybody in the State Department about this.
That place is a sieve!" Murphy said that such a silence 
would strain his relationship with Secretary of State Hull, 
but Roosevelt brushed that aside with "Don't worry about
Cordell. I will take care of him; I'll tell him our plans
a day or two before the landings." Roosevelt's directive 
removed Murphy from any responsibility to the State 
Department, and from the time he returned to Algiers, Murphy 
transmitted and received messages through a military code 
not held by the Department. Murphy's deciphered messages 
finally reached the State Department in September 1960.^®
^^Morgenthau Diaries, Book 572, September 28. 1942, 
IBI-J to IBI-K; ibid.. Book 573, September 29, 1942, 32-35, 
FDRL; Roosevelt to Murphy, September 22, 1942, D. S. File
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When Murphy received his instructions from the 
President and the operations commander. General Dwight 
Eisenhower, he knew that both men agreed with his view 
that Charles DeGaulle should not be brought into the 
operation. Washington's attitude toward DeGaulle's Free 
French movement was never cordial, but became even more 
distant following the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident of 
December 1941. The United States and the Vichy official 
in charge of the two French islands off the coast of 
Newfoundland had signed an agreement which stated there 
would be no change in the political status of French 
possessions in the Western Hemisphere, Directed toward 
Germany, the accord also had the additional effect of 
barring the Free French from the islands. Once German 
submarines began prowling the waters of the northern 
coast of the United States, the tiny islands' importance 
as a communications center was considered by the United 
States. As Great Britain, Canada, and the United States 
negotiated over joint control of the islands, DeGaulle's 
forces seized them. The expedition thrilled battle- 
hungry Americans and imbedded DeGaulle in their minds as 
a true French patriot. Angry over DeGaulle's action 
which gave Germany an excuse to take the same action in
123M956/477 1/2, NA; FRUS, 1942, II: 392n; Murphy, Dip­
lomat Among Warriors, 102, 106; Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 
301.
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the future, Roosevelt, Hull, and the State Department re­
fused to cooperate with the Free French movement and talked 
of DeGaulle as power hungry, irresponsible, and one who 
could not be trusted.35
Following the extensive planning conferences, Mur­
phy returned to Algiers on October 11, 1942, three 
short weeks before the Allied invasion. After considerable 
investigation, he concluded that General Henri Giraud was 
the best hope for French cooperation. The General had 
snubbed German overtures for collaboration, and when im­
prisoned for his refusal, Giraud had escaped and returned 
to Vichy France where he lived as a national hero. Murphy 
believed the heroic Giraud could easily persuade the 
French military in Africa to join the Allies. While 
Giraud remained in Lyon, France, Murphy negotiated with 
General Charles Mast, commander of French forces in 
Algiers.
While he negotiated with Giraud's agent, Murphy 
learned that Admiral Jean Francois Darlan might bring the 
French fleet to Africa if the United States would supply 
him with large-scale aid. As commander-in-chief of all 
French military forces, Darlan's control of the French
S^Murphy to Hull, October 12, 1942; Murphy to War 
Department, October 13, 1942; Murphy to War Department, 
October 15, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 390-394; Gaddis Smith, 
American Diplomacy During The Second World War (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, c. 196^), 36.
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Navy and his cooperation with the United States would al­
most insure success for the invasion. Murphy suggested 
that Darlan be encouraged and then attempted to reconcile 
differences between Darlan and Giraud. General Mast told 
Murphy that Giraud expected the Americans to deal with him 
because Darlan could not be trusted. He explained that 
since the French Army had confidence in Giraud and would 
obey him, the French Navy would follow the army. Mast 
then raised the question of command of the forces in 
Africa, proposing a unified command with Eisenhower heading 
the American forces and Giraud leading the French. Murphy 
recognized the problem and tried to label it a technicality, 
but Mast insisted it was a political point that had to be 
settled in advance, and he called for a meeting with 
officers from Eisenhower’s staff to discuss the issues 
and arrangements for the operation.
Three days after the Murphy-Mast talks. General Mark 
Clark and four staff officers flew from London to Gibraltar 
and then went by submarine to the African coast. In a style 
befitting Upton Sinclair’s Lanny Budd, the Americans left 
the submarine, paddled their kayaks to the Algierian coast, 
and rendezvoused with Murphy and Mast at a farm near 
Cherchell. Mast wanted more information about the time 
and location of the invasion and declared that Giraud should 
be assured of immediate command of all forces. Clark 
remained silent on the invasion date and told Mast that
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Giraud's command of the forces would take place once the 
initial landings were completed. He then outlined a pro­
posal to include Darlan, but Mast again rejected the plan, 
holding to the idea that Giraud alone could deliver French 
forces in Africa. Seeing that the French General was 
adamant, Clark and Murphy dropped the effort to include 
Darlan rather than alienate Giraud and risk making the 
invasion without a major collaborator. Finally, Clark stated 
that Giraud's desire for a simultaneous landing in France 
would not be considered until after the North African 
invasion and that if Giraud accepted the conditions as 
presented, he should be prepared to leave France by sub­
marine.^^
Although Mast believed Darlan no longer in contention, 
unexpected events projected the French Admiral into the 
situation. Prior to the Clark-Murphy-Mast talks, Alain 
Darlan, the Admiral's son, contracted polio and entered an 
Algiers hospital. Two days later, the Admiral arrived in 
Africa to visit his son and to inspect French military 
installations. While there, Darlan made contacts to deter­
mine if American planners would accept his leadership of 
French forces in Africa. With Giraud seemingly in tow, the 
Americans left the French Admiral's overtures unanswered,
^^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble. 328-331; Murphy 
Diplomat Among Warriors, 119.
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and he made plans to return to Prance.
With Clark’s secret visit completed, Robert Murphy 
had two weeks to finish negotiations with General Giraud 
and local officials. When Giraud learned of the outcome 
of Mast’s talks with Clark, he wrote Murphy that while the 
American army would carry out the initial landings, the 
"Inter-Allied Commander-In-Chief" (Giraud) should set the 
date for the landings and take complete control forty-eight 
hours after the operations got underway. He also called 
for a simultaneous landing of fifty thousand men on the 
southern coast of Prance. Murphy saw the potential for 
trouble and requested permission to tell Mast when the 
expedition would arrive. Once informed. Mast charged lack 
of faith by the Americans and then cabled the news to Giraud. 
By return courier, the Prench General told Murphy that he 
could not leave Prance before November 20 and that the 
imminence of the invasion forced him to see the proposi­
tion as nothing more than an ultimatum. Believing his 
personal negotiations about to collapse, Murphy panicked 
and cabled the War Department" that it is not unreasonable 
that Giraud be given 3 weeks interval to perfect his metro­
politan organization and arrange his departure with maximum 
advantage to us." With the convoys already formed and
^^Murphy to Leahy, October 18, 19^2; Murphy to Ray 
Atherton, October 30, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 398-400.
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underway, his recommendation was rejected. Giraud objected 
to the new circumstances, but he left Prance aboard a sub­
marine and then transferred to a seagoing plane for the
Ü ?rest of the trip to Africa.
The confusion mounted even further because at the 
same time Giraud left Prance, Admiral Darlan returned to 
Algiers to be with his son, who seemed to be near death.
With the Invasion only two days away, Darlan likely guessed 
at the approximate time of the operation and flew to Algiers 
to once again try his luck with the Allies.
When Giraud failed to arrive at Algiers, Murphy’s 
plans became more muddled. He planned for Giraud to be in 
Algiers to issue a cease-fire order when the invasion 
started, but Allied officers feared that Giraud continued 
to harbor those sentiments expressed in the letter to 
Murphy so they detoured his plane to Eisenhower's head­
quarters at Gibraltar. They were right. He refused to 
issue a public cease-fire order unless Installed as Inter- 
Allled Commander-in-Chlef with the authority to make all 
decisions regarding the dispersal of Allied troops in 
Prench Africa, and he stubbornly held to the idea of an 
invasion of southern Prance. After a day and night of
^^Giraud to Murphy, October 27, 1942, 419-422; George 
C. Marshall to Murphy, October 27, 1942, 406; Murphy to 
Leahy, October 31, 1942, 409; Leahy to Murphy, November 2, 
1942, 423; Murphy to War Department, November 4, 1942,
PRUS. 1942, II: 424; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 120-121.
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grueling talks, Giraud finally accepted the reality of his 
position and accepted the title of commander-in-chief of all 
Prench forces in North Africa.
With the landings starting and Giraud nowhere in 
sight, Murphy went to the home of the ranking Prench 
officer known to be sympathetic, informed him of the in­
vasion, and requested a cease-fire order. General 
Alphonses Juin pointed out that his proclamation would be 
useless because Admiral Darlan outranked him and could 
rescind any statement Juin might issue. At Murphy's insist­
ence, Juin contacted Darlan who soon appeared at the 
General's home. The Admiral acted surprised and then angry 
at the American move; he told Murphy that he remained 
loyal to Marshall Petain. Protecting his own position, 
and not completely sure of the operation's chances for 
success, Darlan cabled Petain for permission to stop the 
fighting.
Without hesitation, Murphy negotiated with the Vichy 
Admiral. Darlan, not Giraud, clearly commanded the alle­
giance of Prench military forces and could end hostilities 
without question. President Roosevelt helped make Murphy's 
decision easier by authorizing him to make any arrangements 
with Darlan which would help insure the operation.
^^Murphy to Leahy, November 25, 19^2; Leahy to Mur­
phy, October 17, 1942, PRUS, 1942, II: 425; Murphy, Diplomat 
Among Warriors, 127-134; Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, BBU.
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While Murphy and Darlan negotiated the Admiral's 
post-invasion position, Giraud arrived in Algiers supposedly 
to bring an end to Prench resistance. The Prench African 
military officers refused to deal with Giraud and declared 
their allegiance to Petain and Darlan. When General Mark 
Clark arrived and Murphy informed him of Darlan's reluctance 
to act without Petain's approval, Clark threatened to arrest 
him. Portunately for Darlan, the Marshall's authorization 
arrived, and news reached Algiers of Germany's movement 
into Vichy Prance. Realizing Petain was no longer in 
control and seeing his own position in Jeopardy, Darlan 
quickly contacted all Prench African military commanders 
to stop fighting.
With the Prench resistance ending, Eisenhower still 
faced the problem of which Prenchman would be administrative 
officer for Prench Africa. If the United States supported 
Giraud, the situation would remain sensitive because of 
Darlan's many military supporters; on the other hand, to 
support Darlan would mean the loss of the Prench General's 
capabilities as a military tactician. Portunately, Giraud 
understood the problem and told Murphy that he wished to 
be free from any civil duties. Subsequently, Giraud became 
military commander of Prench forces and Darlan served as 
civil administrator for Prench Africa.
^^Agreement between General Mark Clark and Admiral
154
The President's Personal Representative diplomacy 
proved successful as the Allies suffered less than 1,500 
casualties in the initial invasion, and the ease in making 
the landings bolstered public morale at a most crucial 
time. The ultimate credit for the operation's success 
goes not to the Personal Representative but ironically, to 
the Prench Admiral. Robert Murphy followed Roosevelt's 
instructions and contacted the Prenchman he thought could 
stop the fighting, but Murphy's selection of Henri Giraud 
proved to be a bad choice. Then, through fortuitous 
circumstances and Darlan's opportunistic planning, Murphy 
finally made the right choice.
During the pre-invasion days, the State Department 
knew nothing of Murphy's negotiations with Darlan or the 
subsequent agreement putting the Admiral in charge of civil 
affairs in Prench Africa. While Hull concurred with 
Roosevelt's Vichy policies, critics saw that Robert Murphy, 
a State Department professional diplomat, was implementing 
a collaborationist-type policy toward the Vichy and they 
leveled their attacks at the State Department and Secretary 
of State Hull, not the White House. When news of the 
African landings reached the State Department, Hull moved 
quickly to answer the critics. Before he learned of the
Prancois Darlan, November 22, 1942, PRUS, 1942, II: 453-
457; U.S., Department of State Bulletin, vol. 7, November
21, 1942, 935.
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subsequent arrangements with Darlan, however, Hull told 
reporters that credit for the successful operation belonged 
to the State Department. As news of the Darlan negotiations 
reached the United States, public hostility centered once 
again on Hull and his Department, Roosevelt tried to 
lessen public criticism by calling It a "temporary 
expedient," and he ordered the word "protocol" stricken 
from the formal Clark-Darlan agreement to avoid using a 
title which Implied formal recognition of the Darlan 
regime and which would evoke even more public condemnation.
Opponents of Roosevelt's African policies based their 
objections on the collaboration with the Vichy Prench and 
the subsequent damage to the American national character 
for dealing with fascists. They aimed further criticism 
at the failure to include Charles DeGaulle's Free French 
organization In the operation. Ignoring the fact that there 
was a lack of real alternatives, the liberal press railed 
at Hull and Roosevelt. Freda Klrchwey of The Nation saw 
Darlan as "America's First Quisling," and feared that 
Murphy's deal weakened democracy while The New Republic's 
Dorothy Thompson believed the policy brought Into question 
America's basic war alms. Walter Llppmann bemoaned the 
fact that "we have been put to a very severe moral test In 
North Africa and we are not meeting that test," and he 
described administration policies as trying to "turn the 
moral world upside down by Insisting that wrong Is right
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and bad is good." Even Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
quietly complained about the deal, but the Clark-Darlan 
agreement remained in force.
The critics of the "Darlan Deal" in their all-out 
support for Charles DeGaulle, ignored the fact that neither 
Giraud nor DeGaulle had commanded enough backing to 
deliver the Prench forces in Africa in November 1942, but 
the subsequent criticism of Murphy’s post-invasion decisions 
was Justified. When Admiral Darlan set up his administration, 
he sought to replace the Governor-General of Algiers, who 
continually criticized his earlier concessions to the 
Nazis. At Darlan’s request, Murphy arranged for Marcel 
Peyrouton to serve in that post. As Vichy Minister of the 
Interior, Peyrouton had issued the first anti-semitic 
decrees which led to the imprisonment of many French 
citizens. In a later Vichy power struggle, Peyrouton helped 
force the Nazi sympathizer, Pierre Laval, from office.
When Laval regained control, Peyrouton was sent to Argentina 
as Prench Ambassador. With Murphy’s approval, he joined 
Darlan in Algiers. Murphy’s antipathy for DeGaulle in­
fluenced his decision to place more Vichyites in power in
^^Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. 122-123; Burns, 
Roosevelt; Soldier of Freedom, 295-2$6; Langer, Our Vichy 
Gamble, Freda Kirchwey, "America's First Quisling,^'
The Nation, 155 (November 28, 1942), 529-530; The Nation, 
156 (January 2, 1943, and January 30, 1943), 3-4, and Ï51- 
152; Time, 41 (January 4, 1943), 15-16; New Republic, 108 
(February 8, 1943), I65-I06; Morgenthau Diaries, Book 
584, 170-A to 170-G, FDRL.
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Africa, but his policy of cooperation extended beyond its 
usefulness when Germany's invasion of Vichy France shut off 
American contacts in that part of Prance, and since the 
Prench Forces in Africa had joined the Allies, the need 
for Vichy politicians no longer existed.
At first, Roosevelt supported Murphy's unpopular 
arrangements, but the assassination of Admiral Darlan spared 
the President prolonged agony in defending that stand.
With the Prench leader no longer a liability, Roosevelt 
gradually succumbed to public demands for policy changes.
At Casablanca in January 1943, Roosevelt arranged for Giraud 
and DeGaulle to work together in the African political 
set-up. Demanding that he be in charge, DeGaulle refused 
to negotiate with Giraud. The sticky problem remained 
until Roosevelt grew weary of the African situation and 
left DeGaulle free to pressure Giraud into accepting his 
leadership in Prench Africa.
By January 1943, control of civilian programs in 
Africa reverted to the State Department, and Murphy's role 
as Presidential Representative ended. He became civilian 
political adviser on General Eisenhower's staff, helped 
arrange negotiations which led to Italy's surrender, met 
with Josip Tito to discuss American aid to Yugoslav partisans,
^^Hull to Murphy, December 11, 1942, PRUS, 1942, II:
48l; "Recall Robert Murphy," The New Republic, 108 
(February 1, 1943), 131-132.
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and in August 19%%, became Elsenhower’s adviser on German 
affairs.
As the African campaign got underway, Roosevelt 
hoped Premier Stalin would be mollified by the operation. 
Postponement of the cross-channel invasion and reduced 
convoys of lend lease supplies to Murmansk strained 
Stalin's patience and caused Roosevelt to wonder if the 
alliance could survive. In March 19^3, Ambassador Standley 
added to the tension when he accused the Russians of 
abusing American aid and not making an all-out effort on 
the military front. To reassure Stalin, the President 
saw one approach— a face-to-face meeting. After all, 
Churchill had met with Stalin, and Roosevelt no doubt 
believed he could get better negotiations with Stalin 
than did Churchill.
Instead of calling on Ambassador Standley to carry 
his proposal to Stalin, Roosevelt dispatched another 
Personal Representative to Moscow. He had to find a way 
to remove Standley without appearing to have succumbed to 
Russian demands that the Admiral be recalled. Roosevelt 
remembered Standley’s outburst in 19^3 as personal envoys 
began appearing in Moscow and likely assumed that the 
arrival of another Personal Representative might provoke 
Standley to resign. Indignant at the appearance of another 
agent who ignored the Ambassador, who had a letter the 
Ambassador was not allowed to read, and who conferred with
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Stalin without the Ambassador being present, Standley 
resigned within three months. Roosevelt promptly replaced 
him with W. Averell Harriman.
To make the Moscow trip, the President called on. 
Joseph Davies. The Roosevelt-Davies relationship dated back 
to the Wilson years when the Wisconsin lawyer-politician 
had served as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission 
while Roosevelt was in the Navy Department. Davies and 
Roosevelt, like other Progressives, belonged to the 
"Common Counsel Club," a political discussion group in which 
they developed and shared a lasting friendship. When 
Roosevelt first ran for President, Davies worked for the 
ticket and, in 1936, he served as Roosevelt's campaign 
chairman. As a result of his efforts for the ticket, but 
more so because of his $10,000 donation to the campaign, 
Davies was named Ambassador to R u s s i a .
During Davies' pre-war stay in Russia, he had 
thoroughly alienated most of the Foreign Service Officers 
in Moscow. George Kennan "saw every evidence that his
^^Once he became American Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, Averell Harriman complained that he was often forced 
to make inquiries of the Russian Foreign Office because 
Washington failed to keep him informed on vital issues;
Davies to Roosevelt, March 22, 19^3, PSF: 104, Davies Folder,
FDRL; Richard, Ullraan, "The Davies Mission and United 
States-Soviet Relations," World Politics. 9 (January 1957), 
224; Quentin Reynolds, "Diplomat On The Spot," Colliers,
112 (July 24, 1943). 13; Standley, Admiral Ambassador, 
364-382; 475.
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motives in accepting the post were personal and political" 
and accused Davies of a "readiness to bend both the mission 
and its function to the purposes of personal publicity at 
home." Kennan's early Judgment proved correct as Davies 
ignored his staff and constantly laid his views before 
American correspondents stationed in Moscow. Davies 
adopted the position that the Communists were no longer 
bent on world revolution or conquest, but acted as they 
did in order to secure Russia against future German 
aggression.
In spite of his lack of popularity with the pro­
fessionals, Davies gained considerable publicity for his 
predictions of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the 
later successful Russian stand against the Germans. Even 
though grossly erroneous, Davies’ book entitled Mission 
to Moscow helped boost his popularity even further. In 
the book, Davies described Stalin as no heavy-handed killer, 
but a lover of children and dogs who had ordered the trials 
of the late 1930’s to purge Russia of German spies. He 
also concluded that Russian communism was actually growing 
close to American capitalism and presented less a threat 
than fascism because communism was based "on the same 
principle of the brotherhood of man which Jesus preached." 
After he left the Ambassador's post, and returned to the 
United States, Davies continued to describe the Soviet 
Union in the glowing terms he likely believed would most
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help Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to improve relations 
with Russia.
The former Ambassador's ideas and style did not 
change during the intervening five years. After he 
arrived in Moscow, Davies ignored Standley and the American 
Embassy staff and arranged his own meeting with Stalin.
He also held à press conference in which he caused an up­
roar among newspaper correspondents when he accused them 
of disservice, treasonable activities, and aid to Hitler 
for their criticisms of the Soviet Government. He 
attempted to impress Stalin with his friendliness by showing 
a film adaptation of Mission To Moscow, but he received
only "glum curiosity" from Soviet officials and an occa-
lifisional grunt from Stalin.
When the two men talked in private, Davies informed 
Stalin that the President wanted to get away from the 
"red tape of diplomatic conferences" for an "informal and 
completely simple visit for a few days between you and me." 
Roosevelt suggested either side of the Bering Strait for a 
meeting, and to keep it simple, only Harry Hopkins, one
^^Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, 82-83; Joseph Davies, 
Mission to Moscow (New York; Simon and Schuster, c. 19^1), 
34, 5il, 551-^52; "How Russia Blasted Germany's Spy 
Machine," American Magazine, 32 (December, 19^1), 81, 
110*112; "What We DidnH know About Russia," Reader's 
Digest, 40 (March, 1942), 49-55; Standley to Hull, May 22, 
1943, D.S. Pile 121.861/159; Standley to Hull, May 25, 
1943, D.S. Pile 121.861/162, NA.
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interpreter, and one stenographer would accompany him. 
Stalin questioned the value of a conference but told 
Davies that although he could not meet in the early 
summer, possibly a conference in Fairbanks, Alaska, could 
be arranged for July or August.^9
Although Davies successfully completed his mission 
and returned to Washington in early June 19^3, Roosevelt's 
flair for impulsive and uncoordinated personal diplomacy 
momentarily wiped out the prospects for a personal meeting 
with Stalin and resulted in more of the agitation that he 
had hoped to forestall. When Churchill learned of Roose­
velt's designs, he protested that enemy propagandists would 
use the conference to show a split in the Allied camp and 
that it would produce resentment and alarm among the 
British people. Caught in the act, Roosevelt simply lied 
to Churchill and told him that Stalin initially proposed 
that the two leaders meet alone. Though his anger was 
real, Churchill quickly cooled since he had just returned 
from a Washington conference where he got Roosevelt's 
approval for continued operations in the Mediterranean in 
exchange for a firm British pledge to undertake the cross­
channel invasion in May 19^4. Once Stalin learned of the 
decision to direct operations against Italy, which meant
^^Roosevelt to Stalin, May 5, 19^3; Stalin to Roose­
velt, May 26, 1943, FRUS, "The Conference at Cairo and 
Teheran," 1943; 3-7.
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the continental front was second again, he cabled Roose­
velt that the decision represented an act of bad faith on 
the two leaders' part. In addition to the maneuvering 
by Roosevelt and Churchill, the Russian leader likely saw 
Davies' appearance in Moscow and Roosevelt's gesture for 
a personal meeting as nothing more than the President's 
effort to soften him for the unpleasant news.50
The agents dutifully carried out the instructions 
they were given and accomplished the sought-after goals, 
but Roosevelt's Personal Representative diplomacy suffered 
most from his own doings and taught him an important 
lesson about the imprudence of mixing domestic politics 
and foreign policy. Prompted by Democratic politics and 
convinced that his personal charm could overcome any 
difficulties, Roosevelt foolishly sent Wendell Willkie 
abroad without any guidelines. He subsequently found him­
self making apologies for an uncontrollable envoy and 
fighting Willkie-created demands for a second front. Prom 
that experience, Franklin Roosevelt learned never again to 
use a popular opposition politician as a Personal Re­
presentative.
Aside from the Willkie fiasco, the President's 
policies did show imagination and a practical approach to
 ̂ Churchill to Roosevelt, June 25, 1943; Roosevelt to 
Churchill, June 28, 1943; Stalin to Roosevelt, August 8, 
1943, ibid., 10-11; Burns, Roosevelt; Soldier of Freedom. 
371.
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the desperate political-military situation in Europe.
During the first two years of the war, Roosevelt saw that 
the extremely critical period of the war was at hand, thus 
the heavy flow of Personal Representatives in 1942 and 1943. 
As reflected in his envoys' missions, Roosevelt refused to 
guide his actions by fixed political principles that would 
have narrowed his policy options and have created suspicion 
and conflict within the Allied camp. The no-strings-attached 
aid helped keep Russia in the war at a crucial time and 
allowed the Russians time to re-equip their military forces 
and re-group their industrial forces. The President knew 
the Communists were not serious about extending religious 
freedom to the Russian people but he felt the gesture would 
be another bullet in the war of words. Nothing mirrored 
Roosevelt's belief in the special agent's practical value 
more than the dispatching of the Personal Representative 
to negotiate with Franco and Salazar. The agent's wartime 
visits to Spain and Portugal helped move those neutral 
leaders away from a cooperative policy with Nazi Germany. 
Further, Roosevelt heard, suffered from, and tried to play 
down the domestic reaction to his Vichy policies; but when 
no other possibility could assure the quick and relatively 
safe landing of Allied troops in Africa, the President 
willingly embraced the Vichy Admiral.
ROOSEVELT AND THE CHINESE PUZZLE 
CHAPTER IV
Although Franklin Roosevelt's first concern was 
winning the war in Europe, he was simultaneously attempting 
to create military conditions in the Far East which would 
help to insure the success of a later intensified military 
campaign against the Japanese. To accomplish that goal, 
a major American effort was directed toward keeping China 
in the war. The United States supplied Chinese forces 
with the weapons that would keep Japanese troops tied down 
on the Asian mainland, while the Chinese agreed to provide 
locations from which American planes could strike against 
Japan. Later, as American forces gathered, Chinese ports 
would also serve as debarkation points for the invasion 
against the Japanese home islands.
While President Roosevelt actively pursued the 
military objectives, he also sought political goals for 
China. Since Roosevelt thought in the traditional terms 
of the Open Door, he believed that strengthening China 
would secure that nation's postwar territorial integrity 
and provide some stability in the Orient. It followed that
16$
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if China was recognized as the major power in the Par East 
and did preserve order in Asia, the United States would not 
be actively involved in maintaining a Par Eastern balance 
of power. Yet Roosevelt relegated China to a secondary 
position in the wartime scheme of things, and when coupled 
with the Chinese internal problems, such a policy invited 
defeat for his goals in the Par East.
The efforts to make that Par Eastern nation militarily 
and politically sound met with serious problems from within 
China. Por over four years before the United States 
entered the war, China fought against Japan with one very 
evident result— a badly deteriorating society. The indis­
criminate conscription of large numbers of young men from 
villages and the ruthless confiscation of food caused many 
peasants to see the Nationalist army as being no different 
from the Japanese; and as the lower ranks swelled with the 
sullen draftees, the army’s effectiveness dropped. At the 
same time, Chiang Kai-shek did not provide adequate leader­
ship for his troops; instead, the Generalissimo remained 
relucant to deal with the problems of military control and 
organization and constantly maneuvered his armies in order 
to avoid any major engagements with Japanese forces. An­
other major obstacle to China’s wartime effectiveness was 
the malignant effect of the Nationalist-Communist conflict. 
When Chiang Kai-shek began his attempted purge of Chinese 
Communists in 1927, a civil war broke out and continued
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through the 1930's. With the Japanese invasion, the two 
Chinese groups agreed to cease fighting in order to defeat 
the Japanese, but by 1940 the shakey coalition had collapsed. 
To prevent the Chinese Communists from expanding their con­
trol into Nationalist territory, Chiang used army units to 
watch the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese.
Fearing the prospects of Communist territorial gains and 
the loss of support by the Kuomintang conservatives if he 
agreed to initiate liberal reforms, Chiang Kai-shek refused 
to yield to any terms that would lessen the Nationalist 
Government's dominant position.
The basic problem which prompted much pre-Pearl Harbor 
American aid was the rapidly disintegrating Chinese economy. 
The Japanese offensives and subsequent occupation of the 
coastal centers forced the relocation of China's meager 
industries into undeveloped regions, a shift which cut 
China's industrial capacity and productivity to less than 
ten percent of prewar levels. A corollary to the production 
problem was that China also suffered at the hands of 
businessmen and government officials whose speculation and 
hoarding of badly needed commodities added to the inflation­
ary economy.1
Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China. 1941-1950 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c. 1^63), 55-56;
Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1953), 3-13.
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During the four years prior to the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor, American material aid to China amounted to 
less than one hundred million dollars. Insignificant in 
comparison to the aid extended to Great Britain, and later 
to the Soviet Union, the American assistance to China did 
help keep that nation from falling under the complete 
dominance of the Japanese,
In an attempt to stabilize the Chinese economy in 1937, 
the United States agreed to buy Chinese yuan equivalent to 
fifty million American dollars. The yuan purchases amounted 
to over forty-eight million dollars by mid-1938 but proved 
to be of little efficacy in braking the soaring Chinese 
inflation. Of equal importance to the Chinese was the 
American arsenal of weapons which amounted to only nine 
million dollars in aid through the first three years of the 
Sino-Japanese war. In response to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal 
in late 19^0, President Roosevelt decided to send Lauchlin 
Currie, his White House economic adviser, to reassure the 
Generalissimo that more economic and military aid would
pbe forthcoming.
Born in Scotland and educated at the London School of 
Economics, Currie earned his graduate degree at Harvard 
University. His work on monetary policy. The Supply and 
Control of Money in the United States, prompted Secretary of
^U.S., Department of State, United States Relations 
With China. 19*4-1949 (Washington? GPO., 1949), 31.
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the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to persuade Currie to go 
to work for the New Deal in 193%. Por the next five years, 
he remained a part of Morgenthau's work force in the 
Treasury Department, producing several articles and pro­
posals for stimulating the economy. By July 1937, he had 
won such recognition for his economic proposals that the 
President called him to serve as a White House economic 
adviser.
Although he had no previous contact with China and 
did not understand the perplexing internal problems of 
that nation, the brilliant and self-assured economist 
agreed with Roosevelt's decision to send him to China.
Currie believed that he alone could gain a quick under­
standing of China's problems and develop the best possible 
solution to China's economic and political difficulties.
On February 7, 19%1, Currie and his party landed at 
the Chungking airport. During the next three weeks, Currie 
interviewed Chinese bankers and officials of the Ministries 
of Finance and Economics; took the inevitable tour of air­
fields, training schools, and farming projects; and 
spent twenty-seven hours in conference with Chiang Kai-shek. 
As Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson pointed out, Currie's visit 
was "an audit since it brought to the attention of the 
Chinese Government more clearly many of the weaknesses and 
problems facing the nation.
%,S., Department of State Bulletin, % (January 25,
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Within five days of Currie's return to Washington 
on March 12, Roosevelt received his assessment of the 
situation. Currie's report became doubly important because 
it contained the first detailed statistical information 
on China's wartime financial conditions and because it pro­
vided the President with some first hand impressions about 
the Nationalist-Communist problems. Currie told Roosevelt 
that he had attempted to impress Chiang with the need for 
a unified front against the Japanese, but the Generalissimo 
had such hatred for the Communists that the two groups 
could not reach an agreement. To gain more information 
about the Nationalist-Communist conflict, Currie exchanged 
notes with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist liaison 
officer in Chungking. He noted that Chou did not seem 
particularly radical and considered him sympathetic toward 
the struggle against Japan. Currie concluded that the 
Chinese Communists were growing stronger because of their 
progressive taxation of landlords, introduction of local 
village democracy, anti-Japanese propaganda, and basic 
appeals to the Chinese peasants.
With Chiang using fifty army divisions to watch the 
Communists and seeing a growing disaffection among the 
liberal element within free China, Currie proposed a
19^1), 110; Johnson to Hull, February 28, 1941, FRUS, 
1941, V: 602-603; Johnson to Hull, March 3, 194TTT. S.
Pile 033.1193 Currie, Lauchlin 23, NA.
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conciliatory rather than a suppressive policy toward the 
Communists. After falling to convince the Chinese leader, 
Currie turned to Roosevelt and suggested a quid pro quo 
policy. The Installation of an American adviser In China 
to manipulate American aid could "exert enormous Influence 
In Instituting thorough-going political and economic re­
forms and so prevent the clash that now appears Inevitable 
between the left and the right.
The Issue of pressure over unconditional support for 
China found the same response as Roosevelt had given to 
demands for prior political agreements with the Soviet 
Union. He believed that he could personally Influence 
Chiang to change the undesirable policies without the 
threats of withholding or withdrawing aid. Yet Roosevelt 
failed to recognize the Generalissimo’s diplomatic skill In 
turning the situation on Its head and making the dependence 
on American aid a major lever In gaining more aid from the 
United States. When the decision had to be reached, how­
ever, Roosevelt would not stand up to Chiang Kai-shek any 
more than he had to Churchill or Stalin, and for much the 
same reason. China was needed to keep two million Japanese 
troops engaged on the Aslan mainland, and Roosevelt would do 
nothing to Jeopardize that situation.5
Currie to Roosevelt, March 15, 19^1, FRUS, 19^1, IV: 
81-86; John Paton Davies, Dragon By The Tall (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, c. 197&),251-^52.
^Tsou, America’s Failure In China, 105-106.
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When he reviewed the military situation, Currie told 
Roosevelt that Chiang had strongly intimated that the 
Chinese would not go on the offensive until they received 
more guns, ammunition, and planes from the United States. 
Concerned about Chiang Kai-shek’s stubbornness and 
Chinese military capabilities, Currie recommended an 
American military officer be sent to China to inspect 
facilities and determine if the Chinese forces could in 
fact carry the fight to the Japanese.
From his observations about the Chinese leader, 
but moreso because of his knowledge of Roosevelt’s style 
of diplomacy, Currie concluded that Chiang could be held in 
line with a little "care and attention." By speaking of 
China in the same terms used toward England and by men­
tioning the possible postwar surrender of American interests 
in Shanghai, Roosevelt could improve Sino-American relations, 
Currie further suggested that as Chiang "reads every word 
of your speeches and considers you the greatest man in the 
world" a more personal evidence of friendship "would allow 
the United States to help China in the military struggle 
and guide China in her development as a great power in the 
postwar period.’’̂
The economist’s proposal gave Roosevelt an idea for 
fulfilling the goal of making China into an international
^Currie to Roosevelt, ibid., 92.
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power— without a substantive commitment by the United 
States. During the war, the President used the "care and 
attention" gesture in an attempt to placate Chiang and 
build up China. In 19^3, he supported repealing American 
extraterritoriality rights in China, favored Congress­
ional repeal of Chinese exclusion, and insisted that China 
be a signatory nation to the Declaration of the Pour 
Nations in Moscow, thereby recognizing China as an equal 
partner in the war; finally, Roosevelt invited Chiang to 
attend the Cairo Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill.
To insure an adequate hearing of Chinese requests, 
Currie suggested some changes in Roosevelt’s organizational 
method of determining priorities for aid allocations. As 
the breadth of the President’s Aid Committee should be 
extended to include China, Currie proposed that he be 
attached to the body to make sure Chinese requests re-
7ceived the same consideration as other Allied needs.
After listening to Currie’s recommendations, Presi­
dent Roosevelt initiated a flurry of activity in Washington. 
On April 1, 19^1, the United States agreed to purchase 
Chinese yuan equivalent to fifty million American dollars. 
Ten days later, the President put Currie in charge of 
organizing the supply program for China and authorized him 
to deal with the War Department for aircraft "or any other
?Ibid.
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thing that the Chinese request." But at the same time, 
Roosevelt that "I don't want to Imply that I am at this 
time In favor of any of the proposals. Obviously that can 
only be finally worked out In relationship to our whole 
military problem and the needs of ourselves and the 
British." Roosevelt would make some gestures toward 
China, but he had not become so upset that he lost 
sight of the primary American goal of aiding the European 
allies.^
As a further symbol of America's desire to aid 
China, Roosevelt named Owen Lattlmore as political adviser 
to Chiang Kai-shek. In the early years of the twentieth 
century, Lattlmore had lived In and traveled across 
Mongolia and Manchuria, and by the time of the Slno- 
Jananese V/ar he was recognized as a leading scholar on 
China. From 1938 to 1941, Lattlmore served as Director 
of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 
at Johns Hopkins University and edited Pacific Affairs, 
a Journal published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
He went to China In July 1941, but returned to the United 
States less than a year later, since the Generalissimo
q
U.S., Congress, Joint Committee On The Investigation 
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearing Pursuant to S. Con.
Res. 27, part 20, 79 Cong., da aess., iy46, hooseveit to 
Currie, May 15, 1941, 4539; United States Relations With 
China, 31.
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sought an expert on American politics, not Chinese 
affairs.9
Although Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed with 
the President’s appointment, he pointed out that "it is 
assumed that Mr. Lattlmore would of course in any such 
position function as a private American citizen and not as 
an official of this government." Hull, in June 1941, sought 
to keep the United States from being charged with unneutral 
acts which would add to the already growing tension with 
Japan. Moreover, the Secretary of State recognized the 
implications for the State Department of Lattimore's being 
stationed next to Chiang Kai-shek when Currie informed 
him that the President would use commercial channels to 
communicate with Chiang rather than the normal diplomatic 
routes. Currie added that he planned to continue using the 
naval radio channels on matters pertaining to lend lease 
for China.
The Secretary's apprehension proved real as some 
messages transmitted to the American Embassy in Chungking 
were in a code held only by Lattimore, the Chinese Govern­
ment, and the White House. As a result. Ambassador Clarence
^Currie to Roosevelt, May 6, 1941, FRUS, 1941, V: 644; 
Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the ^erican Experience in 
China. 1911-1945 (New York: Macmillan Company, c. 19to), 226.
l^Hull to Roosevelt, May 21, 1941, 648; Hull to Gauss, 
May 29, 1941; 651; Currie to Hull, May 3, 1941, 642; all
cited in FRUS. 1941, V.
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Gauss delivered cables to the Chinese without knowing the
substantive contents. Predictably, Gauss complained to the
Secretary of State:
no Ambassador to China can function 
intelligently and efficiently under 
present conditions without some back­
ground on what is transpiring through 
other than the usual diplomatic 
channels. For what is being done by 
way of aid to China under the Lend 
Lease Act and we have no information 
regarding the provisions of the 
currency stabilization loan agreement.
Gauss concluded, as did numerous other professional diplo­
mats, "that coordinated and effective American representation 
in China calls for the use, to the fullest extent practi­
cable, of normal diplomatic channels of communication."
Even Sumner Welles, who jumped State Department channels 
with regularity, objected to the practice and recommended 
that he explain the situation to Currie. After hearing 
from his friend in the State Department, Roosevelt endorsed 
the suggestion and directed him to send for Currie and work 
out the problem. Currie compromised slightly by agreeing 
to provide the Department with copies of messages trans­
mitted between the President and Chiang Kai-shek. Currie 
did send copies of messages to the Department— several 
days after sending or receiving the transmission at the 
White House. At the same time however, Currie instructed 
Owen Lattimore that normal cables would be sent through 
the Embassy but "special messages may continue to be
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routed through me. " H
Although Welles succeeded in altering the practice 
somewhat, the fact remained that Roosevelt once again built 
a bridge around the State Department. Much as Harry Hop­
kins became the link between Roosevelt and Churchill, 
Lauchlin Currie via Owen Lattimore became the direct con­
tact between the Generalissimo and the President. Once the 
United States entered the war, Roosevelt decided to send 
General Joseph Stilwell to China to coordinate the Ameri- 
can-Chinese war effort. Hopefully, Chiang would grant 
Stilwell authority to develop plans and use whatever means 
necessary, including Chinese troops, to carry out the task 
of fighting the Japanese, saving Burma, and keeping China 
in the war.
The American general’s task was made difficult from 
the outset by the complicated system under which he oper­
ated. Stilwell was the Chief of the Allied Staff under
llQauss to Hull, July 24, 1941, FRUS, 1941, V: 684.
The practice of ignoring the Ambassador also bothered 
Gauss’ predecessor. Nelson T. Johnson wrote that ’’He 
[Currie] reaches the scene [the Embassy Office] simultan­
eously with me, I after thirty years of travel, talk and 
observation; he after an elapsed period of twelve days 
during which he has had contact with no minds or facts that 
might have prepared him for what he is to hear or see;” 
Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Foreign 
Policy Toward ChinaT"1925-1941 (East Lansing; Michigan 
State University Press, 1968), 11; Welles to Roosevelt,
July 25, 1941, 684-605; Memorandum by Stanley Hornbeck,
July 30, 1941, 679; Owen Lattimore to Currie, July 28, 1941, 
687; Currie to Lattimore, July 30, 1941, ibid., all cited 
in FRUS, 1941, V.
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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; he was commander of all 
American forces in the China-Burma-India theater; and 
later he served as deputy commander of the Southeast Asia 
Command. In a position that should have been divided into 
three area commands, Stilwell's attempts to initiate mili­
tary operations against the Japanese in Burma encountered 
obstacles; the United States could not send the requested 
supplies or men because of the higher priority on the 
European sector of war; Great Britain's decisions on logis­
tic support were based on the same military considerations, 
and even placed the defense of India before Burma; and not 
the least of Stilwell's problems was Chiang Kai-shek's 
unwillingness to commit Chinese troops to battle in Burma 
because of his desire to protect his government. Finally, 
Stilwell's efforts were hampered by his disdain, often 
openly expressed, for the Chinese leader.
During the early months of 1942, Stilwell attempted 
to halt the Japanese push into Burma. The overwhelming 
number of Japanese forces made shambles of the general’s 
efforts to keep Rangoon from falling, but Chiang Kai-shek's 
interference also contributed to Stilwell's defeat. In­
dependent of Stilwell, Chiang ordered changes in the 
strategy which left the Chinese army commanders no choice
l^charles P. Romanus, and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's 
Command Problems, vol. 9, part 2 of United States Army in 
World War ÎÎ (Washington: Department of the Army, 195o), 1.
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but to obey him. Though the defeat in Burma did not come 
as a result of Stilwell's poor planning, many Chinese 
officials believed the American officer knew the plan could 
not succeed and accused him of needlessly throwing Chinese 
troops into an unnecessary battle.
In addition to charging that Stilwell's planning 
for Burma's defense was woefully inadequate and poorly 
conceived, Chiang erroneously concluded that Stilwell re­
mained indifferent to the effectiveness of air power in 
China. Chiang received support from Major General Claire 
Channault, who believed the war in China could be won in 
the air. With the subsequent military defeats, domestic 
economic crises, and disappointingly small spurts of 
American aid, Chiang became more and more disenchanted with 
Stilwell. The American General, in turn, found the 
Chinese leader ignorant, arrogant, stubborn and unwilling 
to allow him to execute plans which called for the use of 
more Chinese in the fight against Japan.
In June 1942, Stilwell informed Chiang Kai-shek that 
heavy bombers originally scheduled for China were being 
re-routed to the Middle East and that some lend lease 
supplies stockpiled in the United States for shipment to 
China were allocated elsewhere. The Generalissimo accused 
Washington officials of operating behind Roosevelt's back 
and wondered if the United States and Great Britain consi­
dered China as one of the Allied theaters. He charged
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Stilwell with the responsibility for seeing that the pro­
mised supplies were delivered; he then charged him with not 
submitting his aid recommendations to Washington, Finally, 
Chiang told Stilwell to radio Washington "and ask for yes or 
no on the question, ’Is the U.S. interested in maintaining 
the China Theatre'" Madame Chiang underlined the ultimatum 
by delcaring that the Generalissimo would make a speech 
on July 7 and had to "tell the Chinese people the truth at 
that time"— whether the Allies considered the area necessary 
and would support it.^3
At the same time, Roosevelt was considering a Chinese 
request that Harry Hopkins be sent to Chungking to review 
Sino-American relations. The President had already decided 
that Hopkins' health would not permit him to make the 
long and Hazardous trip, but he had not decided whether or 
not he would send a representative. Lauchlin Currie 
suggested that he make the trip "to encourage the garrison 
until supplies arrive" and to let the "impression be created 
that important developments are pending." When the Presi­
dent learned of Chiang's reaction to the transfer of the 
bombers; his "three minimum demands" of three United States 
divisions in India, 500 combat planes, and 5,000 tons of 
supplies per month; and the not so subtle threats about
Charles P. Romanus, and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's 
Mission to China, vol. 9, part 1 of United States Army in 
World War li (Washington: Department of' the Army, 1^53)»167-m.—
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the forthcoming radio speech, Roosevelt quickly decided 
that Currie should once again go to China.
In his instructions to Currie, the President reiter­
ated his views on Stilwell, China's role in the war, and 
the future Sino-American relationship. He directed Currie 
to leave the impression that important actions would be 
undertaken shortly; explain that present circumstances 
made the European battle front most crucial; emphasize the 
importance of Stilwell's mission and that he could best 
represent Washington with the China-Burma-India military 
requirements; indicate the disappointment over the failure 
to establish a coalition with the Chinese Communists; and 
finally, imply to the Chinese leader that economic aid 
would be influenced by internal developments. Currie was 
also instructed to assure the Generalissimo that he would 
be consulted on all postwar matters. Roosevelt appeared 
to change his mind on the use of aid to press Chiang to 
being some reforms in the Chinese Government, but the 
nature of Currie's instructions was general and implicit 
rather than set in specific demands.
Once Currie reached Chungking, he found Chiang still 
adamant in his desire to have Stilwell removed from the 
China scene or at least no longer in control of lend lease
l^Currie to Roosevelt, June 3, 19^2, 62; Roosevelt 
to Chiang Kai-shek, July 4, 19%2, FRUS, 1942, China: 95;
Theodore H. White, ed.. The Stilwell Papers (New York: 
William Sloane Associates, c. 194Ü), 121.
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supplies for that theater. In talking with the Chinese 
leader, Currie learned that much of the confusion and hos­
tility came from Chiang’s objections to Stilwell’s efforts 
to reform and modernize the Chinese army, the proposal to 
use Chinese Communist forces in the fighting, and his 
failure to acquire the promised aid.
Currie agreed with Stilwell’s plan for re-taking 
Burma and restoring the air transportation route into 
China, but at the same time he created a bothersome problem 
when he described the General's role on Chiang's staff as 
being confined to those parts of the China Theater which 
lay outside Chinese territory. Since the geo-political 
boundary of China and the wartime China Theater coincided, 
Stilwell’s position within China seemed non-existent. The 
Chinese quickly recognized the gap between Stilwell’s 
authority and Currie's description and believed the 
American’s role in China had ended but the War Department 
soon explained that Stilwell was the Chief of Staff to the 
Generalissimo’s Joint Staff for Allied forces anywhere in 
the China Theater and had the duties of planning, organizing-, 
training, and setting field operations as directed by the 
Generalissimo,
^Instructions to Currie, no date June, 1942, Presi­
dent’s Secretary’s Pile; Executive Office, Currie Polder, 
Box 107, PDRL; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission. 
l8l; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 318-3TFI
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While in Chungking, Currie followed Roosevelt’s 
instructions by holding a press conference and later 
delivering a speech at the Chinese-American Institute of 
Cultural Relations. He told both groups of greater war 
production in America and of expected increases in aid, 
and he implied that the United States was making plans for 
a counter-offensive. The remarks on the first points 
were general and expected rhetoric, but the broadly 
phrased description of the second front led many Chinese 
to believe the American attack would first come in the 
Pacific. As time passed without the expected counter­
offensive, more Chinese Joined Chiang in expressing their 
doubts about American sincerity in helping the Chinese 
fight the Japanese. Roosevelt wanted Currie to lead the 
Chinese to believe more attention would be paid to that 
area, but Currie's remarks did little to help Stilwell in 
his efforts to cooperate with the Generalissimo.^^
After Currie returned to Washington, he continued to 
support Stilwell's proposals for training Chinese troops 
and going into Burma but did not support the plan for 
aiding China on a quid pro quo basis. Since his earlier 
trip, Currie had learned of Roosevelt's attitude against 
requiring pre-aid agreements from the wartime allies and
^^Qauss to Hull, August 10, 1942, D. S. Pile 
033.1193 Currie, Lauchlin/29, NA.
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concluded that the United States did not "need to lay down 
any conditions or tie any strings to our support" of the 
Chinese military under General Stilwell, Even though 
Currie supported Stilwell, he failed to recognize the 
tactical plan's relationship to the Chiang-Stilwell 
differences. If Stilwell reformed the army and used the 
Chinese Communists, Chiang's position would be threatened. 
But Currie swallowed Chaign's argument that the personality 
differences with Stilwell hampered an all-out war effort 
and recommended to Roosevelt that the American General be 
recalled from China.
Believing his personally selected agent to be right, 
Roosevelt wrote General George Marshall that Stilwell 
"would be more effective in some other field," but the 
Chief of Staff and Secretary of War Henry Stimson remained 
staunch in their position that Stilwell should be retained 
in his post because no other commander would be as ex­
perienced or as competent. Roosevelt again reversed his 
position and accented Marshall's arguments, but Currie 
continued in his efforts to soothe the Generalissimo. In 
addition to suggesting Stilwell's recall, Currie also 
recommended the recall of Ambassador Gauss and suggested 
that he, Currie, be appointed to that post. Roosevelt 
appeared to favor the idea at one time but dropped the 
proposal once he learned that Chiang Kai-shek preferred
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that Currie stay in Washington.
As Lauchlin Currie pointed out in both the 1941 and
1942 reports, parts of Chiang Kai-shek's army spent their
time keeping Chinese Communist forces under surveillance
and blockading Communist areas in order to prevent their
infiltration into Nationalist territory. In 1942, at
least sixteen Nationalist divisions were engaged in
trying to prevent Communist expansion into Sian, and by
1943, an estimated 400,000 Nationalists were engaged in
1 Rpatrol duty along the border.
During the war, Washington officials familiar with 
the problem called for a policy of reconciliation between 
the two sides. John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, 
Raymond Ludden, Joseph L. Grew, and the "boys" in China—  
Charge^George Atcheson and John Paton Davies— viewed the 
marriage of Communists and Nationalists through glasses 
of expediency. First, the internal struggle meant that 
over one million men were not being employed in the major 
war effort; second, the Chinese Communists held vitally 
important areas in Northern and Eastern China which would
^Currie to Roosevelt, October 1, 1942; Roosevelt to 
Marshall, October 3, 1942, President's Secretary's Pile; 
China, 1942, Box 28; Currie to Roosevelt, November 13,
1942, President's Secretary's Pile; Executive Office, 
Currie Folder. Box 107, FDRL; Marshall to Roosevelt, 
October 6, 1942, FRUS, 1942, China: 159; Romanus and
Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, l86n.
l^unlted States Relations With China, 53; Romanus 
and Sunderland. Stilwell*s Mission, lB4; Tsou, America's 
Failure In China, 150-151.
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be of considerable value in the eventuality of a China- 
based American offensive against Japan. President Roose­
velt looked beyond the wartime necessities and visualized 
a major conflict resulting from a Chinese civil war which 
might draw the United States and the Soviet Union into the 
struggle. He told Sumner Welles that the greatest post­
war threat to peace was a civil war in China as; "The 
danger there was that the Soviet Union would intervene 
in behalf of the Communists, and the Western powers 
would be tempted or forced in their own Interests to back 
the anti-Communist side." The experts in the State Depart­
ment and the decision-makers at the White House were in 
agreement about the impact of a Chinese civil war— on the 
war and postwar Par East, but it ended at that point. 
Franklin Roosevelt relied on his Personal Representative’s 
estimation of the situation and continued the cautious 
approach to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to change his policies 
toward the Chinese Communists.
In 19^3, Chiang Kai-shek declared that the Chinese 
Communists could fight only if they served under his 
command, took orders from his generals, and received 
American aid only through his administration. In addition 
to the Chinese internal friction, Sino-Soviet relations 
deteriorated after Chiang charged that the Russian
l^Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1^50), 152.
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Government secretly supplied the Communist forces with 
arms and munitions and that Russian troops had fired on 
and killed Chinese Nationalist forces along the border 
at Sinkiang,
In a manner typical of Roosevelt, the President 
viewed Chiang's Russophobia as not well founded and be­
lieved that no real grounds for conflict existed between 
the Soviet Union and China. Roosevelt believed that 
through another personal agent he might be able to draw 
the Chinese and Russians together and, at the same time, 
persuade the Generalissimo to negotiate with the Chinese 
Communists.
As the President sought answers to those problems, 
he encountered an issue pertaining to his forthcoming 
campaign for re-election. Throughout the third term, 
Roosevelt's Vice-President, Henry A. Wallace, received 
growing criticism for his liberal political views and, 
by 1944, the reaction against Wallace reached such in­
tensity that Roosevelt feared a major split in the Demo­
cratic Party if Wallace ran again. To avoid facing the 
difficult problem of personally rejecting Wallace and 
likely hoping that a long trip at this time would cause 
serious erosion among Wallace supporters; to allow 
Wallace's rivals for the Vice-Presidential spot to build 
their support; and to make a gesture of concern toward 
the Chinese problem, Roosevelt decided that Wallace needed
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to make an extended trip.
While Wallace was to go abroad, Roosevelt did not 
want him stopping in India, Moscow, or any of the Pacific 
combat zones where he might make headlines, but some­
place secure, like Northern Siberia where the Vice-President 
could placidly and quietly inspect Russian industrial and 
agricultural efforts. The President's political motive 
becomes readily apparent in looking at Wallace's itinerary; 
he spent three weeks in Siberia, May 20 to June 21; only 
three days in Chungking, June 23 to June 26; and continued 
his "inspection tour" until returning to the United States 
on July 9, only ten days before the Democratic National 
Convention began.^0
With the preparations completed, Wallace left Wash­
ington on schedule. He arrived in the Soviet Far East on 
May 23 and spent three weeks touring numerous farms, in­
dustrial plants, and military installations. After com­
pleting his inspection tour of Siberia, the Vice-President 
flew to China and arrived at Chungking on June 20.
In three lengthy conferences, Wallace and Chiang 
Kai-shek discussed the necessity of improved Sino-Soviet 
relations, problems between the Nationalists and Communists,
pn
Edward Stettinius to Hull, March 8, 1944, FRUS, 
1944, China; 216; Samuel Rosenman, Working With Roose­
velt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 438-439;
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 740-741.
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and the military situation in China. Following the 
President's instructions, and appearing to use Roosevelt's 
own words, Wallace pointed out that China's problems with 
Russia should be settled in order to prevent any inter­
ference with the Chinese war effort. He also passed along 
Roosevelt's observation that the Communists and Nationalists 
were basically friends and that "nothing should be final 
between friends," and if their differences could not be 
settled, they needed to call in a friend. When Chiang 
grabbed the obvious implications and asked for Roose­
velt's personal assistance, Wallace rejected the request.
He knew the President would not Jeopardize his reputation 
by attempting to resolve China's internal disputes nor 
would he risk causing more problems with Russia by pro­
posing solutions for long-time Sino-Soviet problems.
The Vice-President mentioned the poor showing of 
Chinese troops in recent fighting, citing a report that 
government forces in Honan fled without offering any 
resistance to the Japanese. President Chiang turned 
Wallace's criticisms around, claiming the inflation and 
scarcity of goods dampened his troop's morale, and pointed 
to the American decision not to start a Burma campaign as 
most seriously affecting Chinese fighting spirit. By 
blaming the American failure to act in Burma and the re­
duction in aid to China, the Generalissimo sought to cover 
the Chinese Army's impotence and his own ineptness in
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planning and directing the military operations.
The only positive results of the Wallace Mission 
dealt with the request that an American military group 
be allowed to enter Communist territory to determine the 
location of Chinese Communist forces for use when American 
operations got underway in that region. At first, Chiang 
said the Americans could go only If the Communists agreed 
to his requirements for consolidation; but on the last day 
of the talks, he reversed his position and consented to the 
mission.
At the same time that Chiang agreed to the American 
expedition to Yennan, he told Wallace of his loss of con­
fidence In General Stilwell. He mentioned Stilwell’s 
refusal to give enough supplies to the Chinese forces for 
a campaign and pointed out that the Chinese war effort could 
not be expected to Improve without adequate assistance and 
cooperation from the American General. Chiang also ex­
plained that he wanted closer cooperation and an under­
standing with the President but felt that the multi­
channeled State Department hindered progress In that 
direction. To serve as a direct liaison between the two 
leaders and to allow Chiang Kai-shek to forego any further 
dealings with Stilwell, he requested the appointment of 
a Personal Representative who would handle military and 
political matters.
21Summary Notes of Conversations Between Vice-
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Before he returned to the United States, the Vice- 
President cabled his impressions of the situation to the 
White House. He told of Chiang's request for a Presidential 
envoy and then pointed out the discouraging state of 
China's economic, political, and military elements, the 
absence of morale among the Chinese, and the possibility 
that Eastern China, including American air bases, could 
fall to Japanese forces within four weeks. Wallace suggested 
that one means of alleviating the crisis would be to re­
place Stilwell with General Albert C, Wedemeyer— who had 
recently visited Chungking and had favorably impressed 
Chiang Kai-shek.22
By the time he returned to the United States,
Wallace found the President to be playing his favorite 
election year game of encouraging several popular Demo­
crats to run for the Vice-Presidential nomination. When 
Wallace inquired about his position, he got the same 
story as the other potential running mates: Roosevelt
supported him but wanted the open convention to decide 
the ticket. Roosevelt's method worked again, as the 
Democratic Convention named Senator Harry S. Truman of 
Missouri as the Vice-Presidential nominee to run with
President Henry A, Wallace and President Chiang Kai-shek,
June 21-24, 1944, United States Relations With China, 549-559.
^^Wallace to Roosevelt, June 28, 1944, FRUS, 1944,
China: 234-237; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 465.
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Roosevelt. The Wallace mission, while doing nothing for 
Sino-American relations or for Henry Wallace, did pay-off—  
for Roosevelt.
Although President Roosevelt agreed with Wallace's 
evaluation of Stilwell's personality, he rejected the 
suggestion to name Wedemeyer and instead followed the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff's advice. Fearful of a total 
disaster for the American war effort in China, the Joint 
Chiefs wanted Stilwell to have a stronger hand in running 
the operation. They praised Stilwell's ability and his 
Job performance, and they called for the President to 
designate him to coordinate all Allied forces including 
the Chinese Communists and to direct all military operations 
in China, Accepting those proposals, Roosevelt cabled 
Chiang that he was raising Stilwell to the rank of General 
and suggested that he be placed in command of all military 
forces.
The President's proposal showed his shallow under­
standing of the Chinese leader. Chiang Kai-shek would 
never accept the placement of a foreigner, especially 
Stilwell, in anything but nominal command of his military 
forces. Accepting Stilwell would be to admit that he was 
personally to blame for the poor war effort and that the 
American was right in his military strategy. Finally, 
Stilwell's new position, if Chiang agreed, would mean the 
arming and placement of Chinese Communist troops in the
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field without Chiang having complete control over their 
maneuvers.
In his cable of July 8, 19%4 to the President, Chi­
ang agreed with the principle that Stilwell should be in 
command but felt that the complex nature of Chinese, do­
mestic politics and the fact that Chinese soldiers did not 
easily accept direction pointed up the need for consider­
able review before making a decision. Chiang would agree 
to the idea but would not consent to the transfer of author­
ity until he worked out certain reservations with Roose­
velt’s Personal Representative.
As the Chinese leader hoped, Roosevelt's return 
cable placed primary emphasis on the selection of a 
political emissary to travel to Chungking to discuss 
Stilwell's role. Successful in his maneuver, Chiang had 
only to await the arrival of the President's position and 
the proposal that he be placed in command of all forces in 
China.
While the President traveled to Hawaii to confer 
with General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz 
on military strategy for the Pacific, Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson and General George Marshall questioned 
Patrick Hurley about China and were satisfied that Hurley 
was the man who might smooth over Stilwell's abrasiveness 
and at the same time work with the Chinese leader. Stim­
son saw Hurley as "loyal, intelligent and extremely
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energetic, pleasant and diplomatic in his manner" and 
"the only man that either Marshall or I could think of to 
revolutionize the situation of backbiting and recrimina­
tion and stalemate."23
Patrick Hurley was no newcomer to Washington or the 
President’s style of foreign policy. A successful claims 
lawyer and investor in oil and real estate, Hurley became 
acquainted with life in the nation’s capital when he served 
as national attorney for the Choctaw tribe. After six 
years as the Choctaw's attorney and a brief stint in the 
United States field Artillery in World War I, Hurley 
returned to his law practice and private life in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma.2^
By 1928, Hurley was well-known in the Republican 
Party in Oklahoma and worked hard for Herbert Hoover’s 
nomination and election. For the Oklahoman’s efforts, 
President Hoover named him Assistant Secretary of War; 
and when his superior, James Good, died in November 1929, 
Hurley was elevated to Secretary of War. In that post. 
Hurley’s nationalistic views of foreign policy became
23peis, The China Tangle. 172-173; Romanus and Sun­
derland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, 4l5-4l6; Tuchman, 
Stilwell and China, 47^1
p ÜThe author has relied heavily on Russell D. Bu­
hite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy 
(Ithacal Cornell University Press, 1973), for information 
on Hurley’s background, professional activities, and con­
cepts of foreign policy.
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evident as he fought against immediate independence for the 
Philippine Islands. Hurley believed, in 1930, that the 
Filipinos had not exhibited a maturity or readiness for 
independence, and that such an abrupt change would cause 
economic chaos for the islanders, who remained dependent 
on American markets. Hurley was also concerned that the 
islands might slip under the influence of the bellicose 
Japanese, which would subsequently affect American 
interests in the Par East. Never one to back away from 
pressure, real or imagined. Hurley often showed a willing­
ness to settle differences and defend his position by the 
bare knuckle approach— thus his belief that an aggressive 
nation like Japan could be checked only by the power of 
the United States.^5
After the Democrats gained control in 1933» and 
Hurley lost his cabinet post, he worked on legal matters 
for several independent oil companies and served as legal 
agent for oilman Harry Sinclair. During the next five 
years, Washington saw little of Hurley; but in 1938, he 
regained some prominence in the capital as a result of his 
successful negotiations with the Mexican Government over 
expropriation of foreign owned lands and the subsequent 
nationalization of oil company property.
After prolonged discussion and after seeing that
^^Buhite, ibid., 68-73.
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Harry Sinclair’s company would not be paid dollar for 
dollar invested in Mexico and that the Mexican expropriation 
policies would not be rescinded. Hurley got an agreement 
by which the Mexican Government paid eight and one-half 
million dollars to Sinclair and allowed him to buy twenty 
million barrels of oil at a discount price. Securing an 
agreement acceptable to both parties and maintaining good 
relations with the Mexican officials throughout the dis­
cussions point to Hurley's ability as a negotiator and 
his awareness, at that time anyway, of the most realistic 
settlement possible.
Even though a life-long Republican, Hurley supported 
several of the New Deal domestic programs and called for 
the American people to stand behind the President as he 
tried to stem the depression. He also supported Roose­
velt's foreign policies: the lend lease proposals, the
destroyers-bases deal, and repeal of the Neutrality acts.
With the Jaoanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
reserve artillery officer sought active duty, but George 
Marshall had younger men to fill such billets and denied 
Hurley's request. President Roosevelt also refused to 
grant Hurley's wish but did use him on several occasions 
as his Personal Representative. To have Patrick Hurley, 
a cabinet member in Herbert Hoover's administration, would
Z^Buhite, ibid., 82-99.
197
lend more respectability to Roosevelt’s plea for wartime 
unity.
Between January 19^2 and February 1944, Roosevelt 
sent Hurley to Australia to try to get supplies to 
General Douglas MacArthur's beleagurered forces in the 
Philippines; on a mission to inspect Russia’s fighting 
forces; to the Middle East in 1943 to evaluate conditions 
in the Arab states; to China in November to confer with 
Chiang Kai-shek about topics to be discussed at the Cairo 
Conferences. He also called on Hurley for advice at the 
Teheran Conference the next month. Hurley’s missions 
were primarily intended to determine the views of national 
leaders and to give encouragement to those people in 
nations Franklin Roosevelt could not personally visit. 
Hurley did his job in a most satisfactory manner, and by 
the end of the Teheran Conference, he awaited his next 
assignment.
By the summer of 1944, with the recommendations 
from Stimson and Marshall, the President decided on Patrick 
Hurley as his Personal Representative to China, Roosevelt 
knew Hurley had very limited knowledge of the Far East, 
having spent only three days in China in 1943 and having 
heard only Chiang Kai-shek’s views on the trouble with 
Stilwell and the problem with the Chinese Communists, but
Z^Buhite, ibid.. 103; 106-10?; 113-116; 124-132.
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the President saw other features which no doubt offset 
Hurley’s lack of experience in Sino-American relations.
While Hurley’s success as an envoy in the previous three 
years helped, far more important was his personality, his 
belief in his own persuasiveness as a negotiator, and his 
grand ego— all of which had previously caught Roosevelt’s 
attention. Much like the President, Hurley also held 
little regard for the "stuffed-shirt diplomats in the State 
Department" and the Foreign Service, believing he could and 
would successfully complete his mission in China. Finally, 
Roosevelt likely felt that Hurley’s prior status as 
Secretary of War would lend prestige to the mission.^8
In his instructions, the President designated Hurley 
as Personal Representative to the Generalissimo to "promote 
harmonious relations between General Chiang and General 
Stilwell and to facilitate the latter’s exercise of command 
over the Chinese armies placed under his direction,"
^^Wallace Murray to Hull, July 17, 19^4, Box 90,
Polder 403, Cordell Hull Collection, Library of Congress,
In 19^4, Hurley had a stormy session at the State Depart­
ment with Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson and 
Eugene Rostow of the Division of Supply and Resources over 
one of Hurley’s reports, Rostow had prepared a memoran­
dum, and initialed by Acheson, that referred to the Hurley 
report on the Middle East as "hysterical Messianic globoloney," 
prompting Hurley to challenge Rostow to "come out in the hall 
and repeat what you said,,,," and then Hurley wondered 
aloud if Rostow was a "real man" or if he was hiding from 
military service by status of deferred diplomat, a point 
which Acheson quickly cleared up by informing Hurley that 
Rostow had already served and been discharged from fur­
ther military duty. Hurley never forgot the incident or 
the officials, or the State Department,
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Hurley was to maintain close contact with Ambassador 
Gauss, and finally, any duties relating to lend lease 
would be specified by the War Department.^9
Prom his orders and conversation with the President, 
Hurley assumed his primary job was to keep China in the 
war, maintain Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in power, and unify 
the Chinese military forces in the struggle against the 
Japanese. Doubts have been raised as to whether Hurley 
went beyond his original orders and independently attempted 
to reconcile the Communist-Nationalist differences, but 
he never received orders from President Roosevelt to stop 
his line of negotiations.^®
When Hurley prepared to leave for China, he told the 
State Department that he was going to detour to Moscow to 
solicit advice "on the line he should adopt in his dealing 
with Chiang Kai-shek" and to inform Stalin of the nature 
of his mission. Department officials feared the side 
trip would disturb Chinese officials and "would not be in 
accord with General Hurley’s position." Secretary of 
State Hull believed the trip was an afterthought, but even 
though the President had told Hull that he had not given 
Hurley instructions for the Moscow trip, Roosevelt in fact
29null to Gauss, August 22, 1944, PRUS, 1944, VI;
250-251.
3®Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 149-150.
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directed Hurley to go to Russia, knowing that Stalin's 
assurances were important to Hurley's chances for success 
in China.31
Prom his talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Hurley learned that the Russians approved of the efforts 
to achieve military unification in China and that the 
Soviet leaders viewed the Chinese Communists as not 
bonafide communists but as using the name communist to 
show their dissatisfaction with conditions in China. As 
a result of Molotov's observations. Hurley approached the 
Chinese internal problems with the idea that without Soviet 
support the Yennan group would be more receptive to a plan 
for unification and that if Chiang Kai-shek knew of the 
Russian position, he would worry less about Russian aid to 
the communists. Thus, Hurley partially based his plan for 
unification on Molotov's statements. Hurley was not duped 
by the Foreign Minister but took his word out of personal 
trust for the Russians, In 1942, when Hurley went to the 
Soviet Union for Roosevelt, Stalin allowed him to be the 
first American to have a full briefing on Russian strategy 
and also to visit the Russian front at Stalingrad. With 
this earlier trust exhibited by the Russians, Hurley could 
see no reason for believing otherwise in 1944.3^
S^Matthews to Hull, August 24, 1944; Hull to Harriman, 
August 26, 1944, and August 29, 1944, PRUS, VI: 252-253;
Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 316.
32peis, The China Tangle, 179-181.
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Once Hurley arrived in Chungking, his first major 
effort involved trying to clear the Chiang-Stilwell feud. 
The American General's professional and personal disdain 
for "The Peanut" and the Generalissimo's total opposition 
to Stilwell's proposal to use Chinese Communist troops 
and personal control of lend lease supplies had not 
diminished since Vice-President Wallace had written of the 
conflict two months prior. Hurley tried to arrange a 
settlement, but the two irreconciable forces and the 
military situation in China blocked any real compromise.
The conflict moved beyond Hurley's ability to 
mediate when Stilwell received a message from President 
Roosevelt to be delivered to the Generalissimo. In 
reference to Japanese military successes in China, the 
President declared that a major disaster could not be 
avoided unless the Salween River troops were reinforced, 
attempts were made to reopen the Burma Road, and, to 
provide military leadership, Stilwell were placed in un­
restricted command of all forces in China. When Stilwell 
showed him the message, Hurley knew it would "knock the 
persimmons off the tree" and tried to persuade Stilwell 
not to deliver it or at least to allow Hurley to try to 
prepare Chiang for it, but the crusty, frustrated General 
would not pass up the chance to see the Chinese leader's 
face when he read the message. Stilwell unwisely handed 
the dispatch to Chiang in the presence of other Chinese
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officials, thus insuring the Chinese leader's irretrace­
able opposition and thereby demolishing any hope that 
Hurley might be able to present a workable s o l u t i o n . 33 
When Chiang next demanded Stilwell's removal,
Roosevelt agreed to remove Stilwell as the General­
issimo's Chief of Staff and of responsibility for lend 
lease in China but wanted to place him in command of 
Chinese troops in Burma and Yunnan Province. Stilwell 
evidently realized the Chinese leader's anger and revised 
his prior stand. In an agenda prepared for proposed 
talks with Chiang, Stilwell agreed to yield control of 
lend lease to the Generalissimo and propose to the Chinese 
Communist that they acknowledge Chiang's authority; Stil­
well later declared that he would not insist on using the 
Chinese Communist troops in the war. The President's 
proposal, along with Hurley and Stilwell's efforts at 
accomodation failed. The growing tension over whether 
Roosevelt would recall Stilwell ended when H.H. Kung,
Chiang's Personal Representative in Washington, cabled 
Chungking that he had learned from Harry Hopkins that the 
President planned to recall Stilwell. With that news,
Chiang informed the Standing Committee of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang that Stilwell must go.
33Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, September 16, 1944, 
PRUS. 1944, VI: 157-158; Davies, Dragon By The Tail. 335.
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When Hurley learned of this, he knew that the issue was no 
longer negotiable; after Chiang made his position known 
to subordinate Chinese officials, the Generalissimo would 
not accept any other action.
In the same dispatch in which he relayed Chiang's 
statement that Stilwell was unacceptable in any position, 
Hurley informed Roosevelt that he knew of no other 
Chinese "who possesses as many of the elements of leader­
ship as Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell 
are incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice 
between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell." While Hurley re­
frained from calling outright for Stilwell's removal, he 
observed that "there is no other issue between you and 
Chiang Kai-shek." In a cable three days later. Hurley 
reached the inevitable conclusion. He recommended that 
as Chiang resented Stilwell, Roosevelt should recall the 
General. On October 19, the President ordered Stilwell 
back to the United States.^5
Although Hurley failed in his efforts to reconcile 
the Chiang-Stilwell differences, he saw the "incompatible
Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, October 5, 1944, 
PRUS, 1944, VI; 165-166; Hurley to Roosevelt, October 
6, 1944, Box 88, Polder 8, China Pile, Patrick Hurley 
Collection, Western History Collections, University of 
Oklahoma.
^^Hurley to Roozevelt, October 13j__1944, Roosevelt 
to Chiang Kai-shek, October 19, 1944, ibid.
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personalities” as the core of the problems between the 
United States and China; and he assumed that with Stil­
well out of the picture, other issues would soon be 
settled. He had resided in China for only one month and 
had a limited understanding of the depth of the problem 
of trying to unify peacefully the Communist forces with 
Chiang Kai-shek's army while preventing the collapse of 
the Generalissimo's government.
To Hurley, the best means of gaining an accomoda­
tion between the two groups would be personal persuasion 
and a show of good-will toward both sides. On November 
7, 1944, Hurley flew to Yenan to confer with the Chinese 
Communist leaders. When the door of the aircraft opened, 
with Mao Tse-tung and other officials ready to welcome 
him, the six foot three inch Hurley appeared and intro­
duced himself with a Choctaw war whoop. Following a 
formal round of introductions and a banquet in Hurley's 
honor, the negotiations got underway.
During the next two days and nights. Hurley and the 
Communists "argued, agreed, disagreed" and finally worked 
out a five point accord. The agreement, signed by Mao 
Tse-tung for the Communist and Hurley as the "Personal 
Representative of the President of the United States," 
called for the Kuomintang and the Communist to work toward 
unification and for a coalition government representative 
of all anti-Japanese political parties. The new government
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would support and pursue the Three Principles of Sun 
Yat-sen for the establishment "of a government of the 
people, for the people, and by the people"; all military 
forces would carry out the orders of the United National 
Military Council; and the coalition government would 
recognize the legality of all anti-Japanese parties. As 
John Paton Davies writes, "Hurley was in the tradition of 
the many American political celebrities who lay great 
store by sonorous pronouncements," and he visualized 
himself as "the word-smith of Magna Charta for a new 
China." But in proposing a plan that was apparently bene­
ficial to the Chinese Communists, Hurley was motivated by 
more practical considerations than the egotistical charac­
teristics described by Davies. He sought to unify the 
Chinese forces for military expedience— to keep Japanese 
forces engaged, and because he believed that the Chinese 
Communists, even with those favorable concessions, could 
never succeed in their efforts to gain control in China.
Yet Hurley's suspicious nature caused him to see 
others, rather than the incompatible Chinese forces, as 
responsible for his lack of success. While in Yenan, he 
met Theodore H. White, a Journalist who told him that Mao 
believed there was little chance for an agreement with 
Chiang. Hurley, his suspicion swelling, felt that White,
^^Theodore H. White, and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out 
of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, c.l9^b), 2^6.
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who was simply passing on information, was "definitely 
against the mission." When Chiang rejected the five-point 
plan, Hurley continued his efforts, believing that the 
Generalissimo wanted an understanding; and once the plan 
was rejected, he blamed "insider" Foreign Minister T. V, 
Soong and accused British Ambassador Horace Seymour, who 
had merely observed that Hurley could not succeed, of 
trying to sabotage his e f f o r t s .3?
After rejecting the Hurley proposal, the Chungking 
Government submitted a counterplan. They agreed to 
incorporate, "after reorganization," the Chinese Communist 
forces into the Nationalist army and to grant recognition 
to the Chinese Communist Party as a legal party; wanted 
the Chinese Communists to give over control of their 
forces to the National Government and designate officers 
to sit on the National Military Council; and they agreed 
upon adherence to the Three People's Principles of Sun 
Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek's plan offered no coalition, 
would reorganize and receive the Communist forces under 
his command alone, and promised reforms— eventually,
Chiang would not agree to any coalition because he 
recognized the growing strength of the communist movement 
in China and realized that a coalition would mean the 
eventual control of the government by the Communists.
3?United States Relations With China, 74; Davies, 
Dragon By The Tail, 367.
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Prom Yenan, the Communists saw the vaporous gesture 
for what it was and rejected Chiang's three point plan.
For many years, Chiang had promised to initiate reforms 
and democratic processes but had not done so; Chiang made 
all the decisions for the National Military Council, 
therefore, representation on that body meant nothing; 
finally, to turn over the Chinese Communist forces to 
"reorganization" under Chiang Kai-shek would virtually 
assure the demise of the Chinese Communist Party,
Although the two groups were obdurate in their 
positions. Hurley persisted in his efforts to draw them 
together. He tried to persuade Chou En-Lai to travel to 
Chungking for further talks, but the Chinese Communist 
rejected Hurley's suggestion on the grounds that no 
evidence warranted another conference. Pour days later. 
Hurley received another communique from Chou stating that 
the talks were discontinued until Chiang's government 
released all political prisoners, withdrew Kuomintang 
forces from around Chinese Communist territories, abolished 
restrictions on the people's freedoms, and ceased secret 
service activity.
The Communist shift to a tougher line came as a 
result of an American military plan that called for United
^^Memorandum by Patrick Hurley, November 8, 1944, 
PRUS, 1944, VI; 673-674.
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States and Chinese Communist cooperation in attacking 
Japanese positions in the communist sectors of China.
The Communist leaders believed that they would receive 
American military assistance through this plan and no 
longer saw the need to negotiate with the Kuomintang or 
Patrick Hurley.39
Although Hurley approved of the scheme, he qualified 
it by pointing out that the Communists should not be in­
formed of the plan while the negotiations were underway.
When he learned that the Communists knew of the proposal. 
Hurley cabled the White House that the American military 
representatives were the source of the breakdown of the 
talks and were part of a plot to undermine his activities. 
Hurley grew more incensed when he learned that Mao Tse-tung 
and Chou En-lai were attempting to arrange a secret trip 
to Washington to see President Roosevelt and were using 
some Foreign Service Officers to circumvent his authority.
The conflict between Hurley and the Foreign Service 
Officers involved two distinct yet related areas; policy 
recommendations and the independent status of the State 
Department group. This problem is yet another example of 
the extent to which disjointed efforts can disrupt the 
effectiveness of a foreign mission. The struggle may well 
have been the outcome of Roosevelt's unwillingness to support
39Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 179-180.
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Clarence Gauss and to see that all diplomatic and military 
missions were coordinated by the American Embassy in 
Chungking.
During his stay as Ambassador, Clarence Gauss found 
that the President used his Personal Representatives 
either to deal directly with Chiang Kai-shek or to go 
through the Generalissimo's agents in Washington. Gauss 
could rely on little assistance from Cordell Hull as State 
Department staff served only as informants and consultants 
rather than advisers on American policy toward China. Now, 
in November 1944, Gauss gladly relinquished the post to 
Hurley.
When Hurley took over, the Embassy's status did not 
change. He seldom worked in his office, made little, if 
any, use of the voluminous records and historical data 
available to the new Ambassador; and spent very little 
time with dispatches, preferring instead to have clerks 
bring them to his quarters and read them aloud to him. 
Hurley continued to rely on his own style of personal 
contact and negotiation rather than working with the ex­
perienced Embassy staff.
At the same time, a group of Foreign Service Officers
Hull to Hurley, December 16. 1944; Chou En-lai to 
Hurley December l6, 1944, PRUS, 1944, VI; 739-740; Memor­
andum of conversation (author not cited), December 19,
1944, ibid.. 741-743.
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continued to operate as they had when Gauss was Ambassador- 
independent of Embassy control. Between 1942 and 1944, 
several of the professional Foreign Service personnel 
received assignment to General Stilwell*s headquarters 
in China. Hopefully, these men would help Stilwell as a 
liaison and advisory staff in his efforts to coordinate 
policy in China, Burma, and India. The General needed 
the personnel, but their assignment placed them outside 
the Jurisdiction of the American Embassy, allowing them to 
send separate reports and recommendations to Washington 
on various problems with China.
The first political officer detailed to the American 
military mission and Instructed to serve under Stilwell 
was John Paton Davies. In the following two years, John 
Stewart Service, Raymond Ludden, and John K. Emmerson 
Joined Davies In the group detached from the American 
Embassy. Their hyperactive reports and Independent 
sorties into the field prompted Gauss to hope that with 
Stilwell’s replacement possibly a better understanding 
about the Foreign Service Officers' "duties, relative 
position and relation to Embassy would be worked out."
In time, Hurley also would be confronted with policy 
recommendations not in line with his own thinking and 
would demand the removal of career diplomats who had more
^^White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 247.
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experience and more knowledge about China than other 
professionals in the area,^^
The Foreign Service Officers, especially Davies and 
Service, held views contrary to Patrick Hurley, In 
general, the former saw the Chinese Communists as having 
control of North China and having the support of many 
local Chinese for their reforms; the group was repelled 
by the avarice, corruption, and ineptness of Chiang's 
regime and believed that as the war grew longer, the 
Chungking government committed fewer troops to the struggle 
against Japan, preferring instead to concentrate their 
forces for the fight against the communists. Subsequently, 
the field officers recommended that policy makers give 
serious consideration to the idea of military and economic 
assistance to the Yenan group.
Even with the similarities in view. Service and 
Davies supported the proposal for aiding the Chinese 
Communists for different reasons. Service saw the 
Communists political program as being democratic in nature 
and as serving the interests of the Chinese people while 
the Kuomintang headed in the opposite direction— authori­
tarianism. With considerable admiration for the Chinese 
Communists, Service concluded that the United States could 
develop a close relationship with the Communists if
^^Peis, The China Tangle, 256-258.
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"American good will and economic assistance was forth­
coming." Davies, who admitted to mistakenly describing 
the Yenan regime as democratic, went beyond a comparison 
of the democratic gestures of the two regimes and called 
for aid to the Communists on the basis that the United 
States "must not Indefinitely underwrite a bankrupt regime," 
He said that If a coalition, however desirable, could not 
be consummated, "then we shall have to decide which 
faction we are going to support." If the Kuomintang did 
not make a serious effort to become a viable part of that 
new coalition, Davies believed the United States "must make 
a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese 
Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly 
to the Russians." He concluded that America "can through 
control of supplies and postwar aid expect to exert con­
siderable Influence In the direction of Chinese nationalism 
and Independence from Soviet control.
Prom his position In Chungking and aware of Presi­
dent Roosevelt’s attitude toward Chiang, Ambassador Hur­
ley believed the Generalissimo’s government would, if 
supported materially. Introduce reforms and ultimately 
Improve the lot of the Chinese peasant. Hurley opposed 
any military aid for the Communists, believing they would 
eventually agree to coalesce with the Kuomintang If they
^^Gauss to Hull, October 31, 1944, PRUS, 1944, VI: 
633-664.
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could not count on American aid. Hurley based this argu­
ment on Russian Foreign Minister Molotov’s remarks that 
the Soviet Government would work with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
regime and did not recognize the Chinese Communist Party. 
Other areas of disagreement between Hurley and the Foreign 
Service group ranged over estimates of the durability of 
the communist movement, the comparative strength of the
two Chinese military forces, and the necessity for immedi-
il Üate as opposed to postwar reforms by the Kuomintang.
The Judgement as to who had the best perspective of 
the situation in China is weighted on the side of the 
Foreign Service Officers. They ranged far and wide, 
observing conditions in both Yenan and Chungking, and 
were attracted to the system which appeared to represent 
their own image of the best political society. Conversely, 
Hurley spent most of his time in Chungking and relied on 
his personal Judgment that the Kuomintang regime would 
become more democratic if given a boost by the United 
States. Yet the Foreign Service Officers proposals were 
least acceptable because to supply arms to the Chinese 
Communists as a legitimate element of China’s political
^^Memorandum by John Paton Davies, November 7, 19^^; 
November 15, 194%, FRUS, 1944, VI: 669-670. and 696; Re­
port by John Stewart Service, August 3, 1944, ibid., 565; 
U.S., Cong., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State 
Department Employees Loyalty Investigations, Senate Report 
2lob, «1 Cong*., 2d Sess., 1950, 1361-13&5; Memorandum by 
John Stewart Service, June 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII: 403-405; 
Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 103-185; 194-195; Fels, The China 
Tangle. 263-264; Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 371.
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society would mean American intervention in her internal 
affairs. Moreover, there was always the possibility that 
with American aid the Chinese Communists would be less 
likely to cooperate with the government. The prospect for 
aid to the Chinese Communists, regardless of their 
cohesiveness and stamina as a fighting force, remained a 
distant option for American policy makers. Indeed, by 
1945 Franklin Roosevelt had Premier Stalin’s word that 
Russia would enter the Aslan war once Germany was defeated, 
and he knew that Soviet penetration of the Chinese frontier 
would jeopardize Chiang's position; therefore, Roosevelt 
would not sanction aid to the Chinese Communists. Fur­
ther, Roosevelt felt that aid to the Communists would be 
of limited value, militarily, and would cause the 
Generalissimo more problems in trying to reach a settle­
ment with the dissidents.
As did Louis Johnson and William Phillips in India, 
Patrick Hurley ultimately proposed a meeting whereby 
Roosevelt would be able to exert his personal influence. 
Hurley wanted the President to get British and Russian 
agreement to immediate unification of military forces in 
China; after Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung reached an 
agreement, Roosevelt would meet with the two leaders.
Hurley knew of Roosevelt's persuasiveness and propensity
45peis, ibid.. 264.
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for personal diplomacy, but the President was not willing 
to risk his reputation on China anymore than on the Indian 
question.
Although the President rejected his suggestion,
Hurley continued his efforts to make some headway in the 
stalled talks. In January 19^5, Hurl%r informed Mao that 
Chiang would agree to Communist membership in a war 
cabinet. On January 2^, the talks resumed with the 
Kuomintang representative proposing that an American 
officer, under Chiang, command Communist forces; an 
American-Communist-Kuomintang representative body advise 
Chiang Kai-shek on Chinese Communist army related matters; 
and that a seven to nine-man war cabinet representative 
of all political parties be established. Again, the 
Communists pointed out that the only satisfactory plan 
was a coalition— not incorporation into Chiang*s regime. 
Later, the Kuomintang agreed to a consultative conference 
to determine how one-party rule could be ended and a con­
stitutional government established, and Chou En-lai im­
plied that the Chinese Communists would participate in the 
conference, but the conference came to naught when Chiang 
proposed self-seeking changes in the plan.^^
Until he left China in February to return to Wash­
ington for consultation. Hurley never rested in his efforts
^^Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 187.
216
to keep the conflict down and the two sides talking. He 
felt that while a civil war might not erupt at once and 
possible reconciliation would be secured eventually, the 
hopes for military unification seemed remote.
With his strong contempt for the State Depart­
ment, his practice of withholding information about the 
talks from the Department personnel, and the independent 
activities of the Foreign Service Officers, what Hurley 
saw as the reasons for the failure of his efforts pointed 
directly to the professionals.
The conflict with the group attached to General 
Wedemeyer's headquarters reached such a pitch that Hurley 
demanded their recall from that theater. Hurley did not 
care to be told that his approach might not be successful, 
and as the evidence seemed to mount in favor of his 
critics. Hurley grew more outraged and heaped invectives on 
the professionals. John Paton Davies, who saw the Am­
bassador’s efforts as a "conceited and foolhardy commit­
ment of the United States to a futile and dangerous course," 
suffered early from Hurley's wrath and left Chungking on 
January 9, 19^5» for his new duty station.^?
The other officers. Service and Ludden, also incurred 
Hurley's displeasure. When Service returned to China from 
Washington in January 19^5, Hurley threatened to have him
United States Relations With China, 79-81.
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cashiered out of the service if he continued making policy 
recommendations as before. Ludden had been in the area 
north and west of Yenan for over four months and had 
traveled by pack mule across Communist territory never 
before explored by an American Foreign Service Officer. 
After returning to Chungking, he told Hurley that popular 
support of the Chinese Communists was a reality and that 
the movement was gaining strength steadily and rapidly.
Not at all pleased with the report. Hurley dropped the 
topic and demanded to know who authorized Ludden's trip. 
With orders from Wedemeyer's headquarters, Ludden had 
carried out his mission, but it became another "green
U p
persimmon" for Hurley.
Shortly after that. Hurley traveled to Washington 
for further consultation. At that time. Service and Ludden 
decided to inform the State Department that Hurley's re­
porting was "incomplete and non-objective." The memoran­
dum, prepared on February 17, pointed out that American 
aid and support made the Generalissimo unwilling to com­
promise; • that the Communists were gaining in strength and 
were thinking of requesting Soviet support; and civil war 
in China was likely if policy was allowed to drift. To 
alleviate those problems, the report continued, the United 
States should continue to aid Chiang Kai-shek's government
h p
Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 382; White and Jacoby, 
Thunder Out of China, 2Ü4.
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but also, in definite terms, inform him that military 
necessity required giving support to the Chinese Commu­
nists. Further, the United States should offer its good 
offices to help unify the Chinese military forces, but 
aid to any military forces would be undertaken regardless 
of whether the compromise had been reached. In addition 
to the authors, George Atcheson, as Charge^ while Hurley 
was in Washington, agreed with the report and prepared an 
accompanying telegram that noted that his concurring dis­
patch had the agreement and assistance of the political 
officers of the Embassy staff and was endorsed by the 
acting commandant of the American military mission.
General Gross.
After receiving the communique. Acting Secretary of 
State Joseph L. Grew sent it, along with State Department 
recommendations, to the White House. Grew pointed out 
signs of Chiang's recent obstinance and suggested that 
American policy needed to be flexible, apparently meaning 
that a less exclusive support of the Generalissimo's 
regime might improve the s i t u a t i o n .50
On March 5, Hurley met with Department officials to 
discuss the report. Hurley raged against the Embassy staff, 
charging that they were acting behind his back, that the
49Davies, ibid., 402-403.
50united States Relations With China, 07-92; Pies, 
The China Tangle, 2&8n.
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Foreign Service Officers were in collusion against him, 
and that his efforts to effect an agreement would have to 
be worked out once again.51
As long as he was Ambassador, Patrick Hurley would 
not stand for reports that offered proposals contrary to 
his approach. Hurley demanded and got George Atcheson, 
along with the staff members who approved the telegram, 
transferred from the Embassy. The groups of Foreign 
Service Officers attached to General Wedemeyer's office 
were removed from China. In a move that appears almost 
vengeful, John Stewart Service was transferred from 
Wedemeyer's staff to the Embassy personnel roster— under 
Hurley's jurisdiction. Needless to say, Service soon 
Joined the others for re-assignment.
The validity of the Ambassador's decision to replace 
Atcheson, for whatever reasons, cannot be denied. The 
Charge'^knew that his telegram would be antithetical to 
Hurley's views and would embarrass the Ambassador while 
he was in Washington, The objection by Hurley was tech­
nically correct, but the Foreign Service Officers' case 
is another question. Davies, Service, Emmerson, Ludden, 
and the others had orders attaching them to the Commanding 
General's staff to do advisory and liaison work in the 
field. Their independent activities and reports would have
S^Feis, ibid., 271.
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helped, but Hurley objected to any activity that did not 
have his prior approval. As Personal Representative,
Hurley worried little about Ambassador Gauss, and his 
independent maneuvers were upheld by President Roosevelt, 
but that was the big difference between Hurley and the 
Foreign Service Officers, a difference that could not be 
resolved. Hurley had Roosevelt's instructions and the 
President's support for his policies and position against 
the State Department.
The Ambassador and the Foreign Service Officers 
both erred in believing that the United States could 
persuade Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists to 
form a coalition. The Generalissimo was not willing to 
yield to a realistic compromise in which he would relin­
quish any of his control, and the Communists would not 
agree to Kuomintang dominance for that very reason. The 
Americans also wrongly viewed the Yenan group as being 
something akin to democrats— an understandable miscalcula­
tion because of the rhetoric about "free enterprise," 
"democracy," and "elections" and possibly because of the 
belief that America's influence on China was salutary 
enough to prompt the Chinese Communists to believe in and 
accept democracy.
While still in Washington, Hurley learned of the Far 
Eastern provisions of the Yalta accord: Russia would enter
the war against Japan; Port Arthur would be leased to the
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Soviet Union; Darien would be internationalized; Russia 
and China would Jointly operate the Chinese Eastern 
Railway; Kurile Island and the southern half of Sakhalin 
Island go to the Soviet Union; status quo would be main­
tained in Outer Mongolia. Hurley was not particularly 
concerned about the protocol’s implication for China's 
sovereignty in Manchuria— what he sought was Russia's 
support for Chiang's government. President Roosevelt 
worried little about the apparent violation of the Open 
Door— he followed the military's advice and agreed to the 
terms in return for Russia's commitment to fight in the 
Par East.
To get Churchill's diplomatic support and to insure 
Russian cooperation in the Par East, Roosevelt sent Hur­
ley back to China by way of London and Moscow. Without 
contrary instructions from the President, Hurley believed 
his mission was to continue the efforts to gain military 
unification and give support to Chiang Kai-shek's regime.
In his side trips. Hurley got British agreement to support 
America's Par Eastern policy and Stalin's commitment to 
unification of the Chinese government under Chiang.
While Hurley was enroute to China, President Pranklin
5 Memorandum by Joseph Ballantine, Director of Office 
of Par Eastern Affairs, March 6, 19^5» FRUS. 19^5, VII; 
260-261; U.S., Cong., Senate, Committee on Poreign Rela­
tions, and Committee on Armed Services, Report on Military 
Situation in the Par East. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 3o6.
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D. Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia. His successor, 
Harry S. Truman, continued Roosevelt's policies toward 
China and supported Hurley in his efforts to arrange a 
unification of the Chinese forces.
Upon his return to Chungking, Hurley felt an agree­
ment would soon be forthcoming once the Communists learned 
of the Russian willingness to treat with the Generalissimo, 
but Hurley once again became perturbed when he learned 
that a recent State Department memorandum recommended the 
arming of Chinese Communist forces if they were directly 
helpful to American plans. These reports buttressed Hur­
ley's personal beliefs that the Par Eastern Office of the 
State Department was disloyal, was conniving against him, 
or at the best, did not know the President's policy toward 
China and the problems of unification. It is possible 
that the Department officials responsible for American 
policy toward China did not know about the White House 
views; evidence throughout this study shows how Roosevelt 
consistently ignored the State Department and regular diplo­
matic channels and no doubt decided on Hurley's instructions 
without prior consultation with the Department. The Am­
bassador informed the Secretary of State that until he re­
ceived different instructions from the President, he would 
pursue the original instructions— to support the Nationalist 
Government.53
53Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 202-208,
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Hurley persisted in his efforts to achieve the 
desired unification and coalition but he could not and 
would not accept the fact that the Chinese opposites were 
Just that— irreconcilable. Nevertheless, Hurley placed 
faith in the Russian influence on the Chinese, believing 
that once the Communists learned of the Soviet position, 
they would strike a bargain. In August 1945, the Sino- 
Soviet accord embodying Russian recognition of the Chiang 
regime became public, prompting Hurley to make further 
efforts to get the negotiating teams together again. Once 
the groups met in Chungking, Mao Tse-Tung called for a 
partitioning of China at the Yangtze River; for the Commu­
nists to be allowed to disarm Japanese troops in parts of 
China; and for status quo on military positions. With a 
possible geo-political division of China into three areas 
controlled by the war lords. Communists, and the Kuomin­
tang; neither Hurley, the President, nor the State De­
partment seriously considered that proposal as a possible 
way out of the Chinese puzzle. By mid-September, with 
increasing reports of armed battles between Nationalist 
and Communist forces, American policy continued to be that 
of supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s government.5^
While mediating the talks. Hurley learned that two 
of the Foreign Service Officers who supposedly conspired
54lbid.. 211-212.
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against him, John Stewart Service and George Atcheson, 
were being assigned to General Douglas MacArthur's Par 
Eastern Command headquarters. They would serve in much 
the same capacity as under Stilwell— political advisers. 
Hurley also read various reports criticizing his efforts 
and suggesting that he should resign. Seeing the appoint­
ment of Service and Atcheson and the newspaper rumors as 
part of an effort to build pressure to remove him. Hurley 
decided to return to Washington to talk with President 
Truman about his position. Hurley not only sought a 
conference with Truman about conditions in China but had 
been giving serious thought to resigning his post. He was 
tired and needed to get away from the physically debilitating 
environs of Chungking to see his family. Moreover, Hurley 
believed he had done a good job, considering all the inter­
fering outsiders, and could now withdraw without appearing 
to be running away from the situation,^5
After he arrived in Washington and heard from Sec­
retary of State James P, Brynes that he had the President’s 
support, along with that of the Secretary, Hurley went to 
his home in New Mexico for rest and to consider Truman’s 
request that he stay in China, Indecisive at first. Hurley 
made up his mind as he read reports of growing conflicts 
between the two forces in China. He also learned that
55lbid,, 213,
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Chinese Communist forces were occupying parts of Manchuria 
while the Russians, in blatant violation of their earlier 
agreements, were preventing Nationalist forces from landing 
at ports in Manchuria. As those activities became public 
knowledge, some newspapers criticized Hurley for supporting 
Chiang Kai-shek and accused him of carrying on activities 
that were contradictory to policy formulated in Washington.
By November 26, Hurley had composed his letter of 
resignation, returned to Washington, and tried to present 
it to Brynes. The Secretary of State refused to accept 
the resignation, saying he would check into Hurley's 
charges that some of his reports were being leaked to the 
press by State Department officials. Later that same day, 
Hurley met with Brynes again and agreed to return to 
Chungking after the Secretary declared that the Department 
would back him and that there was no change in American 
policy toward China.5^
The following day, however. Hurley read of Congress­
man Hugh DeLacy's speech criticizing him for supporting 
Chiang's regime, for dumping Ambassador Clarence Gauss, 
and for engineering the purge of the Foreign Service group. 
Overlooking the fact that DeLacy could draw his information 
from many newspaper and periodical accounts. Hurley again 
saw the conspirators at work in the State Department. He
Ŝ Ibid.
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decided that in spite of Brynes reassurances, he would 
not have the Department’s support if he returned to 
Chungking.57
Shortly after noon on November 27, Hurley resigned 
his Ambassadorial post by releasing his letter of resig­
nation to the press. It described his efforts in China, 
his idea that "the professional foreign service men 
sided with the Chinese Communists to keep China divided 
against itself," and that those officers whom Hurley had 
relieved were now advisers to the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers in Japan and "continued to side with the 
Communist armed party against American policy." Further, 
and in a prescient fashion. Hurley denounced the policy 
of being "sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial 
imperialism against Communist imperialism," a charge that 
later proved to be disastrously accurate for the United 
States in Southeast A s i a . 5®
Most other politicians would consider that an ade­
quate and Just parting shot and would let the issue be 
done— not Hurley. On November 28, he made a speech before 
the National Press Club and again charged the Foreign 
Service Officers with sabotaging his attempts to reach a 
settlement and also of independently changing American 




Foreign Relations Committee hearing and named Atcheson, 
Davies, Service, and Emmerson as part of a "pro-communist, 
pro-imperialist" group responsible for destroying American 
policy in the Far East.^9
In all the public charges. Hurley revealed that he 
was not the kind of man who accepted defeat, easily or any 
other way. He never considered the possibility that he, 
and Franklin Roosevelt for that matter, had been duped or 
had under-estimated the Chinese Communists, Hurley could 
not accept the fact that his personal Judgment of the 
Chinese and Russian leaders needed revising, nor would he 
acknowledge that the Russians had put one over on him. 
Instead, he hurled the invectives which eventually but 
prematurely ended the careers of several Asian experts and 
left Hurley a bitter and disgruntled old man.
The dreary and sad case of Patrick Hurley’s legacy 
as Franklin Roosevelt’s Personal Representative and Am­
bassador to China never really ended— it became more of a 
prologue. The Hurley charges against the State Department 
and the Foreign Service Officers surfaced again at the time 
of the demonic "witch hunts" of Senator Joseph McCarthy 
as the reasons for America’s "loss of China." McCarthy 
used Hurley’s charges to build a national following and win 
another six-year term as United States Senator as he sought
^^United States Relations With China, 581-583.
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out the supposed net of communists, communist sympathizers, 
traitors, or whatever from within the ranks of the Poreign 
Service. The accused, guilty of nothing more in general 
than of advocating a different policy, provided McCarthy, 
who took up where Hurley left off, with the answer for 
America's failure to keep a friendly government in power 
in China and the answer, in McCarthy's eyes, for America's 
power suddenly becoming less than omnipotent— traitors in 
the State Department, The Poreign Service Officers—
John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies, and John Stewart 
Service— were all recipients of McCarthy's venomous attacks, 
and all three were exonerated of the charges of being 
communists or in league with the Communist Party in the 
United States. The Officers were besmirched with the red 
stain, however, and their usefulness as experts in 
American foreign policy was thereafter certainly limited, 
John Carter Vincent retired in 1953; John Paton Davies, 
who underwent eight State Department hearings, all of 
which found him totally loyal, was fired by Secretary of 
State John Poster Dulles in 195^ as a "security risk"; 
in 1969 the Department re-examined Davies' case and granted 
him security clearance; John Stewart Service was dismissed 
from the Poreign Service in 1951 for "reasonable doubt" of 
his loyalty and was then reinstated as a senior foreign 
officer in 1957.^°
^^Buhite. ibid.. 272-273; Davies and Service's
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When the President decided to send Hurley to patch 
up the Stilwell-Chiang split, he also decided to send 
along Donald Nelson— a domestic political liability. The 
former chairman of Sears, Roebuck Company, Nelson had 
joined Roosevelt's administration in 1940 as purchasing 
agent for the National Defense Committee and did a good 
Job in negotiating with consumer goods industries for the 
government but after he became chairman of the War Pro­
duction Board, Nelson came under constant criticism for 
his lack of forcefulness in persuading some industries to 
speed up conversion to wartime production. Finally, in 
June 1944, Nelson violated Roosevelt's political aphorism: 
Do the Job with no adverse publicity which might cost the 
Administration votes and give the Republican Party ammuni­
tion for the next campaign. The trouble started when 
Nelson issued an order permitting production of a few 
previously prohibited items for civilian consumption. The 
military services and the War Manpower Commission opposed 
any cutback in production of military supplies, and 
Charles Wilson, executive vice-chairman of the War
personal views of Sino-American relations are found in 
Davies' Dragon By The Tail, and John Stewart Service,
The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-
China Relations (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies,
1971) ; È.J*. Kahn, Jr., "Foresight, Nightmare, and Hind­
sight," New Yorker, 48 (April 8, 1972), 43-44 discusses 
Service's career; and David Halberstam, The Best and The 
Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972) provides an
account of Davies professional life, the blighting of his 
career, and his life in professional exile.
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Production Board, resigned in protest against Nelson's 
reconversion plan.
Pacing election in November, the President decided 
to send Nelson where he could do the least harm— to China, 
His assignment was to investigate the Chinese economy and 
to evaluate its effect on the war effort. But as is now 
clear to historians, Roosevelt did not need Nelson's 
analysis. He received a steady stream of reports from 
General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss; and Lauchlin 
Currie, in charge of lend lease for China, kept an up-to- 
date status report on the Chinese economy. The instruc­
tions were, in fact, meant to keep Nelson out of the news 
in the United States, to keep him from interfering with 
policy or strategy in China and, as General George Mar­
shall declared, to "'confine himself to selling razor 
blades.'
To the political observers, it was evident that 
President Roosevelt did not select Nelson for his know­
ledge of China or his ability as a statesman. Nelson's 
previous experience as a representative of the United 
States came in October 1943, when he toured some Russian 
industrial locations. He knew little about China, a 
limitation which Roosevelt saw as an asset in this 
particular mission. The businessman's shallow understanding
^^Romanus, and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Pro­
blems , 376-387; Tuchman, Stilwell and China,
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of the Chinese situation appeared in his reports, which 
made no mention of the large parcels of productive land 
being controlled by a few landlords or the deleterious 
effect of the Communist-Nationalist conflict on China's 
economic and political stability. Nelson's personality 
assured the President that his agent would not make 
offensive remarks to the Generalissimo, As chairman of 
the War Production Board, Nelson preferred to negotiate 
and come to terms with other agencies but when he faced a 
demanding official. Nelson tended to be conciliatory and 
generally backed down in his demands for scarce materials.^2
In spite of his reluctance to stand up to competi­
tive administrators, Nelson understood business organiza­
tion and management and knew how to explain it to Chiang 
Kai-shek. After spending nearly three weeks surveying 
Chinese industries around Chungking, Nelson reported his 
findings to the Generalissimo. Nelson's report reflected 
the American businessman's desire for order and stability 
in a national economy, as he denounced the bureaucratic 
obstacles that caused inefficient work practices and 
prevented greater productivity by Chinese industry. Nelson 
proposed dispatching a mission of experts to China— one 
in steel making, one in management of steelworks, two
^^Roosevelt to Nelson, August 18, 1944, President's 
Secretary's Pile: China, 1944, Box 28, PDRL; Tuchman,
Stilwell and China, 479.
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ordinance experts, experts to assist in the repairing of 
Chinese trucks, and alcohol experts to help improve 
methods of distillation and increase the percentage of 
productivity of fuel. For implementation. Nelson produced 
an organizational flow chart showing the establishment of 
seven departments, fourteen subcommittees, and one 
Director; the composite committee to be known as the 
Chinese War Production Board.
To complete his review of China’s economic situa­
tion, Nelson conferred with Chiang Kai-shek on China's 
postwar economic reconstruction. He called for seven 
more American experts . one each in textiles, steel, power, 
banking, consumer goods, export trade, and railroads to 
confer and advise the heads of seven ministries on the 
procedure to establish and regain various markets for 
China. Nelson rejected Chiang's idea for automobile 
factories in China and instead protected Detroit's best 
interest by suggesting that China should build plants for 
assembling American-made parts. Nelson also envisioned 
an eight hundred million dollar dam on the Yangtze River, 
which at completion would speed China's transition into 
an efficient made-in-America industrialized nation, allow 
3,000-ton ships to sail directly to Chungking, control 
flooding, allow irrigation of farms in central China, and 
eventually provide ten million kilowatts of electric 
power for China. Until the development loan was paid off,
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and to carry out the project and manage it. Nelson proposed 
the establishment of a Tennessee Valley Authority type- 
agency in China.
After listening to Nelson, the Generalissimo believed 
he had found another staunch advocate of increased 
American aid to China, as well as a politician who had 
access to the White House. To impress Nelson, finding 
him another pliant American, Chiang asked him to serve 
as Chief Adviser to the Chinese War Production Board, 
adding that if he did not return to China, the situation 
would become hopeless. Again, Chiang used a Presidential 
Representative to turn the situation around and made 
the gesture of following Roosevelt’s suggestion for 
reforming China's economic infrastructure, but in fact he 
agreed to a plan which would only build more centralized 
power for Chiang Kai-shek.
After making his own suggestions for improving the 
Chinese industrial productive sector and finding himself
G3gtettinius to Hull, August 9, 1944, D.S. Pile 
740.0011PW/8-944, NA.; Transcript of Henry Morgenthau- 
Grace Tully conversation, October 27, 1941, Morgenthau 
Diaries, Book 454; 204, PDRL; I.P. Stone. "Nelson vs.
Wilson," The Nation, 159 (September 2, 1944), 259-260; 
Donald Nelson. Arsenal of Democracy (New York; Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, c. 1946), 414; Herman Somers, Presi­
dential Agency: Office of War Mobilization and Reconver­
sion (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1950), 18^-202; 
Richard Polenberg, War and Society. The United States, 
1941-1945 (New Yorkl J. B. Lippincott Company, c. 1972), 
Ti Burns', Roosevelt; Soldier of Preedom, 246.
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unable to refuse the Generalissimo’s flattery. Nelson 
agreed to recommend that he return to China to set up the 
Chinese War Production Board, Donald Nelson had to show 
confidence in his own plan but more likely saw the post as 
a passport by which he could eventually return to a better 
position in Washington.
As Nelson developed the economic plans for China, 
the White House also planned for Nelson's future. Ad­
ministrative assistants Jonathan Daniels and James 
Barnes reminded the President that he must decide about 
Nelson's position on the War Production Board. Roosevelt 
wanted Nelson's resignation but did not push for it prior 
to the trip to China, instead naming Julius Krug as Acting 
Chairman. Now, with the notoriety over the Nelson- 
Wilson feud abating, Roosevelt decided Nelson could resign 
his official post without causing undue publicity for the 
White House. But as James Barnes cautioned. Nelson re­
mained a symbolic leader for American businessmen and had 
many friends in Congress; therefore, "a slight in this 
respect might be politically harmful." Roosevelt would 
handle the matter with his personal, and sometimes over­
bearing, political s t y l e .^5
^Conversations of September 19, 1944 between Presi­
dent Chiang Kai-shek and Donald M. Nelson, D.S. File 
893.00/10-1244, NA.; Eliot Janeway, "The Nelson Impact on 
China," Asia and The Americas, 45 (March, 1945), 123.
65Jonathan Daniels to Roosevelt, September 20, 1944;
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When Nelson returned to Washington in October 1944, 
he agreed to resign his job on the War Production Board, 
but in order to make "a graceful exit from the Govern­
ment," he wanted a job promoting American foreign trade. 
Roosevelt grasped the opportunity, suggested that Nelson 
adhere to Chiang’s request, and then proposed that Nelson 
become "Personal Representative of the President and 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Large of 
the United States of America" to represent and advise 
Roosevelt on economic relations with other nations,
Harry Hopkins agreed that Nelson wanted that type of job 
but warned that such a fancy title could subject the 
President to political criticism. Roosevelt agreed and 
reduced the embellishment to a mere "Personal Representa­
tive to the President."
To further insure that Nelson's resignation would 
not produce adverse political reactions, word "leaked" out 
that the President might have Nelson in mind to succeed 
Jesse Jones as Secretary of Commerce. To complete the 
political charades, Roosevelt empowered Nelson to attend 
Cabinet meetings and then used the White House budget to 
set up a fully equipped and staffed office for Nelson in 
the State Department building.
James M. Barnes to Roosevelt, September 21, 1944, Official 
Pile 2626, PDRL.
6 6 Harry Hopkins to Roosevelt, September 27, 1944;
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Although the President wanted Nelson to appear to 
be important, Roosevelt preferred that he gain publicity 
elsewhere. One week after Roosevelt granted him ex­
officio status for Cabinet meetings. Nelson left on his 
second trip to China. He spent three weeks setting up the 
Chinese War Production Board and then traveled to Australia 
and New Zealand for talks relating to economic cooperation 
between those countries and China. Within a month. Nelson 
returned to Washington, and while Roosevelt could not keep 
him abroad forever. Nelson’s private life saved the 
President further trouble. Divorced in late January 1945, 
Nelson then married his secretary a month later and 
quietly remained in his post until May 1945, when he 
resigned to become President of the Society of Independent 
Movie Producers.^?
The Nelson mission to the Par East met Roosevelt's 
objectives of considerable surface activity by Nelson, 
but it had no impact on basic American policy toward 
China. The War Production Board streamlined the Chinese 
productive effort on paper only, and Nelson’s recommendations
Draft of letter to Donald Nelson from Roosevelt, October 
3, 1944; Jonathan Daniels to Roosevelt, October 6, 1944; 
Hopkins to Roosevelt, October 7, 1944, President’s 
Secretary’s Pile: War Production Board, 1944; Roosevelt
to Nelson, November 2, 1944, Official Pile 5626, PDRL; 
"Best Mission," Time, 44 (December 4, 1944), 18.
^^New York Times, January 20, 1945, 13; Pebruary 9,
1945, 171 May 13, 1945, 3.
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for postwar economic development received little consider­
ation in Washington, The biggest reaction came from the 
State Department, which claimed that any investigation of 
Nelson's proposals should be coordinated and carried out 
by the State Department.
The President's diplomacy toward China mirrored his 
positioning of the Par East in his over-all war plans, his 
understanding of the serious nature of attempting to 
resolve the Nationalist-Communist conflict, and his atti­
tude toward the State Department. His unwillingness to 
commit large numbers of troops and amounts of supplies to 
the China theater shows Roosevelt's fundamental priority 
of channeling the bulk of America's force against the 
Axis powers in Europe. Throughout the war, Roosevelt 
supported Chiang Kai-shek primarily to keep China in the 
war to tie down Japanese forces. Toward the Nationalist- 
Communist conflict, the President had no real policy 
options because the Kuomintang was China's ruling body, and 
Roosevelt clearly recognized the implications of following 
the recommendations to support and arm the Chinese Commu­
nists. American aid to the rebel force against the ex­
pressed wishes of the sovereign ruler would be a dangerous 
policy and might provoke the Generalissimo to consider a 
separate peace with Japan. While the President did send 
Henry Wallace and Donald Nelson to China for his own 
political reasons, Lauchlin Currie and Patrick Hurley's
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missions show the President's deep concern for, and his 
serious efforts to solve, the economic and political 
problems which hindered China's wartime activities and 
which tore at Sino-American relations. Moreover, Roose­
velt tried to develop American policy toward the Par East 
in order to build a more compatible relationship with the 
Soviet Union— a nation which also saw no alternative to 
working with Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Finally, because 
of his personal prejudice against the State Department 
and because their policy proposals were unacceptable, 
Franklin Roosevelt ignored the professional advice as he 
developed policy toward China. Because of his unwilling­
ness to trust the State Department experts, Roosevelt 
caused much of the animosity between his agents and the 
career officers, which appeared to thwart effective 
implementation of policy in China, In fact, the 
Jealousies between the two elements had little impact on 
American policy in the Far East; even if he had used 
State Department personnel to carry out his decisions, 
circumstances within China and Franklin Roosevelt's under­
standing of the situation would have dictated that American 
policy toward China remain the same.
CONCLUSION
In the development and execution of America's wartime 
foreign policy, Pranklin Roosevelt believed that if he 
could meet with other heads of state, he could settle 
mutual problems; however, since the war precluded many 
summit meetings, Roosevelt attempted to exert his personal 
influence through his surrogates. Further, while the war 
was at its most crucial stage, 1941-1943, the President 
used these personal agents in an effort to build morale at 
home and abroad by publicizing the envoys' trips as ex­
amples of cooperation and Allied harmony; thus, the Per­
sonal Representative became the on-stage understudy for 
the President in the diplomatic theater. The resident 
American Ambassador could have been used in many Instances, 
but Roosevelt preferred the splashy, high-sounding 
"Personal Representative of the President of the United 
States." He hoped that by this technique, the foreign 
leader would be impressed by the personal envoy arriving 
directly from the White House. The Ambassador would not 
be acceptable for another reason; Roosevelt's approach to 
foreign policy was influenced to a large degree by domestic 
politics, and he attempted to play to the American voter
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through his personalized handling of American foreign 
policy. At the same time, however, as complicated as was 
the President himself, Roosevelt's motives for using the 
personal agent cannot be so easily delineated and often 
fall into both classifications.
As international problems were, of course, foremost 
In the President's mind, Roosevelt sought to keep the 
Anglo-American-Russian alliance intact by using Harry 
Hopkii , to impress Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin 
with his sincerity and desire to cooperate in winning the 
war. The frail, often ill Hopkins accomplished his main 
objectives on each mission and had more influence on 
American wartime policies than any other envoy. He helped 
set up the lend lease channels between the United States 
and Great Britain, influenced Roosevelt to develop an aid 
program for Russia at a time when some Americans were 
willing to see Germany defeat the Soviet Union, hammered 
out the plans with Churchill for the 1942 invasion of 
Africa and, most important, developed a working relation­
ship with the British Prime Minister which helped cement 
the Anglo-American part of the Grand Alliance.
The President would not think of posting Harry Hop­
kins In London permanently, so he selected the capable 
Averell Harriman to become his on-station symbol for 
Amefican-British cooperation, Roosevelt could have looked 
far before finding another envoy as selfless and dedicated
2iil
as Harriman, whose substantial contribution to maintaining 
a good Anglo-American relationship cannot be overlooked.
The President recognized Harriman's good work and his 
talent, and in 19^3 when he wanted a diplomat to try to 
improve relations with the Soviet Union, he selected 
Harriman to serve as Ambassador.
As to Roosevelt's decision not to follow the same 
practice and send a Personal Representative to Moscow, 
one can only conclude that first, the President placed 
greater priority on cooperation with the British, and 
second, he believed Russian needs could be met by the 
American military mission stationed in the Russian capital. 
As the war progressed, however, and Stalin became upset 
over the Anglo-American failure to initiate a second front, 
Roosevelt tried to mollify the Premier with an almost steady 
flow of Personal Representatives to Russia. Hoping the 
appearance of the personal agents could convey his concern 
and sincere desire for cooperation, Roosevelt dispatched 
Patrick Hurley to tour the Russian military front; at 
other times, he sent Donald Nelson to check on the Soviet 
industrial sector and then Vice-President Henry Wallace to 
inspect Russian agriculture. An early invasion of the 
continent was not possible because of the problem of re­
tooling American industry for wartime production and 
immediate demands that slowed the requisite stockpiling of 
goods for the invasion. Stalin grew increasingly bitter
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because of the President's precipitous promises of a forth­
coming Invasion which were then broken. To try to offset 
the damage, Roosevelt sent Joseph Davies to try to arrange 
a summit meeting of the two leaders so that Roosevelt could 
attempt personally to charm the Soviet leader. Stalin 
received and treated the agents with cordiality and sump­
tuous banquets— but cared more about the arrival of Ameri­
can supplies.
At the same time, Roosevelt did not overlook the 
Asian theater and also used Personal Representative diplo­
macy in an attempt to placate the demanding Generalissimo 
Chiang-Kai-shek. Lauchlin Currie made two trips to the Par 
East, ostensibly to work out details for American financial 
aid to China; yet. Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau's department had earlier negotiated loans to the 
Chinese and could have easily extended the agreement.
Thus, Currie's main objective was not economic aid for 
China, but to present to the Chinese visible proof that 
the President and the American people had not forgotten 
the Par Eastern ally, and to give the Generalissimo a 
sense of participation in the Allied war plans. Roosevelt 
sent other envoys, Wendell Willkie and later Vice-President 
Wallace, to show his truthfully serious concern over the 
Chinese situation. The problems in China did bother Roose­
velt, but his primary concern was with the European 
theater of the war, and as he understood that American
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military power could not be equally effective in both 
areas, his agents to Chungking carried words of encourage­
ment but no promises of substantial increases in material 
aid for China. Because of the Generalissimo's threats of 
a possible separate peace with Japan and because the Stil- 
well-Chiang clash appeared to hamper the war effort, Roose­
velt dispatched Patrick Hurley to Chungking in an attempt 
to settle the problem. Hurley tried and, when faced with 
failure, blamed others, never realizing that neither he 
nor the President could succeed in solving the problem.
At least Roosevelt's efforts did help keep the Chinese in 
the war, tying down large numbers of Japanese troops on the 
Asian mainland.
The coterie of agents gave tl.e American people a 
picture of Pranklin Roosevelt as the non-partisan, wartime 
helmsman of American foreign policy and at the same time, 
allowed him to work to improve his political image at home. 
All of his Personal Representatives' missions had political 
Implications. In 1941, he sent the Republican standard 
bearer, Wendell Willkie, to England to build support for 
lend lease; then, in the late summer of 1943, the Presi­
dent dispatched him to Russia and China to impress those 
nations' leaders with the unified American war effort.
The latter mission, however, had a more important goal for 
Roosevelt; to lessen Willkie's influence as an opposition 
politician. His decision to send Willkie to those countries
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without restraints on the topics of discussion proved 
disastrous for the President, Roosevelt apparently 
believed that Willkie accepted the premise that the trip 
was solely designed to show American wartime unity;
Willkie evidently knew better and did more to raise public 
questions about Roosevelt's foreign policies than would 
have been raised if the President had not sent him on the 
second trip. The other well-known Republican Personal 
Representative, Patrick Hurley, became a regular supporter 
of the President's policies and did a creditable Job of 
carrying out Roosevelt's instructions. The idea that 
Herbert Hoover's prestigious Secretary of War would serve 
as a Personal Representative had considerable appeal, and 
Roosevelt no doubt felt that by using Hurley, he would 
gain additional Republican support for his policies.
Further, Roosevelt probably believed that if a Republican 
was involved in carrying out policies, other members of the 
opposition party would be less likely to attack the ad­
ministration.
The Personal Representative diplomacy also afforded 
the President the means of removing political liabilities 
from the administration without a bitter personal confronta­
tion, and gave him a plausible explanation with which to 
gloss over the damaging questions and publicity which 
followed that type of dismissal. When adverse publicity 
centered on one of his subordinates, Roosevelt called on
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the individual to make a "fact finding" trip to a distant 
country— a euphemistic title which meant for Henry Wallace 
a trip to Siberian farmlands, the confines of Chungking 
for Donald Nelson, and the Middle East for William Bullitt.
In his attempt to maintain party unity and to keep down 
public criticism, Roosevelt used the same technique on 
office holders of lesser importance. Lowell Mellett, 
former newspaperman and public relations worker in the New 
Deal, was head of the Washington branch of the Bureau of 
Motion Pictures, à wartime censoring agency. He came to 
Roosevelt's attention when Congressional opposition to 
his office began to surface and he was subsequently sent 
on a "mission of information" to the Middle East. After 
the publicity died down, and Mellett returned to the United 
States, he became a White House administrative assistant, 
but he operated out of the public's eye.
The dualistic character of Personal Representative 
diplomacy, that is, improving Allied relations while at the 
same time building domestic support for his policies, 
appeared in the missions of Myron Taylor, Louis Johnson, 
William Phillips, and Robert Murphy. Taylor's appointment 
as Personal Representative to the Vatican was designed to 
combine the moral suasion of the White House and the Vatican 
to influence Mussolini to take a less belligerent position; 
then, Roosevelt sent him to gain the Pope's support in 
order to persuade American Catholics to be less vocal in
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their opposition to Roosevelt's plans to aid Russia; and 
finally, in 1942, Taylor traveled abroad in an effort to 
sway Spain and Portugal to take a friendlier stand toward 
the Allies. Roosevelt’s instructions to Taylor to raise 
the snecter of postwar communism with Franco and Salazar, 
and the offer of American economic aid to offset that 
Dossibility was part of the attempt to gain better accomo­
dations with the neutrals. The offer of reconstruction 
aid was used primarily as a wartime levef, but Roosevelt 
also supported it because he saw that policy as a means of 
developing postwar economic stability which would help 
reduce future world tension. In using the Personal Repre­
sentative, the President had the means and opportunities 
to influence foreign governments in an attempt to secure 
inroads for American business interests, but evidence does 
not show that Roosevelt purposely sent agents abroad for 
that goal. The military situation first influenced the 
decision to offer rehabilitative economic aid; then, the 
desire to lay the foundation for an international trade 
system spurred Roosevelt, who considered economic benefits 
for the United States to be secondary to the basic goal of 
winning the war. Indeed, Taylor's representations helped 
mold a good relationship between the President and the Pope, 
and his tactful discussion with Franco and Salazar doubt­
lessly enhanced those neutral leaders' receptivity to 
further Allied overtures for cooperation.
2 4 7
Seeing the political crisis in India, the President 
believed that an American gesture for Indian independence 
might prompt greater Indian support for the Allied cause, 
so he sent Louis Johnson and William Phillips to try to 
alleviate the conflict. Further, the presence of a Presi­
dential Personal Representative would show the American 
people that in addition to the basic military goals, Roose­
velt was actively pursuing the democratic ideals of the 
Atlantic Charter. Louis Johnson, the brusque politician, 
and William Phillips, the skilled diplomat, believed they 
failed in their missions; yet, the President never gave 
them enough power to really pressure the British to move 
toward independence for India. Roosevelt knew the British 
Prime Minister would not yield to American intervention in 
India, and when Churchill showed his personal displeasure 
at the Presidential envoys' meddling, Roosevelt pulled 
his agents out of India and made no further gestures 
toward that region.
At first glance, the President's selection of Robert 
Murphy for the pre-invasion negotiations in Africa appears 
to have been a matter of no choice. Except for the fallen- 
from-grace Bullitt, no New Deal politician had Murphy's 
experience in dealing with the French, nor had any one of 
them traveled as extensively in the French African posses­
sions. Murphy did prove to be a good choice; he saw the 
political value of, and made recommendations for, the
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establishment of an economic trade program with the French 
Africans; he set up an Intelligence gathering network 
and made arrangements with the Vichy representatives in 
Africa, which saved many Allied and French lives at the 
time of the 1942 invasion. But Roosevelt’s opportunistic 
use of the surrogate technique for domestic political 
purposes strongly suggests that he would have selected a 
Foreign Service Officer for that particular mission anyway. 
The severe domestic criticism of Roosevelt’s policies toward 
the Vichy French Government would be expected to swell 
once again when the political arrangements in French Africa 
were revealed. Although a remote factor, the anticipated 
reaction likely prompted the President to pick the pro­
fessional diplomat, thereby allowing Roosevelt to turn 
much of the ensuing criticism away from the White House, 
and toward the State Department.
In his calculated attempt to appeal to the American 
voter, Franklin Roosevelt made a conscious effort to 
restrict the State Department and Foreign Service's role 
in foreign policy. As John Franklin Campbell points out in 
Foreign Affairs Pudge Factory, Roosevelt’s attitude toward 
the State Department reflects a traditional view of public 
service dating back to George Washington’s administration.
In that first cabinet. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton favored the establishment of a durable, energetic 
corps of professional office holders to provide an element
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of continuity In the government, while Thomas Jefferson 
called for frequent changes of office holders, fearful 
that a permanent administrative bureaucracy would develop 
In the executive branch and evolve into a government 
unresponsive to the people's wishes. In 1924, Congress- 
tlonal legislation formally established the Foreign Ser­
vice, but through American history, the Jeffersonian Idea 
has been dominant, and Franklin Roosevelt's thinking proved 
to be no exception to that belief.
The professional diplomat, dedicated to looking at 
Issues from the position of how policy affects the nation's 
Interests and to implementing a President's policies re­
gardless of his party affiliations, did Indeed reflect a 
Hamiltonian Image; a permanent. Intellectually elite 
body, carrying out foreign policy from administration to 
administration without regard for the Impact of policies on 
the public. The career diplomats' aloofness from partisan 
loyalties caused Franklin Roosevelt the Democrat to see the 
Foreign Service as dull, vapid, and manned by reactionary 
officials Incapable of responding to his policies. George 
F. Kennan writes that In addition to his desire for power, 
Roosevelt had little or no understanding of a disciplined 
government organization that was not Interested In domestic 
party politics; thus, the professional diplomatic corps 
would be of little value to Franklin Roosevelt In his 
national political campaigns. Therefore, he embraced and
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perpetuated the popular view of the career diplomats: 
distrust and animosity for the small, talented group of 
non-politicians that did not concern themselves with the 
democratic process, seemed unresponsive to the people's 
demands, and had grown into a closed bureaucracy thereby 
losing touch with the American people. Further, Roosevelt 
feared that if State Department officials were actively 
involved in the decision-making, they would ignore the 
domestic political sector in formulating policies, thus 
causing him additional problems with the voters. Franklin 
Roosevelt Justified his own rejection of the State De­
partment and the Foreign Service by accusing them of being 
just what they were— a group of disinterested specialists—  
and of operating as they were supposed to operate— like 
dedicated enforcers of American foreign policy. Further, 
by adhering to his view of the State Department, Roosevelt 
ignored such highly qualified Foreign Service Officers as 
Llewellyn Thompson, Foy Kohler, Charles Bohlen, George P. 
Kennan, John Paton Davies, and John Carter Vincent. By 
whatever means used to select his personal envoys, Frank­
lin Roosevelt often adhered to the political aphorism that 
an ounce of loyalty is worth more than a pound of brains. 
While he expressed dissatisfaction with the State 
Department because of its archaic and bureaucratic 
machinery, Roosevelt made few gestures to correct the 
supposed ills he so often pointed out. Moreover, while he
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criticized the group, he excluded the Foreign Service 
professionals from any responsible positions for developing 
wartime policy, thereby denying that group an opportunity 
to prove its worth.
The President's method of dealing around the State 
Department meant that all vital information flowed straight 
to the White House, and often no farther. Each time he 
used an agent, Roosevelt reduced the prospects for develop­
ing any body of Presidential strength within the bureaucracy 
outside the White House. With the lack of concentrated 
centers of power at levels beneath the President, State 
Department officials found themselves unable to respond 
to those issues being handled within the confines of the 
White House,
As a result of his exclusive control of foreign 
policy and his unwillingness to defend the Foreign Service 
against its many detractors, Roosevelt's method had a 
demoralizing effect on the group; more important is the 
fact that his attitude had a lasting impact on the public's 
understanding of the State Department. If the President, 
especially Franklin Roosevelt, implied that the State De­
partment was in a bad way, the American people accepted 
and continued to believe it. When Senator Joseph McCarthy 
investigated the "causes for the loss of China," he ulti­
mately directed a barrage of accusations of treason not at 
Roosevelt so much as against the Foreign Service, the group
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that had a minor role in formulating America's wartime 
policies. Roosevelt classed them as reactionary, and 
McCarthy called them communists, but the contradiction 
in terms meant little to some Americans; they remembered 
that the President had complained about the Foreign Service 
Officers, and they applauded as the Senator ferreted the 
supposed elitists and traitors out of the government.
Like Roosevelt, the Senator exploited the popular myth of 
incompetence and immorality within the Department by adding 
the charge of communist infiltration, thereby contributing 
to the deterioration of the professional ranks by driving 
many career officers into early retirement, intimidating 
policy planners, and no doubt causing many bright young 
people to disregard the foreign service as a career.
While their means differed, the two politicians' actions 
had the same deleterious effect of confirming and per­
petuating the public distrust for the State Department 
and the Foreign Service.
Although the President had the constitutional power 
to conduct foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt's person­
alized diplomacy broadened even further the Chief Execu­
tive's dominant position in the making of foreign policy. 
Congress authorized and appropriated monies for the war 
years, confirmed the President's ambassadorial nominees, 
and passed resolutions supporting American participation in 
the United Nations, but in fact the legislative branch had
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little real influence on wartime diplomacy. Franklin 
Roosevelt's close control of foreign policy practically 
eliminated the Congress from maintaining a viable role in 
policy development, reduced the interchange of ideas from 
the legislative branch, and emasculated the Senate’s power 
to advise and consent. Finally, the Personal Representa­
tive method of executing policy, based partly on unavoid­
able military requirements and party on Franklin Roosevelt's 
personal and political motives, set a pattern of growing 
executive supremacy in the development and implementation 
of American foreign policy which has extended to the 
present.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Manuscripts
The Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress 
The Harry Hopkins Papers, Franklin Roosevelt Presidential 
Library, Hyde Park, Mew York 
The Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress 
The Patrick Hurley Papers, Western History Collections, 
Bizzell Memorial Library, University of Oklahoma 
The Henry Morgenthau Diaries, Roosevelt Presidential 
Library
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Presidential 
Library 
Map Room File 
Official File 
President’s Personal File 
President’s Safe File 
President’s Secretary’s File
The Department of State File, National Archives
Government Documents
U.S., Congressional Record. 19^1-19^5.
U.S., Cong. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack. Hearings, part 20. 79 Cong.,
2d Sess., 19^6.
U.S., Cong., Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
Hearings on S. 275, part 3. 77 Cong., 1st Sess.,
w n ~ .
U.S., Cong., Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, and 
Committee on Armed Services. Report on Military 
Situation In the Far East. 82d Ôong., 1st Sess.,
1951.
U.S., Cong., Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
State Department Employees Loyalty Investigations. 
Senate Report 2108, 81 Cong., 2d Sess., 1^50.
U.S., Department of State Bulletin. 19^1-19^5.
254
255
U.S., Department of State. Foreign Relations of the
Tlnitpti States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941: Vol. I:
General, The Soviet Union; II: Europe; III: The
British Commonwealth, The Near East, Africa; IV 
and V: The Par East; 1942: I: General, The
British Commonwealth, The Par East; II and III: 
Europe; IV: The Near East and Africa; China;
1943: I: General; II: Europe; III: The British
Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, The Par East; China; 
1944: I: General; IV: Europe; V: The Near
East, South Asia, Africa, The Par East; 1945:
VII: The Par East: China.
U.S., Denartment of State. Peace and War, 1931-1941. 
Washington: Department of State, 1943.
U.S., Department of State. United States Relations With 
China, 1944-1949. Washington: GÏ>0., 1949.
Books
Acheson, Dean. Present at The Creation. New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, l969.
Barnard, Ellsworth. Wendell Willkie, Pighter Por Freedom. 
Marquette : Northern Michigan University , 1966.
Barnes, Joseph. Willkie. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1952. ,
Barrett, David. Dixie Mission: The United States Army
Observer Group in YennanV Berkeley : Center for
Chinese Studies, 19tO.
Beitzell, Robert. The Uneasy Alliance; America, Britain,
and Russia, 1941-1943. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
W f T ,
Bendiner, Robert. The Riddle of The State Department.
New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942.
Blum, John. Years of Crisis. 1928-1937. vol. 1 of Prom
the Morgenthau Diaries. 3 vols. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1959.
Brown, Norman. The United States and India and Pakistan. 
Cambridge : Harvard University fress, 19&3.
Bryant, Arthur. Turn of the Tide. London: Collins, 1957.
256
Buhlte, Russell D. Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy 
Toward China, 1925-1941% East Lansing; Michigan 
State University Press, 1968,
________ . Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy.
Ithacal Cornell University Press, 1973.
Bullitt, Orville, ed. For The President, Personal and
Secret Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and William C. Êullittl Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1972.
Burns, James M. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1^56.
______ . Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. New York:
ïïârcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970.
Butcher, Harry. My Three Years With Eisenhower. New 
York: Simon and Schuster,
Campbell, John. Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory. New 
York: Basic Books, 1971.
Chamberlin, William. America's Second Crusade. Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co., 1950.
Chennault, Claire. Way of a Fighter. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, "1949.
Chittick, William. State Department. Press, and Pressure 
Groups. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1^70.
Cianfarra, Camille. The Vatican and the War. New York:
E. P. Dutton and Company, 19^4.
Colegrove, Kenneth. The American Senate and World Peace. 
New York: Vanguard Press, 19^4.
Current, Richard. Secretary Stimson: A Study in State-
craft. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1954.
Davies, John P. Dragon By the Tall. New York: W. W.
Norton, 197&.
Davies, Joseph. Mission to Moscow. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1941.
257
Dawson, Raymond. The Decision to Aid Russia. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959.
Dillon, Mary, Wendell Willkie. New York: J, B. Lippin-
cott Company, 1952.
Divine, Robert. Roosevelt and World War II. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. *
______ . Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism
TÏÏ America buring; World War I T . New York:
Atheneum, 1967.
Dobney, Frederick, ed. Selected Papers of Will Clayton. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 197*1.
Falcon!, Carlo. The Silence of Pius XII. Boxton: Little,
Brown and Company, 1965.
Farago, Ladislas. The Game of Foxes. New York: David
McKay Company, 1^71.
Farnsworth, Beatrice. William C. Bullitt and the Soviet
Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.
Feis, Herbert. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 19^?.
________ . The China Tangle. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity ^ress, 19^3.
________ . The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1^50.
Ferrell, Robert. American Diplomacy in the Great De­
pression. New Haven: lale University Press, 1957.
Fischer, Louis. The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign
Relations, 1941-1945. New York; Harper and Row, 
W T T .   --------
Friedel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 3 vols. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 19^2-1956.
Priedlander, Saul. Pius XII and the Third Reich. Trans­
lated by Charles Fallman. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966.
Gaddis, John. The United States and the Origins of the 
Cold War. 19'
Press, 1971.
^_ ^1-1^^?. New York: Columbia University
2 5 8
Graebner, Norman, ed. An Uncertain Tradition; American 
Secretaries of State In the Twentieth Century. New 
York: McGraw-rilll Book Company, I961.
Goodhart, Phlllo. Fifty Ships That Saved the World.
Garden City: Doubleday Co., 1965.
Griffis, Stanton. Lying In State. New York: Doubleday
and Company, 1952.
Gunther, John. Roosevelt In Retrospect. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1950.
Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: 
Random House, 1972.
Halle, Kay, ed. Winston Churchill on America and Britain. 
New York: Walker and Company, 1970.
Hargrove, Erwin. Presidential Leadership. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 19bb.
Hayes, Carlton J. H. Wartime Mission to Spain, 1942- 
1945. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945.
Hess, Gary. America Encounters India, 1941-1947. Balti­
more : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
Hope, A. Guy. America and Swaraj: The U.S. Role In
Indian Independence. Washington: Public Affairs
Press, 1968.
Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.
Ickes, Harold. The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon. New 
York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943.
________ . The Inside Struggle. 1936-1939. and The Lowering
Cloud. 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 vols 2 and 3 of The Secret Diary 
of Harold L. Ickes. New York: Simon and Schuster,
Ï 9 W .
Israel, Fred, ed. The War Diary of Breckinridge Long. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
Johnson, Donald. The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, I960.
Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925-1950. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967.
259
Kimball, Warren, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease,
1939-1941. Baltimore ; Johns Hopkins ^ress, 1969.
Koenig, Louis. The Presidency and the Crisis; Powers of 
the Office Prom the Invasion of̂  Poland to Pearl 
Harbor. New York; King's Crown Press, 1944.
Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War. New York: Random
House, 1968.
Langer, William. Our Vichy Gamble. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1947.
Langer, William, and Gleason, S. Everett. The Undeclared 
War, 1940-1941. New York; Council on foreign 
Relations (Harper and Company), 1953.
Leahy, William. I Was There. New York: Whittlesey
House, 1950.
Lohbeck, Don. Patrick J. Hurley. Chicago, Henry Regnery 
Co., 1956.
Lord, Russell. The Wallaces of Iowa. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co.,
McNeill, William. America, Britain, and Russia: Their
Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-19461 London :
Oxford University Press, 195%.
Moley, Raymond. After Seven Years. New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1^39.
Morlson, Eltlng. Turmoil and Tradition; A Study of the 
Life and T l m ^  of Henry L. Stlirison. Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Company, I960.
Morton, Louis, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 
vol. 2, part 15 of Ünlted States Army In World War 
II. Washington; Department of the Army, 19&2.
Murphy, Robert. Diplomat Among Warriors. Garden City: 
Doubleday and Company, 1964.
Nelson, Donald. Arsenal of Democracy. New York: Har­
court, Brace and Company, 1946.
Neumann, William. After Victory; Churchill, Roosevelt, 
Stalin and the" Making of the Peace. New York: 
Harper and Row, 19671
2 6 0
Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power. New York: Signet
Books, 196%.
Nichols, Peter. The Politics of the Vatican. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 196Ü.
O'Connor, Raymond. Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and
Unconditional Surrender. New York: VT. W. Norton,
1971.
Palmer, Norman. South Asia and United States Policy. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19661
Phillips, William. Ventures in Diplomacy. Boston: The
Beacon Press, 1952.
Polenberg, Richard. War and Society; The United States, 
1941-1945. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company,w r r .—
Pratt, Julius. Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: Cooper
Square, 19W I
Range, Willard. Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order. 
Athens : University of Georgia Press, 1555.
Romanus, Charles, and Sunderland, Riley. Stllwell* s
Mission to China, vol. 9, part 1, United States 
Army in World War II. Washington, Department of 
Army, 1953.
______  . Stllwell's Command Problems, vol. 9, part 2,
HniteT"States Army in World War II. Washington; 
Department of Army, 1956.
Roosevelt, James, and Shalett, Sidney. Affectionately,
FDR. New York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959.
Roosevelt, Elliott. As He Saw It. New York: Duell,
Sloane and Pearce, 1945.
 ., ed. FDR. His Personal Letters. 1928-1945.
Rew York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1950.
Rosenman, Samuel. Working With Roosevelt. New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1952.
Schlesinger, Arthur. Age of Roosevelt. 3 vols. New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957-1960.
2 6 1
Service, John S, The Amerasla Papers; Some Problems in 
the History of US-Chlna Relations. Berkeley;
Center for Chinese Studies, 1971.
Sherwood, Robert. Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 194Ü.
Simpson, Smith. Anatomy of the State Department. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, l^ôH.
Smith, Gaddis. American Diplomacy During World War II.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
Snell, John. Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of 
Global War. 1939-19^5» Boston: koughton Mifflin
Company, 19^3.
Somers, Herman. Presidential Agency; Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion. Cambridge : Harvard
University Press, 1950.
Standley, William, and Ageton, Arthur. Admiral Ambassador 
to Russia. Chicago; Henry Regnery Co., 1955.
Stimson, Henry, and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Duty In
Peace and War. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
Taylor, Myron, ed. Wartime Correspondence Between Presi­
dent Roosevelt~and Pope Plus XIÏ. New York; The 
Macmillan Company, 1947.
Thomas, Lately. When Even Angels Wept. New York:
William Morrow Company, 1^75.
Tsou, Tang. America's Failure In China, 1941-1950.
Chlcagol University of Chicago Press, 19&3.
Tuchman, Barbara, Stllwell and the American Experience 
In China, 1911-19^5. Wew York: Vhe Macmillan
Company, 1970.
Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr., and Morris, Joe. The Private 
Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1$$2.
Wallace, Henry. Soviet Asia Mission. New York: Reynal
and Hitchcock, 1946.
Wedemeyer, Albert. Wedemeyer Reports, New York: Holt
Rinehart and Company, 195b.
262
Wehle, Louis. Hidden Threads of History. New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1953.
Welles, Sumner. Seven Decisions that Shaped History.
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.
________ . The Time for Décision. New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1944.
Where Are We Heading. New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1946.
White, Theodore, ed. The Stilwell Papers. New York:
William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948.
______, and Jacoby, Annalee. Thunder Out of China.
FTew York: William Sloane Associates, 194b.
Willkie, Wendell. One World. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 19431
Wilson, Theodore. The First Summit: Roosevelt and
Churchill at Placentia bay, 1941. Boston; ffouKhton 
Mi’fflin Company! TgS'9.  -----
Wriston, Henry. Executive Agents In American Foreign 
Relations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
Ï 9 W .
Young, Roland. Congressional Politics in the Second World 
War. New York: Columbia University Press, 195b.
Newspapers
New York Times, 1941-1945.
The Times, 1941.
Articles
"Best Mission." Time, 44 (December 4, 1944).
Cowley, Malcolm. "What’s Wrong With State." New 
Republic, 109 (August l6, 1943).
Davies, Joseph. "How Russia Blasted Germany's Spy Machine." 
American Magazine, 32 (December, 1941).
"What We Didn't Know About Russia." Reader's
Digest.40 (March, 1942).
263
Dulles, Poster Rhea, and Rldinger, Gerald. "The Anti-
Colonial Policies of Franklin Roosevelt." Political 
Science Quarterly, 70 (March, 1955).
Franklin, William M, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to 
Berlin." World Politics, l6 (October, 1963).
Frisch, Morton. "Roosevelt cn Peace and Freedom." Journal 
of Politics, 29 (August, 1967).
Hastings, Martin. "United States-Vatican Relations." 
American Catholic Historical Society of Phila­
delphia. 69 (June. l9^ü).
Hopkins, Harry. "The Inside Story of My Meeting With
Stalin." American Magazine, 132 (December, 1941).
Janeway, Eliot. "The Nelson Impact on China." Asia and 
the Americas, 45 (March, 1945).
Kahn, E. J. "Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight." New 
Yorker, 48 (April 8, 1972).
Kirchwey, Freda. "America’s First Quisling." The 
Nation, 155 (November 28, 1942).
"McCormick’s Gas Attack." The Nation, 154
(Way 23, 1942).
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr. "The Morgenthau Diaries; How
F.D.R. Fought the Axis." Colliers, 120 (October 
11, 1947). '
Mosley, Philip E. "The Occupation of Germany." Foreign 
Affairs, 28 (July, 1950).
Pratt, Julius, "The Ordeal of Cordell Hull." Review of 
Politics, 28 (January, 1966).
"Recall Robert Murphy." The New Republic, 108 (February 
1, 1943).
Reynolds, Quentin. "Diplomat on the Spot." Colliers, 112 
(July 24, 1943).
Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic
View." Foreign Affairs, 6 (July, 1928).
Soule, George. "Liberals and the State Department." New 
Republic, 107 (December 14, 1942).
26k
"State Department Appeasers." New Republic, 105 (July 
28, 1941).
Stone, I. P. "Millionaires Club." The Nation. 159 
(December 9, 1944).
"Nelson vs. Wilson." The Nation, 159 (Sep­
tember 2, 1944),
"Washington Notes." The Nation, 154 (May 23, 
1942).
Ullman, Richard. "The Davies Mission and United States-
Sovlet Relations." World Politics. 9 (January, 1957).
"Welles Showdown Spotlights Feud In the State Department." 
Newsweek, 22 (September 6, 1943).

